“Revolution in Thought: A new look at determinism and free will"

[DBT]

Contingency and modal possibility

''In logic, a thing is considered to be possible when it is true in at least one possible world. This means there is a way to imagine a world in which a statement is true and in which its truth does not contradict any other truth in that world. If it were impossible, there would be no way to conceive such a world: the truth of any impossible statement must contradict some other fact in that world. Contingency is not impossible, so a contingent statement is therefore one which is true in at least one possible world. But contingency is also not necessary, so a contingent statement is false in at least one possible world. While contingent statements are false in at least one possible world, possible statements are not also defined this way. Since necessary statements are a kind of possible statement (e.g. 2=2 is possible and necessary), then to define possible statements as 'false in some possible world' is to affect the definition of necessary statements. Since necessary statements are never false in any possible world, then some possible statements are never false in any possible world. So the idea that a statement might ever be false and yet remain an unrealized possibility is entirely reserved to contingent statements alone. While all contingent statements are possible, not all possible statements are contingent''

The above accords exactly with what I have been saying all along,

No doubt. It just doesn't relate all that well with the nature of determinism as it happens to be defined.

 

[pood]

Contingency and modal possibility

''In logic, a thing is considered to be possible when it is true in at least one possible world. This means there is a way to imagine a world in which a statement is true and in which its truth does not contradict any other truth in that world. If it were impossible, there would be no way to conceive such a world: the truth of any impossible statement must contradict some other fact in that world. Contingency is not impossible, so a contingent statement is therefore one which is true in at least one possible world. But contingency is also not necessary, so a contingent statement is false in at least one possible world. While contingent statements are false in at least one possible world, possible statements are not also defined this way. Since necessary statements are a kind of possible statement (e.g. 2=2 is possible and necessary), then to define possible statements as 'false in some possible world' is to affect the definition of necessary statements. Since necessary statements are never false in any possible world, then some possible statements are never false in any possible world. So the idea that a statement might ever be false and yet remain an unrealized possibility is entirely reserved to contingent statements alone. While all contingent statements are possible, not all possible statements are contingent''

The above accords exactly with what I have been saying all along,

No doubt. It just doesn't relate all that well with the nature of determinism as it happens to be defined.

As you define it — hard determinism. I define it as soft determinism.

 

[peacegirl]

Contingency and modal possibility

''In logic, a thing is considered to be possible when it is true in at least one possible world. This means there is a way to imagine a world in which a statement is true and in which its truth does not contradict any other truth in that world. If it were impossible, there would be no way to conceive such a world: the truth of any impossible statement must contradict some other fact in that world. Contingency is not impossible, so a contingent statement is therefore one which is true in at least one possible world. But contingency is also not necessary, so a contingent statement is false in at least one possible world. While contingent statements are false in at least one possible world, possible statements are not also defined this way. Since necessary statements are a kind of possible statement (e.g. 2=2 is possible and necessary), then to define possible statements as 'false in some possible world' is to affect the definition of necessary statements. Since necessary statements are never false in any possible world, then some possible statements are never false in any possible world. So the idea that a statement might ever be false and yet remain an unrealized possibility is entirely reserved to contingent statements alone. While all contingent statements are possible, not all possible statements are contingent''

The above accords exactly with what I have been saying all along,

You are making general statements in order to distinguish contingent from necessary, but this really doesn't relate to the individual movement from moment to moment in the direction of satisfaction. Of course, you can always say that a person could have chosen this instead of that IF HE HAD WANTED TO, but at that moment HE DIDN'T WANT TO, rendering any other choice, an impossibility, a realistic mirage that this possibility could have been chosen. Contingency only means that our decisions are based on what factors or antecedents we take into consideration. This whole argument of Swartz's centers around contingent versus necessary, which does not come close to proving that someone could have done otherwise or why a person was compelled to choose one thing over another. The purpose of contemplation itself is to decide which option is preferable or we wouldn't have this ability, but we have no control over our ultimate choice since it is a compulsion that pushes us in one direction only. We can't help but to move in the direction of what gives us greater satisfaction, which is Life's movement. We don't live in two parallel worlds where another choice, at that exact time and place, could have been made. It is obvious that a person's final choice will be contingent on what considerations he was grappling with to come to a decision. But, once again, to say that his choice, AT THAT MOMENT, could have been other than what it was because contingent truths allow for unrealized possibilities, is categorically false and just failed the litmus test.

 

[DBT]

Contingency and modal possibility

''In logic, a thing is considered to be possible when it is true in at least one possible world. This means there is a way to imagine a world in which a statement is true and in which its truth does not contradict any other truth in that world. If it were impossible, there would be no way to conceive such a world: the truth of any impossible statement must contradict some other fact in that world. Contingency is not impossible, so a contingent statement is therefore one which is true in at least one possible world. But contingency is also not necessary, so a contingent statement is false in at least one possible world. While contingent statements are false in at least one possible world, possible statements are not also defined this way. Since necessary statements are a kind of possible statement (e.g. 2=2 is possible and necessary), then to define possible statements as 'false in some possible world' is to affect the definition of necessary statements. Since necessary statements are never false in any possible world, then some possible statements are never false in any possible world. So the idea that a statement might ever be false and yet remain an unrealized possibility is entirely reserved to contingent statements alone. While all contingent statements are possible, not all possible statements are contingent''

The above accords exactly with what I have been saying all along,

No doubt. It just doesn't relate all that well with the nature of determinism as it happens to be defined.

As you define it — hard determinism. I define it as soft determinism.

As compatibilists define it.

The given definition of determinism is not being disputed. I don't dispute it. To me it's just a question of whether the idea of free will as defined by compatibilists is compatible with their own definition of determinism, which I don't dispute.

Given the terms of their definition of free will, it may appear to be compatible with determinism, but is it a valid definition of free will?

That is the question, and the point of contention between compatibilism and incompatibilism.

 

[peacegirl]

Contingency and modal possibility

''In logic, a thing is considered to be possible when it is true in at least one possible world. This means there is a way to imagine a world in which a statement is true and in which its truth does not contradict any other truth in that world. If it were impossible, there would be no way to conceive such a world: the truth of any impossible statement must contradict some other fact in that world. Contingency is not impossible, so a contingent statement is therefore one which is true in at least one possible world. But contingency is also not necessary, so a contingent statement is false in at least one possible world. While contingent statements are false in at least one possible world, possible statements are not also defined this way. Since necessary statements are a kind of possible statement (e.g. 2=2 is possible and necessary), then to define possible statements as 'false in some possible world' is to affect the definition of necessary statements. Since necessary statements are never false in any possible world, then some possible statements are never false in any possible world. So the idea that a statement might ever be false and yet remain an unrealized possibility is entirely reserved to contingent statements alone. While all contingent statements are possible, not all possible statements are contingent''

The above accords exactly with what I have been saying all along,

No doubt. It just doesn't relate all that well with the nature of determinism as it happens to be defined.

As you define it — hard determinism. I define it as soft determinism.

As compatibilists define it.

The given definition of determinism is not being disputed. I don't dispute it. To me it's just a question of whether the idea of free will as defined by compatibilists is compatible with their own definition of determinism, which I don't dispute.

Given the terms of their definition of free will, it may appear to be compatible with determinism, but is it a valid definition of free will?

That is the question, and the point of contention between compatibilism and incompatibilism.

Yes, as they define it, but definitions mean nothing where reality is concerned. Absolutely nothing. The definition of free will does not allow for this believed compatibility, if you carefully analyze it. If compatibilists were honest, they would not try to make it appear as if these two opposite ideologies were at all compatible because they are not, if you are thinking rationally. It's like saying we have free will and we don't have free will at the same time. One would cancel the other out. It's amazing to me how people don't get this. This IS trickery and people fall for it.

 

[DBT]

Whether compatibalism fails or not still doesn’t relate to 'light at the eye/instant vision,' transforming human nature or achieving world peace.

 

[peacegirl]

Whether compatibalism fails or not still doesn’t relate to 'light at the eye/instant vision,' transforming human nature or achieving world peace.

DBT, these are two different discoveries. His second discovery does play a part, but it's not the one that will prevent that for which blame and punishment were previously necessary. This is the two-sided equation, which people are either overlooking or handwaving away.

 

[BSilvEsq]

Contingency and modal possibility

''In logic, a thing is considered to be possible when it is true in at least one possible world. This means there is a way to imagine a world in which a statement is true and in which its truth does not contradict any other truth in that world. If it were impossible, there would be no way to conceive such a world: the truth of any impossible statement must contradict some other fact in that world. Contingency is not impossible, so a contingent statement is therefore one which is true in at least one possible world. But contingency is also not necessary, so a contingent statement is false in at least one possible world. While contingent statements are false in at least one possible world, possible statements are not also defined this way. Since necessary statements are a kind of possible statement (e.g. 2=2 is possible and necessary), then to define possible statements as 'false in some possible world' is to affect the definition of necessary statements. Since necessary statements are never false in any possible world, then some possible statements are never false in any possible world. So the idea that a statement might ever be false and yet remain an unrealized possibility is entirely reserved to contingent statements alone. While all contingent statements are possible, not all possible statements are contingent''

The above accords exactly with what I have been saying all along,

No doubt. It just doesn't relate all that well with the nature of determinism as it happens to be defined.

As you define it — hard determinism. I define it as soft determinism.

As compatibilists define it.

The given definition of determinism is not being disputed. I don't dispute it. To me it's just a question of whether the idea of free will as defined by compatibilists is compatible with their own definition of determinism, which I don't dispute.

Given the terms of their definition of free will, it may appear to be compatible with determinism, but is it a valid definition of free will?

That is the question, and the point of contention between compatibilism and incompatibilism.

Yes, as they define it, but definitions mean nothing where reality is concerned. Absolutely nothing. The definition of free will does not allow for this believed compatibility, if you carefully analyze it. If compatibilists were honest, they would not try to make it appear as if these two opposite ideologies were at all compatible because they are not, if you are thinking rationally. It's like saying we have free will and we don't have free will at the same time. One would cancel the other out. It's amazing to me how people don't get this. This IS trickery and people fall for it.

Free Will either exists or it does not exist. The same is true of Determinism. The two cannot, however, co-exist.

Compatibilism is an illogical, but understandable, construct that is embraced by either (i) people who lack Free Will and are compelled to embrace Compatibilism despite its illogical underpinnings, or (ii) people who have Free Will and mistakenly believe that Determinism rules the universe.

Determinism posits that all activity in the universe is both (i) the effect of [all] antecedent activity, and (ii) the only activity that can occur given the antecedent activity. That is what is meant by saying that everything is “determined” (or “pre-determined”) — it is the inexorable consequence of activity that preceded it. In a wholly deterministic universe, everything that has ever occurred, is occurring, and will occur since the universe came into existence (however that might have occurred) can only occur exactly as it has occurred, is occurring, or will occur, and cannot possibly occur in any different manner. This mandated activity necessarily includes all human action, including all human cognition.

As I understand the notion of Free Will, it posits that a human being, when presented with more than one course of action, has the freedom or agency to choose between or among the alternatives, and that the state of affairs that exists in the universe immediately prior to the putative exercise of that freedom of choice does not eliminate all but one option and compel the selection of only one of the available options.

Based on the foregoing:

1. If Determinism is true (i.e., the universe is truly and entirely deterministic), then humans lack Free Will because the truth of Determinism means that (a) humans lack the ability to think in a manner that is not 100% caused by prior activity that is outside of their control, as human cognition is simply a form of activity that is governed by Determinism, and (b) there are no such thing as true “options” or “alternatives” because there is one, and only one, activity that can ever occur at any given instant; and
   
   
2. If Free-Will exists in its pure form, then Determinism is not true because the existence of Free Will in its pure form depends upon (a) the existence of true “options” or “alternatives,” and (b) humans being capable of thinking (and acting) in a manner that is not 100% caused by prior activity that is outside their control.

As I understand Determinism and Free Will, they are irreconcilably incompatible unless (i) Determinism is defined to exclude human cognition from the inexorable path of causation forged through the universe long before human beings came into existence, and/or (ii) Free Will is defined to be include the illusion of human cognition that is a part of the path of Determinism.

As William James aptly observed:

“The issue . . . is a perfectly sharp one, which no eulogistic terminology can smear over or wipe out. The truth must lie with one side or the other, and its lying with one side makes the other false.”

I could write many pages describing the varied attempts of by Compatibilists to harmonize the irreconcilable concepts of Determinism and Free Will, but it is unnecessary for me to do so, as there is an excellent discussion of this subject on-line at Compatibilism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). It should suffice to say that none of the various arguments for Compatibilism courageously presented on the Stanford website is satisfying, and all suffer from the same flaw identified above — namely, a stubborn refusal to come to grips with the true and complete nature of Determinism and Free Will. Or, as William James less generously observed, all efforts to harmonize Determinism and Free Will are a “quagmire of evasion.”

Notwithstanding the foregoing, if people do, in fact, lack Free Will, then the true and only reason that anyone believes in Compatibilism is because that is what such people are compelled to believe by forces outside of their non-existent control. By the same token, if Free Will does exist, then the people who freely choose to believe in Compatibilism do so based on the mistaken belief that Determinism is true, combined with an emotion-driven irrational effort to harmonize their mistaken belief in Determinism with their psychological desire to believe (correctly) in their own Free Will.

Peace Out

 

[bilby]

Well, every determinist behaves like a compatibilist, which is good enough for me - it's obvious that determinists can't bring themselves to believe their own position, so it would be strange for me to be persuaded by it.

 

[pood]

The universe at bottom is quantum indeterministic, so there is that.

 

[pood]

@BSilvEsq is conflating pre-determinism with determinism. They are not the same thing.

It is ludicrous to imagine that the Big Bang has the ability to write symphonies, create works of art, or erect magnificent buildings. Humans do that by choosing among alternatives.

Humans are part of the deterministic process.

 

[BSilvEsq]

The universe at bottom is quantum indeterministic, so there is that.

Quantum Theory does not disprove that the universe is truly and entirely deterministic.

At most, Quantum Theory posits that certain activity of the universe is incapable of being predicted with certainty at a quantum level, and even then I would argue that Quantum Theory posits no more than that humans have been unable to devise a way to make such predictions and may be incapable of doing so despite the best of efforts. The truth of determinism does not depend upon human (or even divine) capacity to predict activity or even the capacity to observe the complete mosaic of causation, which is nearly infinite in its depth and breadth.

I have discussed this at length in “Quantum Mechanics does not undermine, much less falsify, Causal Determinism,” which can be read at https://qr.ae/pGzUoy.

 

[pood]

The universe at bottom is quantum indeterministic, so there is that.

Quantum Theory does not disprove that the universe is truly and entirely deterministic.

At most, Quantum Theory posits that certain activity of the universe is incapable of being predicted with certainty at a quantum level, and even then I would argue that Quantum Theory posits no more than that humans have been unable to devise a way to make such predictions and may be incapable of doing so despite the best of efforts. The truth of determinism does not depend upon human (or even divine) capacity to predict activity or even the capacity to observe the complete mosaic of causation, which is nearly infinite in its depth and breadth.

I have discussed this at length in “Quantum Mechanics does not undermine, much less falsify, Causal Determinism,” which can be read at https://qr.ae/pGzUoy.

Our best understanding of quantum theory is that it is fundamentally indeterministic — indeterministic as an ontology not an epistemology. IOW there are no hidden variables that would make QM deterministic if only we knew them.

 

[BSilvEsq]

@BSilvEsq is conflating pre-determinism with determinism. They are not the same thing.

It is ludicrous to imagine that the Big Bang has the ability to write symphonies, create works of art, or erect magnificent buildings. Humans do that by choosing among alternatives.

Humans are part of the deterministic process.

OK. I get it. You believe in free will -- either because you freely choose to have that belief or because that is the belief you are caused to have by antecedent activity that dates back to the beginning of time.

I am not conflating pre-determinism with determinism. I am applying a definition of Causal Determinism that is well accepted in the philosophy community. As I stated in my prior post:

Determinism posits that all activity in the universe is both (i) the effect of [all] antecedent activity, and (ii) the only activity that can occur given the antecedent activity. That is what is meant by saying that everything is “determined” (or “pre-determined”) — it is the inexorable consequence of activity that preceded it. In a wholly deterministic universe, everything that has ever occurred, is occurring, and will occur since the universe came into existence (however that might have occurred) can only occur exactly as it has occurred, is occurring, or will occur, and cannot possibly occur in any different manner. This mandated activity necessarily includes all human action, including all human cognition.

To that I will add the following:

A great number of discussions of Causal Determinism explicitly or implicitly assume that a combination of perfect information about the past and perfect information about the present instant would, necessarily, permit a perfect prediction of the future if the universe is truly and entirely deterministic. Personally, I reject that predictability is an aspect of Causal Determinism. As I understand it, Causal Determinism posits only that everything has a cause and cannot occur in any manner other than how it does occur — without regard to the ability to predict or replicate that activity. Causal Determinism does not posit that the factors that have caused, are causing, or will cause any particular activity can be known or understood, or that any specific future activity can be predicted with any degree of certainty. Indeed, if the tenets of Determinism are taken to their logical conclusion, Determinism, itself, makes it impossible to know how the totality of all prior activity will interact to cause the next occurrence of activity, because the totality of all prior activity has never before coalesced.

To be clear, in philosophy (as contrasted with theology), "pre-determined" does not mean that a deity or other conscious, intelligent, deliberate or purposeful entity or force has made a decision to impose a certain future. Rather, the term simply means that all past activity (which most folks agree to be fixed and unchangeable after the fact) inexorably causes all future activity, thereby rendering the future activity to be as fixed and unchangeable as the past activity. As stated by Karl Popper:

“The metaphysical doctrine of determinism simply asserts that all events in this world are fixed, or unalterable, or predetermined. It does not assert that they are known to anybody, or predictable by scientific means. But it asserts that the future is as little changeable as is the past. Everybody knows what we mean when we say that the past cannot be changed. It is in precisely the same sense that the future cannot be changed, according to metaphysical determinism.”

You state:

"It is ludicrous to imagine that the Big Bang has the ability to write symphonies, create works of art, or erect magnificent buildings."

Ludicrous is a strong word and one that does not belong in philosophical debate. Causal Determinism is a metaphysical paradigm that is both robust and internally consistent. If the tenets of Causal Determinism are accepted, it logically follows that the Big Bang (if that was, in fact, the beginning of all activity in the universe) was the originating cause of all symphonies, works of art, and magnificent buildings. In fact, accepting Causal Determinism as true, and further accepting that the Bog Bang was the first cause, the Big Bang wrote this post and your post, created this website, and is causally responsible for everything that has occurred since the Big Bang -- and in a way that everything that thereafter occurred was inexorable and the only thing that could occur even before it did so.

You may believe that it is ludicrous to imagine such a complex and immovable chain of events, but Albert Einstein not only imagined the same thing, but he contended that he could prove it theoretically, and many other great minds of the past have shared that belief, as exemplified by the following quotes:

“Human beings in their thinking, feeling and acting are not free but are as causally bound as the stars in their motions.” – Albert Einstein

“There are no accidents in my philosophy. Every effect must have its cause. The past is the cause of the present, and the present will be the cause of the future. All these are endless links in the chain stretching from the finite to the infinite.” – Abraham Lincoln

“In historical events great men-so called-are but the labels that serve to give a name to an event, and like labels, they have the last possible connection with the event itself. Every action of theirs, that seems to them an act of their own free will, is in an historical sense not free at all, but in bondage to the whole course of previous history, and predestined from all eternity.” – Leo Tolstoy

“Future is predestined and unchangeable.” – Vivake Pathak

“The future is certain. It is just not known.” – Johnny Rich

“The fate of one individual invariably fits the fate of the other and each is the hero of his own drama while simultaneously figuring in a drama foreign to him—this is something that surpasses our powers of comprehension, and can only be conceived as possible by virtue of the most wonderful pre-established harmony.” – Arthur Schopenhauer

“Things could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no other order than they have been produced.” – Baruch Spinoza [Note: Spinoza's "god" was the universe, itself, and not the Abrahamic god of his ancestors]

I also find the following instructive:

“Man is a masterpiece of creation if for no other reason than that, all the weight of evidence for determinism notwithstanding, he believes he has free will.” – Georg Lichtenberg

“The first dogma which I came to disbelieve was that of free will. It seemed to me that all notions of matter were determined by the laws of dynamics and could not therefore be influenced by human wills.” – Bertrand Russell

“The deep-rooted belief in the psychic freedom and choice is absolutely not scientific and should give a way to the assertions of determinism, which controls mental life.” – Sigmund Freud

“Free will is the ability to do gladly that which I must do.” – Carl Jung

Lastly, one of the best, and most poetic, statements of Determinism can be found in the Rubā‘iyyāt of Omar Khayyám (written in the 12th Century), which contain the following verse:

With Earth’s first Clay They did the Last Man knead,
And there of the Last Harvest sow'd the Seed:
And the first Morning of Creation wrote
What the Last Dawn of Reckoning shall read.

You end with the following assertion: "Humans do that [i.e., write symphonies, create works of art, and erect magnificent building] by choosing among alternatives."

If humans do have free will, and are not meat puppets of the universe, then you are 100% correct, and Causal Determinism is a false construct. By the same token, if the universe is truly and entirely deterministic, then your statement (whatever "your" might mean in a deterministic universe) would be false -- albeit compelled by the universe in an ironic form of self-contradiction.

We all know that a computer or robot can be programmed to assert that it “believes” something and even can "feel" something, even though it does not. How does anyone know that their perceived beliefs and feelings are real and not programmed, imagined or otherwise illusory -- "determined" (or "pre-determined") by antecedent activity of the universe going back to the Big Bang (or beyond).? After all, a person who is truly delusional has faith that he or she has a grip on reality, and has no ability to recognize that the delusion is not real.

In “2001: A Space Odyssey,” the main character, Dave, is interviewed by a BBC reporter about HAL, the super-computer that helps to operate the spaceship. When the reporter asks Dave if he believes that HAL is capable of emotional feelings, Dave responds: "Well, he acts like he has genuine emotions. Um, of course he's programmed that way to make it easier for us to talk to him, but as to whether or not he has real feelings is something I don't think anyone can truthfully answer."

The same may be true of human perception of free will. If Causal Determinism is true, Free Will is an illusion, as is the very act of perception. If Free Will does, in fact, exist, it exists without regard to whether it is perceived to exist. And, if Free Will does not exist, the mere fact that it might be perceived to exist does not make it so.

Unfortunately, there is no way to prove whether Causal Determinism is true or false — as I have attempted to explain (or as I have been caused to attempt to explain) at Does quantum mechanics undermine hard determinism? Accordingly, inasmuch as the truth of Causal Determinism precludes the existence of Free Will, the inability to falsify Causal Determinism forecloses the ability to prove the existence of Free Will — as explained at Is there really anything as free will?

Notwithstanding my belief in and acceptance of a lack of Free Will, I continue to live my life in the same manner as I lived it before adopting that belief — still seemingly making choices “as if” I had Free Will, and I suppose I will continue to do so unless and until I am caused to act otherwise. In that regard, I note that Albert Einstein is quoted as having said: “I am compelled to act as if free will existed, because if I wish to live in a civilized society I must act responsibly. . . I know that philosophically a murderer is not responsible for his crime, but I prefer not to take tea with him.”

 

[BSilvEsq]

The universe at bottom is quantum indeterministic, so there is that.

Quantum Theory does not disprove that the universe is truly and entirely deterministic.

At most, Quantum Theory posits that certain activity of the universe is incapable of being predicted with certainty at a quantum level, and even then I would argue that Quantum Theory posits no more than that humans have been unable to devise a way to make such predictions and may be incapable of doing so despite the best of efforts. The truth of determinism does not depend upon human (or even divine) capacity to predict activity or even the capacity to observe the complete mosaic of causation, which is nearly infinite in its depth and breadth.

I have discussed this at length in “Quantum Mechanics does not undermine, much less falsify, Causal Determinism,” which can be read at https://qr.ae/pGzUoy.

Our best understanding of quantum theory is that it is fundamentally indeterministic — indeterministic as an ontology not an epistemology. IOW there are no hidden variables that would make QM deterministic if only we knew them.

I suppose we will just have to agree to disagree on what the "best" understanding is, as the best minds in physics have disagreed on the point you assert since Quantum Theory was first articulated. Moreover, even the best collective understanding of human beings is no more than that -- a collective "understanding" of a paradigm that, itself, is an imperfect human metaphor for reality (to the extent there is such a thing). As I have written elsewhere, no informed and open minded person believes that any human paradigm is correct. Rather, the best that can be hoped for a paradigm is that it best reflects the current state of an ever-evolving human understanding of matters beyond the grasp of human detection.

As I see things, there are no true “laws” of physics. There are simply principles that the authors of the story of physics find sufficiently robust to be compelling based on the current state of knowledge. New knowledge that is consistent with the paradigm, but somewhat different from some aspect of the paradigm, causes the paradigm to be revised to accommodate the new knowledge. Other new knowledge is so inconsistent with an existing paradigm so as to require its abandonment in favor of a new paradigm that accounts for all that is known.

Physics, itself, was born out of an informational revolution that caused many people to abandon prior mythology. In relatively recent past, physicists have taken a quantum leap in their beliefs, causing the physics paradigm to be reshaped. Some physicists, however, are unpersuaded by the new story and remain attached to Newtonian physics (which is purely deterministic).

As we continue to evolve, we develop new and greater information (or, possibly, build on our grand illusion). If the evolution of new information is sufficiently great it leads to revolution in which the most robust current paradigm is abandoned and relegated to the history books. In that regard, it seems more likely than not that there will come a time when today's modern physics will be viewed as a step between ancient mythology and some yet-to-be written story of the universe, which will, in turn, yield to yet a new and broader story.

 

[steve_bank]

The word indeterminate is contextual.

At the quantum scale phenomena are modeled as probabilistic . Statically predicable.

Did you watch the World Series? Great game 7.

A player has a batting average of 0.250. You can not predict exactly which at bat he will get on base, but statistically he will 25% of the time.

Roll a fair die and the number 2 will cone up 1/6 of the time, but you don't know what each roll will be.

A radioactive material has a probability of emitting a particle, but you don't know exactly when.

There is nothing mysterious about phenomena appearing statistical to us.

An atom is always in a physical sate at any point in time.

 

[pood]

Good Zod, what an onslaught of quotes! Albert Einstein! Abraham Lincoln! Leo Tolstoy! And more!

Yeah, not sure I want to wade into these waters again. Maybe I will. But I have said my piece repeatedly. We’ll see.

 

[pood]

Just one quick point, which I have made many times before: the fixity of the future, as much as of the past, does not invalidate free will.

 

[pood]

It seems a common misperception is that free will requires the ability to change something. It does not. It just means you play your small part in freely making the past, present and future be what it was, what it is, and what will be.

I can well imagine that the future is as fixed as the past under the Minkowski block world. If so, it just means my future temporal parts are freely doing their bit to instantiate the future.

 

[BSilvEsq]

The word indeterminate is contextual.

At the quantum scale phenomena are modeled as probabilistic . Statically predicable.

Did you watch the World Series? Great game 7.

A player has a batting average of 0.250. You can not predict exactly which at bat he will get on base, but statistically he will 25% of the time.

Roll a fair die and the number 2 will cone up 1/6 of the time, but you don't know what each roll will be.

A radioactive material has a probability of emitting a particle, but you don't know exactly when.

There is nothing mysterious about phenomena appearing statistical to us.

An atom is always in a physical sate at any point in time.

Everything you have written is about the ability if humans to make predictions of the future, and nothing about whether the future is fixed or capable of alternatives. You are injecting a requirement of human predictability into a metaphysical construct that has no such requirement.

If all you are saying is that Quantum Theory teaches that there are many activities of the universe that are beyond the ability of humans to predict with certainty, and that the best that can be accomplished is a probabilistic model, then I fully agree with your post. If, however, you are saying that quantum theory disproves determinism, I disagree -- as does Einstein and many other respected physicists.

And, I did watch the WS last night. I am a lifelong Phillies fan. I moved to Malibu over a decade ago, and I have adopted the Dodgers (except when they are in competition with the Phillies). When the Dodgers won last night, it felt to me like the Dodgers avenged the 1993 Phillies and lifted that heavy loss from my shoulders. Go Dodgers -- 3Peat in 2026. Of course, the the 2026 WS has already been won by whoever is determined to win it, and we are just waiting to see that chain of causation play out. As Soren Kierkegaard wrote, "Life must be lived forward but understood backwards."