Eliminating Qualia

[Elixir]

Facebook just revealed at its F8 conference that the company has had 60 engineers working on a brain-computer interface that will let you type words merely by thinking them.

The thinking is what pushes the machine.

The mind.

If one understands what is happening in front of them they know nothing can be proven in this forum.

All that can happen is people can present ideas and discuss them. Nothing can be proven by anyone. Not one thing.

Evidence (something a mind experiences) can be presented.

But it is insanity to ask for evidence that a mind experiences. It is asking for something to experience.

I bet you think that's profound. Did it come from your mind? If so, what is the "you" that possesses said mind?
(Hint: it's a sack of biochemicals)

 

[untermensche]

Of course it came from my mind.

That is where everything you read here came from.

Some mind.

What a mind is is not understood by you.

Not by a long shot.

You have some prejudices. Nothing else.

But if a mind can experience presentations created by a brain it too is likely a creation of the brain.

A brain has no use of presentations. It has created them so it understood what they were before they existed.

Only an experiencing mind has need of presentations.

And that is what they get all day long.

Nothing but subjective experiences.

 

[Elixir]

Of course it came from my mind.

Bold added. What is the "you" that has this so-called "mind"?
You didn't answer.

 

[untermensche]

Of course it came from my mind.

Bold added. What is the "you" that has this so-called "mind"?
You didn't answer.

Figure of speech.

It came from me.

I am a mind.

You are a mind with the experience of a body typing on a computer and so am I.

 

[skepticalbip]

Of course it came from my mind.

Bold added. What is the "you" that has this so-called "mind"?
You didn't answer.

UM is quite confused as evidenced by his answer below, "You are a mind with the experience of a body typing on a computer and so am I".

He sees no self contradiction in both seeing you as an individual being (mind), separate from his mind, communicating with him and you being a figment of his imagination.

 

[ryan]

At least accept that there is a property of being observable and another property of being able to observe.

...the known/observed and the unknown/unobserved are reminders that there at least 2 essential properties in nature. We start with the known/observed and we assume there exists the unknown/unobserved somewhere out there. I will tentatively say that the mind is the observed/known.

Just to chip in.....

I get the vague feeling that saying the above sorts of things has the effect of, 'automatically' defining the world as if there is duality, so I'd be vaguely concerned about some sort of 'assuming conclusions' pitfall. I know you're adding caveats, and not yet positing this or that sort of duality.

I guess I'm not sure your two types of property aren't in some way...arbitrary. I guess this has something to do with what a 'property' is, or what a 'separate property' or an 'essential property' is.

Also, I'm not sure what the two are. I was a bit surprised to see you allocating 'mind' to the 'observed/known'.

I like property dualism, and here's why.

There is the property of the mind, and there is everything else within, perhaps only one kind of substance, namely matter/energy. All we really have to do is find at least one other property of this substance that isn't a product of the mind (where the conception of matter/energy exists); in other words I will try to escape idealism. A way to do this is to think about the mind as the ability to observe objects. These objects, though, must be observable. The property of being observable is not part of the typical definition of the mind, so we know that it is not just a product of the mind. It must be something else entirely.

I came to the need for a second kind of general property. I have been explaining them as the observable and the observer.

Sound similar-ish to the experiencer/experienced thing taxonomy we've been hearing about a lot in the thread?

A couple years ago I was stuck on idealism. And I think I remember Untermensche saying something like experiencer/experienced, which made sense and still does. It's a good way to exemplify property dualism.

Of course I can't use experience/experiencer to argue for the mind since "experience" usually implies qualia/mind thus begging the question. But "observe" seems a little more universally acceptable, especially for science.

 

[Treedbear]

...
I like property dualism, and here's why.

There is the property of the mind, and there is everything else within, perhaps only one kind of substance, namely matter/energy. All we really have to do is find at least one other property of this substance that isn't a product of the mind (where the conception of matter/energy exists); in other words I will try to escape idealism. A way to do this is to think about the mind as the ability to observe objects. These objects, though, must be observable. The property of being observable is not part of the typical definition of the mind, so we know that it is not just a product of the mind. It must be something else entirely. ...

I don't see property dualism as having any advantage over any other kind of dualism. It seems to just isolate the problem as something that needs no further explanation. A lot like God, if you'll excuse the analogy. An uncaused cause. Or dark matter in astrophysics, except that at least the name dark matter alludes to an observable effect. But the hard problem remains. You still need to explain the mechanism for conscious awareness (or qualia, or mind as you call it). In its simplest form: why does the color red "just so happen" to appear the way it does? I'm all for simplifying the problem, but one must admit it's incomplete.

 

[untermensche]

He sees no self contradiction in both seeing you as an individual being (mind), separate from his mind, communicating with him and you being a figment of his imagination.

I have never once said I think other people are a figment of my imagination.

They are something I experience. Not something I imagine.

I have no idea if they are more than an experience. I believe they are.

No human can know if their experiences are more than experiences.

 

[ruby sparks]

I’m absolutely certain that everyone here has a different thing in mind when they use the word mind.

I’m with Ryle. Once we have a multimodal catalog of all m and p states, mind will not be one of them anymore than you can find society or university.

Ok, obviously, I don't understand that.

But I hear Ryle was a behaviourist, or at least called that, which is not the same thing.

As to what behaviourism is in any case, I am not up to speed.

However, I will chance saying this, I'm not all that bothered to try to find a particularly specific location for mind. My guess is it's here and there, probably but not entirely inside my skull. Possibly smeared.

 

[ruby sparks]

That’s easy. Thinking on words really is just talking with the speech production out of gear. That’s a nice serial signal at certain places in the brain. Possible but not close. The public side of the brain is easy. The private side practically impossible.

Now I'm not following you again.

These decoders also (it seems) work on pictures. And even the letters are arguably just shapes. Possibly they are not functioning as language as such.

So, if I am having a private, wordless experience in my imagination of, say, a green field under a blue sky, possibly with a naked teenage elfess sprawled in the foreground, and some sort of decoder can tell that, and put it on a screen, in an auditorium full of people maybe, then how is that not my private side (specifically my embarrassing elf fantasies) being made public?

 

[ruby sparks]

There is the property of the mind, and there is everything else within, perhaps only one kind of substance, namely matter/energy. All we really have to do is find at least one other property of this substance that isn't a product of the mind (where the conception of matter/energy exists); in other words I will try to escape idealism. A way to do this is to think about the mind as the ability to observe objects. These objects, though, must be observable. The property of being observable is not part of the typical definition of the mind, so we know that it is not just a product of the mind. It must be something else entirely.

I'm going to admit I don't understand that at all.

But I would be interested in an elaboration.

 

[ryan]

...
I like property dualism, and here's why.

There is the property of the mind, and there is everything else within, perhaps only one kind of substance, namely matter/energy. All we really have to do is find at least one other property of this substance that isn't a product of the mind (where the conception of matter/energy exists); in other words I will try to escape idealism. A way to do this is to think about the mind as the ability to observe objects. These objects, though, must be observable. The property of being observable is not part of the typical definition of the mind, so we know that it is not just a product of the mind. It must be something else entirely. ...

I don't see property dualism as having any advantage over any other kind of dualism. It seems to just isolate the problem as something that needs no further explanation. A lot like God, if you'll excuse the analogy. An uncaused cause. Or dark matter in astrophysics, except that at least the name dark matter alludes to an observable effect. But the hard problem remains. You still need to explain the mechanism for conscious awareness (or qualia, or mind as you call it). In its simplest form: why does the color red "just so happen" to appear the way it does? I'm all for simplifying the problem, but one must admit it's incomplete.

Yeah, I don't think anyone ever has a complete theory in mind. Property dualism has its perks, and that's probably all we can ever ask for, at least in these times.

Dualism is more about the ontological description of what there is; it certainly is not explaining the other hard problem/s of how and why.

 

[ryan]

There is the property of the mind, and there is everything else within, perhaps only one kind of substance, namely matter/energy. All we really have to do is find at least one other property of this substance that isn't a product of the mind (where the conception of matter/energy exists); in other words I will try to escape idealism. A way to do this is to think about the mind as the ability to observe objects. These objects, though, must be observable. The property of being observable is not part of the typical definition of the mind, so we know that it is not just a product of the mind. It must be something else entirely.

I'm going to admit I don't understand that at all.

But I would be interested in an elaboration.

Oops, the comma in the first sentence should have been before "within" not after it.

So I was trying to say that if we start with the mind and then assume that it depends on a substance, the brain, we can then give matter a mental property. But obviously that is not the only property matter has. What other property can be said about all types of matter? I say it is its causal behavior. So there are at least two essential and very different properties in existence. Now we got one substance and two all-encompassing properties where everything we know about has either of these two properties.

*I forgot to add the most important part. The observer is the mind and the observable is all that is causal.

 

[ruby sparks]

There is the property of the mind, and there is everything else, within perhaps only one kind of substance, namely matter/energy. All we really have to do is find at least one other property of this substance that isn't a product of the mind (where the conception of matter/energy exists); in other words I will try to escape idealism. A way to do this is to think about the mind as the ability to observe objects. These objects, though, must be observable. The property of being observable is not part of the typical definition of the mind, so we know that it is not just a product of the mind. It must be something else entirely.

I'm going to admit I don't understand that at all.

But I would be interested in an elaboration.

Oops, the comma in the first sentence should have been before "within" not after it.

So I was trying to say that if we start with the mind and then assume that it depends on a substance, the brain, we can then give matter a mental property. But obviously that is not the only property matter has. What other property can be said about all types of matter? I say it is its causal behavior. So there are at least two essential and very different properties in existence. Now we got one substance and two all-encompassing properties where everything we know about has either of these two properties.

*I forgot to add the most important part. The observer is the mind and the observable is all that is causal.

No, sorry, still lost.

Ok, I'll ask some specific questions:

There is the property of the mind, and there is everything else, within perhaps only one kind of substance, namely matter/energy.

What is 'the property of the mind'? Is it 'being mental'? If so, is that really a 'property' of itself, rather than something which has properties?

Regarding energy, we can't, I don't think, observe this, so, if you have an observer/observed paradigm, where does energy (or information) fit?

What other property can be said about all types of matter? I say it is its causal behavior. So there are at least two essential and very different properties in existence. Now we got one substance and two all-encompassing properties where everything we know about has either of these two properties

So are the two key 'duality' properties 'being mental' and 'being causal'? If so, if mental was causal, how would that fit?

I thought the two key properties were observability and observation.

So I'm not clear on what are the two elements/aspects of your duality.

I admit to being slightly wary of the word properties. I don't mind using it, but I'm not sure properties 'carve nature at its joints'.

A lot of the time, what is called a property just seems to be a descriptor, and sometimes the distinctions seem to be abstract or semantic as a result, so I wonder if sometimes such talk only divides up ideas, not things.

 

[ruby sparks]

That’s easy. Thinking on words really is just talking with the speech production out of gear. That’s a nice serial signal at certain places in the brain. Possible but not close. The public side of the brain is easy. The private side practically impossible.

Now I'm not following you again.

These decoders also (it seems) work on pictures. And even the letters are arguably just shapes. Possibly they are not functioning as language as such.

So, if I am having a private, wordless experience in my imagination of, say, a green field under a blue sky, possibly with a naked teenage elfess sprawled in the foreground, and some sort of decoder can tell that, and put it on a screen, in an auditorium full of people maybe, then how is that not my private side (specifically my embarrassing elf fantasies) being made public?

Caveat: The 'qualia' are still private, yes, or shared only indirectly, perhaps via empathy (ie someone else having a similar response to naked teenage elfesses to mine).

 

[Speakpigeon]

Oh, and here's the key bits from Chalmers' paper:

https://evolutionnews.org/2008/06/the_hard_and_easy_problems_in/

I'll be honest, I think that solving the easy problems is harder than the hard problem. That's just reminding ourselves that the problem only exists on the back of a religious way of looking at brains. Once you accept that the hard problem is just what solving the easy problem feels like from the inside then there's not much else to explain. Solving problems by asking the right question rather than the wrong one has a long history. It's another job philosophers have.

The really hard problem is to do with beliefs...

I missed that.

Explaining is always explaining something in terms of something else.

The problem of consciousness has been qualified as "hard" because solving it would require explaining consciousness in terms of physical things. Good luck with that.

And it's been assessed as "hard" by comparison with explaining physical things in terms of physical things, which is indeed a piece of cake by comparison to believe the work already done.

Now, there may be a harder problem still, which would be explaining the physical world in terms of bare consciousness and in terms of qualia.

We can tell these "harder" problems are really harder when we see people busy with being engaged in the easy problem just deny there is any other problem at all to consider, an instance of which is given by the link you provided in your post.

Maybe solving the easy problem, as I framed it above and as it is indeed still considered today by its practitioners, will prove harder than people think, if they think anything in this respect, but I think you're talking about something else, something perhaps a bit analogous to my "harder still" problem of explaining the physical world in terms of our subjective experience. Which is indeed an instance of asking a different question altogether.

Me, I asked the question. Job done.
EB

 

[Treedbear]

Oh, and here's the key bits from Chalmers' paper:

https://evolutionnews.org/2008/06/the_hard_and_easy_problems_in/

I'll be honest, I think that solving the easy problems is harder than the hard problem. That's just reminding ourselves that the problem only exists on the back of a religious way of looking at brains. Once you accept that the hard problem is just what solving the easy problem feels like from the inside then there's not much else to explain. Solving problems by asking the right question rather than the wrong one has a long history. It's another job philosophers have.

The really hard problem is to do with beliefs...

I missed that.

Explaining is always explaining something in terms of something else.

The problem of consciousness has been qualified as "hard" because solving it would require explaining consciousness in terms of physical things. Good luck with that.

And it's been assessed as "hard" by comparison with explaining physical things in terms of physical things, which is indeed a piece of cake by comparison to believe the work already done.

Now, there may be a harder problem still, which would be explaining the physical world in terms of bare consciousness and in terms of qualia.

We can tell these "harder" problems are really harder when we see people busy with being engaged in the easy problem just deny there is any other problem at all to consider, an instance of which is given by the link you provided in your post.

Maybe solving the easy problem, as I framed it above and as it is indeed still considered today by its practitioners, will prove harder than people think, if they think anything in this respect, but I think you're talking about something else, something perhaps a bit analogous to my "harder still" problem of explaining the physical world in terms of our subjective experience. Which is indeed an instance of asking a different question altogether.

Me, I asked the question. Job done.
EB

I think the hard problem will only be solved by changing our perspective in some revolutionary way that provides a more objective understanding. But for now it seems we're about here:

 

[ryan]

Oops, the comma in the first sentence should have been before "within" not after it.

So I was trying to say that if we start with the mind and then assume that it depends on a substance, the brain, we can then give matter a mental property. But obviously that is not the only property matter has. What other property can be said about all types of matter? I say it is its causal behavior. So there are at least two essential and very different properties in existence. Now we got one substance and two all-encompassing properties where everything we know about has either of these two properties.

*I forgot to add the most important part. The observer is the mind and the observable is all that is causal.

No, sorry, still lost.

Ok, I'll ask some specific questions:

There is the property of the mind, and there is everything else, within perhaps only one kind of substance, namely matter/energy.

What is 'the property of the mind'? Is it 'being mental'? If so, is that really a 'property' of itself, rather than something which has properties?

It appears that the mind is dependent on the brain/matter. So you might say that a normal working brain has a mental property the same way you might say that an electron has a charge.

Regarding energy, we can't, I don't think, observe this, so, if you have an observer/observed paradigm, where does energy (or information) fit?

Energy and especially holes are fascinating problems. We can't detect or observe holes either, but we somehow know they exist. We would need a whole thread and the world is probably going to need at least another 100 years to figure out what energy and holes are.

What other property can be said about all types of matter? I say it is its causal behavior. So there are at least two essential and very different properties in existence. Now we got one substance and two all-encompassing properties where everything we know about has either of these two properties

So are the two key 'duality' properties 'being mental' and 'being causal'? If so, if mental was causal, how would that fit?

It's fine. Mental can be causal and causal can be mental. Both properties can overlap into the universal substance of matter/energy. The "or" I was using was meant to be inclusive.

I thought the two key properties were observability and observation.

I went back and added that on the bottom.

I admit to being slightly wary of the word properties. I don't mind using it, but I'm not sure properties 'carve nature at its joints'.

A lot of the time, what is called a property just seems to be a descriptor, and sometimes the distinctions seem to be abstract or semantic as a result, so I wonder if sometimes such talk only divides up ideas, not things.

Well I don't see what other option we have. Science uses "property" to explain ontological differences. And since I think that practically everyone can agree that all there is, at least all that is that is relevant, are the mental and the physical. And when it comes to the mind, which is an abstract concept, it seems only natural that we use abstract language. If not that what then?

 

[ruby sparks]

No, sorry, still lost.

Ok, I'll ask some specific questions:



What is 'the property of the mind'? Is it 'being mental'? If so, is that really a 'property' of itself, rather than something which has properties?

It appears that the mind is dependent on the brain/matter. So you might say that a normal working brain has a mental property the same way you might say that an electron has a charge.

Regarding energy, we can't, I don't think, observe this, so, if you have an observer/observed paradigm, where does energy (or information) fit?

Energy and especially holes are fascinating problems. We can't detect or observe holes either, but we somehow know they exist. We would need a whole thread and the world is probably going to need at least another 100 years to figure out what energy and holes are.

What other property can be said about all types of matter? I say it is its causal behavior. So there are at least two essential and very different properties in existence. Now we got one substance and two all-encompassing properties where everything we know about has either of these two properties

So are the two key 'duality' properties 'being mental' and 'being causal'? If so, if mental was causal, how would that fit?

It's fine. Mental can be causal and causal can be mental. Both properties can overlap into the universal substance of matter/energy. The "or" I was using was meant to be inclusive.

I thought the two key properties were observability and observation.

I went back and added that on the bottom.

I admit to being slightly wary of the word properties. I don't mind using it, but I'm not sure properties 'carve nature at its joints'.

A lot of the time, what is called a property just seems to be a descriptor, and sometimes the distinctions seem to be abstract or semantic as a result, so I wonder if sometimes such talk only divides up ideas, not things.

Well I don't see what other option we have. Science uses "property" to explain ontological differences. And since I think that practically everyone can agree that all there is, at least all that is that is relevant, are the mental and the physical. And when it comes to the mind, which is an abstract concept, it seems only natural that we use abstract language. If not that what then?

Thanks. I think I'm a bit clearer now. The two main 'sides' (categories? Aspects?) at least as we conceive or speak of them (an important caveat I think) are mental and physical.

Still not sure about the observer/observed thing.

Also, things (properties I suppose) such as speed don't seem to be mental, or physical (or indeed observable, or observing). So I don't know if we have enough categories. Not that I'm keen on having more, but it feels ok so long as we accept that each one does not necessarily refer to a 'completely different thing' (which imo is one big issue with for example um's model).

Also, personally, I myself would throw 'information' into the mix (as well as matter/energy) as a candidate description/property of a possible universal substance.

At this point, I'm thinking that your worldview options are not clashing much if at all with mine.

 

[Speakpigeon]

I think the hard problem will only be solved by changing our perspective in some revolutionary way that provides a more objective understanding. But for now it seems we're about here:
View attachment 15808

Yeah, but we're ruminating on it. We are.
EB