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Eliminating Qualia

"You know what your mind experiences" is gobbledygook, for your model. Not only does it invoke a 'you' that you have to discredit

I explained this.

"You" is "that which experiences" in another person.

"I" am that which experiences.

says that you know you have a mind

I am "that which experiences".

We give "that which experiences" the label "mind".

I know that I am experiencing. Therefore I know that I am mind.

it also clearly says that you know you have a mind

Sure. I misspeak.

I don't know I have a mind. My body has a mind. I know I am mind.

What's going on here is two minds are interacting as apish human minds do.
 
I explained this.

"You" is "that which experiences" in another person.

"I" am that which experiences.



I am "that which experiences".

We give "that which experiences" the label "mind".

I know that I am experiencing. Therefore I know that I am mind.

it also clearly says that you know you have a mind

Sure. I misspeak.

I don't know I have a mind. My body has a mind. I know I am mind.

So, according to you, mind is aware of itself, basically. Otherwise, it could not know anything, or even if there was a mind at all in the first place. It couldn't know if it existed. It would have no way of knowing that.

Self awareness, in other words. A perfectly acceptable part of a putative cognitive model, subjectively verifiable by every human and quite-well understood by various disciplines.

Why you have such an issue with it in principle is anyone's guess.
 
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How many of your questions have I answered?

Some, I'll give you that. Unfortunately even then, you have a tendency to answer them with mere repeated declarations about your position, not detailed argument from 1st principles (or objective evidence, the latter of which which we all lack at times, but you lack the most) either for your position or (more importantly vis a vis your certainty) against another. Then there are the questions I have to repeat many times before you respond.

I don't have time to list them all, but there were a few new ones in here, for example, today:

.... 'if the mind experiences, how, and what with? What's it even made of? Does it have any 'experience sensors', or what?' How do the experienced things communicate their existence to the mind? Using qualia waves? And if it has autonomy, what does it use to supposedly go about exercising that with? What is the mechanism? And how does it manage to be both dependent and independent at the same time?

Oh and 'why can the brain not be the experiencing thing?' is one that goes way back. Please don't just declare that it can't and that the mind can. "The brain can't because it can't" is merely a tautology, as is 'the mind can because it can'.
 
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unterzombie said:
You say zombie, zombie, zombie.

And think you have said something.

Sub is a P-Zombie too. All of you are. Only I am not.

Fuck off am I! Unlike you poor saps, my biology and phenomenology are, where it counts, the same thing. For me the answer to the easy problem is the answer to the hard problem. All it takes is a metaphysical assumption that mind and body are the same thing. Everything neatly falls into place and I can prove my conceptual content heterophenomenologically and my non conceptual content neurobiologically.

Easy.

You are only a zombie if you can't prove you are conscious objectively. Poor old zombiemensch can't even prove he's conscious to himself.
 
Subzombie said:
unterzombie said:
You say zombie, zombie, zombie.

And think you have said something.

Sub is a P-Zombie too. All of you are. Only I am not.

Fuck off am I! Unlike you poor saps, my biology and phenomenology are, where it counts, the same thing. For me the answer to the easy problem is the answer to the hard problem. All it takes is a metaphysical assumption that mind and body are the same thing. Everything neatly falls into place and I can prove my conceptual content heterophenomenologically and my non conceptual content neurobiologically.

Easy.

You are only a zombie if you can't prove you are conscious objectively. Poor old zombiemensch can't even prove he's conscious to himself.

Exactly what a P-Zombie would argue. Only that which is not a P-Zombie could recognize this fact. Therefore, using unterzombie’s application of logic, only I am not a P-Zombie.

Q.E.D.
 
Subzombie said:
Fuck off am I! Unlike you poor saps, my biology and phenomenology are, where it counts, the same thing. For me the answer to the easy problem is the answer to the hard problem. All it takes is a metaphysical assumption that mind and body are the same thing. Everything neatly falls into place and I can prove my conceptual content heterophenomenologically and my non conceptual content neurobiologically.

Easy.

You are only a zombie if you can't prove you are conscious objectively. Poor old zombiemensch can't even prove he's conscious to himself.

Exactly what a P-Zombie would argue. Only that which is not a P-Zombie could recognize this fact. Therefore, using unterzombie’s application of logic, only I am not a P-Zombie.

Q.E.D.

Damn, rumbled... MIndzz sub wants sub to eat your mindzz...
 
Children and their zombies.

They demand to be given something to experience with their mind.

And claim at the same time the mind is a delusion.
 
.... 'if the mind experiences, how, and what with? What's it even made of? Does it have any 'experience sensors', or what?' How do the experienced things communicate their existence to the mind? Using qualia waves? And if it has autonomy, what does it use to supposedly go about exercising that with? What is the mechanism? And how does it manage to be both dependent and independent at the same time?

Of course I ignore these questions.

They are questions for science. Not for me.

Oh and 'why can the brain not be the experiencing thing?' is one that goes way back. Please don't just declare that it can't and that the mind can. "The brain can't because it can't" is merely a tautology, as is 'the mind can because it can'.

You can call "that which experiences" the brain if you like.

You have not changed anything.

I will call it the mind.

Now we are done with naming "that which experiences". And we still have no idea what it is.
 
Yes, I agree. That's what I am trying to say.

I hope not, because imo it's ropey. Especially the 'you know what your mind can do' part.

Every normal, developed human (human system to be precise) knows it experiences mind, at least some of the time. Mind is probably created by brain activity. I'm not sure how we can go beyond that. In that sense, mind is real, or to be precise again, the experience is real. What it is and what it does and can do are riddled with potential illusions. Autonomy for the mind, for example, is particularly unlikely, because it's dependent, not independent.

Well we know at least some of what the mind does.
 
Children and their zombies.

They demand to be given something to experience with their mind.

And claim at the same time the mind is a delusion.

I certainly have never claimed that. My phrase is 'User Illusion' Ruby hasn't claimed that either and neither has Koy. What I'm torturing you about is intellectual dishonesty. You help yourself to ideas that cannot be objectively proven and then object when others do the same thing. Shall I post a few examples of you doing just this, or can you remember?
 
Yes, I agree. That's what I am trying to say.

I hope not, because imo it's ropey. Especially the 'you know what your mind can do' part.

Every normal, developed human (human system to be precise) knows it experiences mind, at least some of the time. Mind is probably created by brain activity. I'm not sure how we can go beyond that. In that sense, mind is real, or to be precise again, the experience is real. What it is and what it does and can do are riddled with potential illusions. Autonomy for the mind, for example, is particularly unlikely, because it's dependent, not independent.

Well we know at least some of what the mind does.

How?

The best we can manage with minds is that we know how it seems to us. That's not inerrancy, merely indefeasibility. Sadly, that indefeasibility cuts both ways and so we have literally no criterion against which we can judge any mental phenomenon from the inside. There is the real problem verifying any mental event is, to quote the bard, 'like buying another copy of the paper to check that the first copy is correct. Have a go: imagine a line exactly six inches long. Now I don't deny that it seems to be six inches long and no one can gainsay you on how it seems. However, how do you verify that the line you have imagined is six inches long? You could, if you wished, imagine a ruler and imagine measuring the line and so on.

I hope you see the problem.

Now that problem gets worse.

We have a sodding great blindspot and we never notice it. Even when we follow well known techniques to expose it, we notice that something disappears, but the blindspot remains resolutely hidden behind a clear conscious experience. Now, it happens that the easy problem of consciousness comes to our aid here: there can't be any information because there are no detectors of any sort where the nerve travels into the eye. For a long time people assumed that the brain 'filled in' the blindspot, but now we know that it doesn't. It's a clear example of what psychologists call neglect. There's no signal from the world so the brain, parsimonious as ever, simply doesn't bother putting any resources there. You don't notice the blindspot because there's nothing there to detect it. The end. However, the worrying thing is that this neglect is experienced as more of the same.

Likewise, the only area of high quality vision is about the same size as the blindspot. All the rest is incredibly out of focus movement detection using huge coalitions of neurons to pull a little information out of not much. Again there are techniques to unmask this. Once again, even as you are realising that you can't tell what suit, or even colour, a card is when held almost directly in front of you, you have the image of perfectly good peripheral vision.

There's a user illusion. The assumption that this user illusion cannot be doubted is a claim that Descartes made that still, today, is intuitively obvious to most non specialists. However, up until fifty odd years ago so was the appeal to dualism and the mind being better known than the body. Up until a century or so ago the idea that God was an intuitive certainty was widespread and so on.

The problem is that what Descartes is doing with his doubting is a bit worrying. He's doubting in language, in an intentional idiom. That's the sort of thing an AI system can do. How convincing would you find an AI system coming out with descartes' formulation, quite independently and without invoking any conscious experience, merely intentional production - no first person, just words? How convincing is that? Because that's basically Dennett's position on what we do and, while I don't buy it myself, for other reasons, I see the deep force of it and how very inadequate any response I have ever seen to it has been.

It's just been shrugged off, not refuted. He's got a profound point that whatever consciousness is, it isn't what we intuitively think it is. Dennett's spent a long time looking at what happens when brains go wrong and using that to get insight on when they don't. There's some fucking odd phenomena out there, including people who actually and sincerely claim that it is not like anything to be them. What if they are actually seeing things as they are?
 
Children and their zombies.

They demand to be given something to experience with their mind.

And claim at the same time the mind is a delusion.

I certainly have never claimed that. My phrase is 'User Illusion' Ruby hasn't claimed that either and neither has Koy. What I'm torturing you about is intellectual dishonesty. You help yourself to ideas that cannot be objectively proven and then object when others do the same thing. Shall I post a few examples of you doing just this, or can you remember?

You asked for "evidence".

That is something a human can experience in some way.

It is not anything else.

If you want evidence you want something to experience. You are saying you are a thing that experiences.

Which any honest human not completely lost in some delusion knows.
 
Well we know at least some of what the mind does.

How?

The best we can manage with minds is that we know how it seems to us. That's not inerrancy, merely indefeasibility. Sadly, that indefeasibility cuts both ways and so we have literally no criterion against which we can judge any mental phenomenon from the inside. There is the real problem verifying any mental event is, to quote the bard, 'like buying another copy of the paper to check that the first copy is correct. Have a go: imagine a line exactly six inches long. Now I don't deny that it seems to be six inches long and no one can gainsay you on how it seems. However, how do you verify that the line you have imagined is six inches long? You could, if you wished, imagine a ruler and imagine measuring the line and so on.

I hope you see the problem.

Now that problem gets worse.

We have a sodding great blindspot and we never notice it. Even when we follow well known techniques to expose it, we notice that something disappears, but the blindspot remains resolutely hidden behind a clear conscious experience. Now, it happens that the easy problem of consciousness comes to our aid here: there can't be any information because there are no detectors of any sort where the nerve travels into the eye. For a long time people assumed that the brain 'filled in' the blindspot, but now we know that it doesn't. It's a clear example of what psychologists call neglect. There's no signal from the world so the brain, parsimonious as ever, simply doesn't bother putting any resources there. You don't notice the blindspot because there's nothing there to detect it. The end. However, the worrying thing is that this neglect is experienced as more of the same.

Likewise, the only area of high quality vision is about the same size as the blindspot. All the rest is incredibly out of focus movement detection using huge coalitions of neurons to pull a little information out of not much. Again there are techniques to unmask this. Once again, even as you are realising that you can't tell what suit, or even colour, a card is when held almost directly in front of you, you have the image of perfectly good peripheral vision.

There's a user illusion. The assumption that this user illusion cannot be doubted is a claim that Descartes made that still, today, is intuitively obvious to most non specialists. However, up until fifty odd years ago so was the appeal to dualism and the mind being better known than the body. Up until a century or so ago the idea that God was an intuitive certainty was widespread and so on.

The problem is that what Descartes is doing with his doubting is a bit worrying. He's doubting in language, in an intentional idiom. That's the sort of thing an AI system can do. How convincing would you find an AI system coming out with descartes' formulation, quite independently and without invoking any conscious experience, merely intentional production - no first person, just words? How convincing is that? Because that's basically Dennett's position on what we do and, while I don't buy it myself, for other reasons, I see the deep force of it and how very inadequate any response I have ever seen to it has been.

It's just been shrugged off, not refuted. He's got a profound point that whatever consciousness is, it isn't what we intuitively think it is. Dennett's spent a long time looking at what happens when brains go wrong and using that to get insight on when they don't. There's some fucking odd phenomena out there, including people who actually and sincerely claim that it is not like anything to be them. What if they are actually seeing things as they are?

The mind, as an extra or dual property, has the property of observation. This is a very different and subtle property than the rest of the properties we know about in the universe. The rest of the reported properties in the universe are the physical/causal properties. Subjective observation itself is a property in addition to the physical/causal properties observed in the universe. And in that sense, those are the only two kinds of properties that we know about.

So some have trouble accepting this other property because we do not observe another mind's property of observation due to it not being physically/causally effective.
 
Children and their zombies.

They demand to be given something to experience with their mind.

And claim at the same time the mind is a delusion.

I certainly have never claimed that. My phrase is 'User Illusion' Ruby hasn't claimed that either and neither has Koy. What I'm torturing you about is intellectual dishonesty. You help yourself to ideas that cannot be objectively proven and then object when others do the same thing. Shall I post a few examples of you doing just this, or can you remember?

You asked for "evidence".

That is something a human can experience in some way.

It is not anything else.

If you want evidence you want something to experience. You are saying you are a thing that experiences.

Which any honest human not completely lost in some delusion knows.

No, I asked for objective evidence because that's what you always ask for and I like rubbing your nose in your hypocrisy. If I could I'd just put you on ignore. Your contribution is the worst thing of all: boring. I'd love to know where a bunch of smart people could have got to without the constant distraction.
 
Well we know at least some of what the mind does.

How?

The best we can manage with minds is that we know how it seems to us. That's not inerrancy, merely indefeasibility. Sadly, that indefeasibility cuts both ways and so we have literally no criterion against which we can judge any mental phenomenon from the inside. There is the real problem verifying any mental event is, to quote the bard, 'like buying another copy of the paper to check that the first copy is correct. Have a go: imagine a line exactly six inches long. Now I don't deny that it seems to be six inches long and no one can gainsay you on how it seems. However, how do you verify that the line you have imagined is six inches long? You could, if you wished, imagine a ruler and imagine measuring the line and so on.

I hope you see the problem.

Now that problem gets worse.

We have a sodding great blindspot and we never notice it. Even when we follow well known techniques to expose it, we notice that something disappears, but the blindspot remains resolutely hidden behind a clear conscious experience. Now, it happens that the easy problem of consciousness comes to our aid here: there can't be any information because there are no detectors of any sort where the nerve travels into the eye. For a long time people assumed that the brain 'filled in' the blindspot, but now we know that it doesn't. It's a clear example of what psychologists call neglect. There's no signal from the world so the brain, parsimonious as ever, simply doesn't bother putting any resources there. You don't notice the blindspot because there's nothing there to detect it. The end. However, the worrying thing is that this neglect is experienced as more of the same.

Likewise, the only area of high quality vision is about the same size as the blindspot. All the rest is incredibly out of focus movement detection using huge coalitions of neurons to pull a little information out of not much. Again there are techniques to unmask this. Once again, even as you are realising that you can't tell what suit, or even colour, a card is when held almost directly in front of you, you have the image of perfectly good peripheral vision.

There's a user illusion. The assumption that this user illusion cannot be doubted is a claim that Descartes made that still, today, is intuitively obvious to most non specialists. However, up until fifty odd years ago so was the appeal to dualism and the mind being better known than the body. Up until a century or so ago the idea that God was an intuitive certainty was widespread and so on.

The problem is that what Descartes is doing with his doubting is a bit worrying. He's doubting in language, in an intentional idiom. That's the sort of thing an AI system can do. How convincing would you find an AI system coming out with descartes' formulation, quite independently and without invoking any conscious experience, merely intentional production - no first person, just words? How convincing is that? Because that's basically Dennett's position on what we do and, while I don't buy it myself, for other reasons, I see the deep force of it and how very inadequate any response I have ever seen to it has been.

It's just been shrugged off, not refuted. He's got a profound point that whatever consciousness is, it isn't what we intuitively think it is. Dennett's spent a long time looking at what happens when brains go wrong and using that to get insight on when they don't. There's some fucking odd phenomena out there, including people who actually and sincerely claim that it is not like anything to be them. What if they are actually seeing things as they are?

The mind, as an extra or dual property, has the property of observation. This is a very different and subtle property than the rest of the properties we know about in the universe. The rest of the reported properties in the universe are the physical/causal properties. Subjective observation itself is a property in addition to the physical/causal properties observed in the universe. And in that sense, those are the only two kinds of properties that we know about.

So some have trouble accepting this other property because we do not observe another mind's property of observation due to it not being physically/causally effective.

Surprisingly, Dennett's got aboutness covered:

https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/evolerr.htm

Professional philosophers get to be professional philosophers by knowing what they are talking about. Dennett has demonstrably been engaged in a singular pursuit since nineteen sixty nine. It's fine to disagree with him, but I wouldn't be underestimating him. He knows all the angles and he has got them covered.
 
The mind, as an extra or dual property, has the property of observation. This is a very different and subtle property than the rest of the properties we know about in the universe. The rest of the reported properties in the universe are the physical/causal properties. Subjective observation itself is a property in addition to the physical/causal properties observed in the universe. And in that sense, those are the only two kinds of properties that we know about.

So some have trouble accepting this other property because we do not observe another mind's property of observation due to it not being physically/causally effective.

Surprisingly, Dennett's got aboutness covered:

https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/evolerr.htm

Professional philosophers get to be professional philosophers by knowing what they are talking about. Dennett has demonstrably been engaged in a singular pursuit since nineteen sixty nine. It's fine to disagree with him, but I wouldn't be underestimating him. He knows all the angles and he has got them covered.

But my post has nothing to do with aboutness. The explanation of aboutness is still generally considered a mystery.
 
The mind, as an extra or dual property, has the property of observation. This is a very different and subtle property than the rest of the properties we know about in the universe. The rest of the reported properties in the universe are the physical/causal properties. Subjective observation itself is a property in addition to the physical/causal properties observed in the universe. And in that sense, those are the only two kinds of properties that we know about.

So some have trouble accepting this other property because we do not observe another mind's property of observation due to it not being physically/causally effective.

Surprisingly, Dennett's got aboutness covered:

https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/evolerr.htm

Professional philosophers get to be professional philosophers by knowing what they are talking about. Dennett has demonstrably been engaged in a singular pursuit since nineteen sixty nine. It's fine to disagree with him, but I wouldn't be underestimating him. He knows all the angles and he has got them covered.

But my post has nothing to do with aboutness. The explanation of aboutness is still generally considered a mystery.

Cool, in that case I'd be grateful if you explain what you mean by 'observation' if you don't mean aboutness.
 
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