Eliminating Qualia

[ruby sparks]

A "thing" unto itself.

Not sure what 'thing unto itself' implies as a consequence.

The activity that produces a product is not the product.

The activity in the computer chip is not the product of that activity.

It is something that arises because of the activity.

The mind, a distinct entity, arises because of activity.

It is not the activity.

It is not the thing producing the activity.

It is a "thing" unto itself.

Not necessarily. The activity could be what we call mind. It might just happen to feel like something to the system.

I think you like making everything separate. Now you've even added a pigeonhole for 'activity' as a separate, middleman 'thing' to brain and mind. And you already have qualia as separate 'things' from brain, mind and now presumably 'activity'. You end up with a horde of supposed interactions between all the different 'things'. It's not entirely unlike adding 'angels carrying' to why apples fall from a tree. It might even tempt another regress; when to stop subdividing? It's not parsimonious. It may in fact be nothing more than semantics.

Take 'life' for example. We could say this is a different 'thing' from non-life, right? But does that make 'life' a separate 'thing' in a brain?

In any case, I was specifically asking about the consequences. Autonomy and/or independence. Splitting the world up into a plethora of separate 'things' does not necessarily make them all autonomous or independent. To say that something is independent when it is at every instant fully dependent seems to me to be going in the direction of a contradiction in terms.

But you keep diverting away from responding to my questions. What experiences the self? And why can't a brain be an experiencer?

 

[WAB]

Yes, very difficult. It has been many years since I tried. We have some Derrida threads in the archives, I believe. I sort of rode the fence on him, thinking perhaps he made too much ado about nothing, or, more correctly, that he was just, well, almost deliberately attempting to frustrate understanding, to further clog lines of communication among people rather than reaching with genuine sincerity toward clarity.

Of course, he was wickedly brilliant, but, like John Ashbery*, an American poet famous for writing a kind of sophisticated, pretentious nonsense verse (similar but different to the candid and funny nonsense of Carroll & Lear, and Ashbery's contemporary, Kenneth Koch), I found the effort to understand him (Derrida) was taking too much of my time, effort, and patience, so I sorta bailed on him: ungrateful little smarmy brat that I am!



*You'll notice — 'cos you're so perceptive and clever, ya bastard ya — I like to keep bringing poets into the mix. This irritates that crap out of some folk 'round these here parts, who think poets ought to be left to the warm and fuzzy world of esthetics.

But I strongly disagree, and I'm something of a Shelleyan with respect to politics (you thought I was gonna say literature, oh come on, admit it! lol ), as I am a Spinozist with respect to philosophy.

Shelley (dead at 29, an utter tragedy for everyone with any respect for truth and intellectual courage), author of The Necessity of Atheism:

I’m with Tom Stoppard’s position in Arcadia. Most of the Romantics were self agrandizing man whores with the ethics of a character from a Shakespeare comedy. However I don’t much accept the primacy of Science. I hold that we have dozens of great intellectual traditions, including theatre, poetry and literature. If one wants to understand the human condition then the best approach is multidisciplinary.

oooh...ooo ooo ooooohhhhh...ooooohhhhh...oooooh....oooooh...! [Arnold Horshack, Welcome Back Kotter] I've not heard of Stoppard, but Arcadia is all about what I'm about. The primal garden, Eden, oft referred to by Swinburne, the Pre-Raphaelites, T.S. Eliot, et al.

I once visited the Collossi of Memnon just to climb up one and recite Ozymandius. I’m a sad bastard.

Al Bundy voice [ultimate albeit reluctant as in what the actual all fuck and you had me at hello submission and epiphany]: "I love you."

y'all are gonna miss me when I'm gone.

 

[ruby sparks]

Perhaps mind is not of itself an illusion. Mind exists, at least as an undeniable experience, whatever it is. But some of its capacities, including for example being in control, may be illusory, at least to an extent, to whatever it is that experiences it.

As Einstein once said, if the moon were somehow to become self-conscious, it might think that it was steering itself around the earth.

Several psychological experiments reveal how we can believe we are exercising control over our actions and reactions when we are in fact not. This even extends to a belief in control of external events, and this type is known in psychology, unsurprisingly, as 'The Illusion of Control'.

Do you think these ideas just coalesced randomly?

Or were they put together by an active mind that can move ideas around at will?

What ideas?

Regarding ideas generally, I do not know whether a mind, or a brain for that matter, can move them around at will. It certainly feels like that. But there are contraindicators in many clinical experiments testing for example conscious intent and the illusion of control. And philosophically, the sort of will that most people assume they use, the sort I think you are describing, is, it seems, almost impossible to explain. No one, as far as I know, can explain how it might even work or be possible in principle, or philosophically. Everyone agrees that it feels like it though.

So what experiences self? And why can't a brain be an experiencer?

 

[Subsymbolic]

Perhaps mind is not of itself an illusion. Mind exists, at least as an undeniable experience, whatever it is. But some of its capacities, including for example being in control, may be illusory, at least to an extent, to whatever it is that experiences it.

As Einstein once said, if the moon were somehow to become self-conscious, it might think that it was steering itself around the earth.

Several psychological experiments reveal how we can believe we are exercising control over our actions and reactions when we are in fact not. This even extends to a belief in control of external events, and this type is known in psychology, unsurprisingly, as 'The Illusion of Control'.

Do you think these ideas just coalesced randomly?

Or were they put together by an active mind that can move ideas around at will?

What ideas?

Regarding ideas generally, I do not know whether a mind, or a brain for that matter, can move them around at will. It certainly feels like that. But there are contraindicators in many clinical experiments testing for example conscious intent and the illusion of control. And philosophically, the sort of will that most people assume they use, the sort I think you are describing, is, it seems, almost impossible to explain. No one, as far as I know, can explain how it might even work in principle. Everyone agrees that it feels like it though.

So what experiences self? And why can't a brain be an experiencer?

Didn’t I just have a shot at that explanation?

 

[ruby sparks]

What ideas?

Regarding ideas generally, I do not know whether a mind, or a brain for that matter, can move them around at will. It certainly feels like that. But there are contraindicators in many clinical experiments testing for example conscious intent and the illusion of control. And philosophically, the sort of will that most people assume they use, the sort I think you are describing, is, it seems, almost impossible to explain. No one, as far as I know, can explain how it might even work in principle. Everyone agrees that it feels like it though.

So what experiences self? And why can't a brain be an experiencer?

Didn’t I just have a shot at that explanation?

Did you? Sorry.

 

[ruby sparks]

Some theories are full of holes. In Um's case, they're pigeonholes.

As someone else pointed out, a red ball has both redness and roundness. Two completely different things, separate and removed from each other. You can't say that shape and colour are the same thing or are even related. Don't even get me started on size, density, elasticity, temperature, velocity or location.

So many completely different things.

A ball may be any colour, but if the ball happens to be red, the colour is a part or aspect of that particular ball.

This, unlike so much of the discussion lately, is at least bang on the topic of qualia.

I think it might be better to say that the ball itself has no colour. The colour only exists in the brain, I think.

However the properties of the ball that are experienced as red by the brain (or mind, if that is one's model) are intrinsic to the ball and not, it would seem, a separate 'thing', yes.

 

[WAB]

The activity that produces a product is not the product.

The activity in the computer chip is not the product of that activity.

It is something that arises because of the activity.

The mind, a distinct entity, arises because of activity.

It is not the activity.

It is not the thing producing the activity.

It is a "thing" unto itself.

Not necessarily. The activity could be what we call mind. It might just happen to feel like something to the system.

I think you are too fond of making everything separate. Now you've even added a pigeonhole for 'activity' as a separate, middleman 'thing' to brain and mind. And you already have qualia as separate 'things' from brain, mind and now presumably 'activity'. You end up with a horde of supposed interactions between all the different 'things'. It's not entirely unlike adding 'angels carrying' to why apples fall from a tree. It's not parsimonious. It may in fact be nothing more than semantics.

Take 'life' for example. We could say this is a different thing from non-life, right? But does that make 'life' a separate 'thing' in a brain?

In any case, I was asking about the consequences. Autonomy and/or independence. Splitting the world up into a plethora of separate 'things' does not necessarily make them all autonomous or independent. To say that something is independent when it is fully dependent seems to me to be going in the direction of a contradiction in terms.

But you keep diverting away from responding to my questions. What experiences the self? And why can't a brain be an experiencer?

ruby, if I may, this is actually what I would ask of you, DBT, Dennet, Harris, and anyone else who goes anywhere near the "consciousness as illusion" silliness. Yes, I still maintain that it's a load of crap.

What, exactly, is doing the experiencing? IF the brain is the experiencer, then why can't I simply tell my brain to stop my heartbeat? That is, if I am only my brain: the experiencer.

Who, or what the actual fuck (stole that from Sub, but I did let him know, lol), is this "I". Why is it needed? What possible reason does the brain have to present this illusion to itself.

WTF— according to YOU— makes a subjective experiencer preferable to a merely operational, functioning machine, a complex arrangement of nuts and bolts?

I know for myself why I prefer the experience, well, at least the good things, not so much the pain & suffering; but what advantage does an experiencer have over a p-zombie, with respect to fitness, Darwin, evolution? What do materialists think is the answer to this question?

Please, don't just tell me I do not understand things, or that I am asking the wrong questions (Subsie):

Explain what you mean. Don't refer to Dennet, or link to a paper; tell me, in your own words, what you mean. But, may I make an appeal that you answer me in private, or email me, if this requires a B I G bunch of paragraphs. I do not have the energy to go toe to toe with anyone in a long drawn out thread, particularly since my memory is fuck.d and I can't even wrap my noodle around all the gadgets, doodads, buttons, tabs, available to me, and necessary for a formal engagement right here.

I am, after all, NOT arguing with Dennet, but with ruby, DBT, untermensche, Subsie, et al.

 

[untermensche]

A ball may be any colour, but if the ball happens to be red, the colour is a part or aspect of that particular ball.

No ball in the world is red.

Red is only something that exists on the balls in the mind.

Color is something brains create for minds to experience.

They do not exist in any other way.

 

[untermensche]

Grammar is only for those who believe in it.

The only people who really care about grammar are children needing a grade.

It is not needed.

Actually, it is absolutely necessary to be able to write clearly, as you ironically demonstrate with your example.

Humans have an internal "grammar" and it arises simply by exposure to language.

And it is how they communicate.

The things humans have added to language and call grammar are useless doo dads.

All humans need to be taught are the labels of things and nothing else, no lessons in "grammar", and they can communicate just fine.

In fact that is how most humans have communicated just fine in human history.

This can only be read as 'the mind knew it is decision'. The best reading I can see is that 'the mind used to know that it is constituted by decision'.

It seems the problem here is the stupid grammar.

Take away the stupid man-made grammar and people can understand just fine.

 

[ruby sparks]

Nonetheless, the properties are intrinsic to the ball.

And the ball's various properties could be subdivided. The shape and size properties are not in any way related and do not affect each other, I think.

So does that make 'shape' and 'size' different 'things'? More to the point, does it make them independent? I don't think so. It would seem odd to say that either of them exist in their own right.

 

[untermensche]

I like this from your linked article.

The effects of hallucinogens are thought to be mediated by serotonin receptor activation; however, how these drugs elicit the unusual behavioral effects remains largely a mystery, despite much research.

The receptor is part of the cell. Not the things that bind by sheer chance to the receptor.

Cells do change.

It is called differentiation.

But it does not happen because something binds to a receptor temporarily.

What that changes is only the behavior of the cell.

The mind arises due to the behavior of the brain.

Not simply because there is a brain.

That has to be the most impressive piece of out of context cherry picking that I have ever seen. You don't get much more intellectually dishonest than that. I assume you know where genes are found and what they do?

This is called not being able to deal with ideas so instead the throwing of labels is done in frustration.

You don't have the slightest clue how to form an argument.

You think name dropping and word dropping are arguments.

A real serious form of ignorance.

 

[ruby sparks]

ruby, if I may, this is actually what I would ask of you, DBT, Dennet, Harris, and anyone else who goes anywhere near the "consciousness as illusion" silliness. Yes, I still maintain that it's a load of crap.

My best shot at that would be not to say that the experience of consciousness is itself an illusion (the experience undeniably exists) but that there are illusory aspects to it, in that it may not be playing the role we tend to think it does. I think Dennett would agree. The definition of 'illusion' usually includes 'misinterpreted perception' and so does not have to mean 'no perception'.

What, exactly, is doing the experiencing?

Imo, the best candidate is the brain.

IF the brain is the experiencer, then why can't I simply tell my brain to stop my heart from beating? That is, if I am only my brain: the experiencer.

Because, it seems, some brain or body functions don't seem to need or at least don't seem to give rise to consciousness or self-consciousness. Some say consciousness is just the tip of the iceberg, etc.

Oddly, through meditation, it seems possible for you to voluntarily and consciously slow your heart down, at least.

Who, or what the actual fuck (stole that from Sub, but I did let him know, lol), is this "I".

Imo it is most likely a brain experience, real in that it's an experience, but possibly/probably not doing all the things we think it's doing. At the very least, I think its opinion of its own powers and importance is probably overrated. All is vanity as far as the typical 'I' is concerned.

Why is it needed? What possible reason does the brain have to present this illusion to itself. WTF makes a subjective experiencer preferable to a merely operational, functioning machine, a complex arrangement of nuts and bolts?

I think that's an open question. The 'Darwinian options' seem to be, (a) it's useful in some way, (b) it's of itself a hindrance in some way (like the weight of a polar bear's warm coat) and (c) it's neutral or a necessary byproduct, a bit like the heat generated by your computer. Or, it may be a combination of any 2 or 3 of those, or there may be another option I'm not thinking of. Either way, it's definitely a fun capacity, in my opinion.

I guess most people would intuitively choose (a).

 

[untermensche]

The activity that produces a product is not the product.

The activity in the computer chip is not the product of that activity.

It is something that arises because of the activity.

The mind, a distinct entity, arises because of activity.

It is not the activity.

It is not the thing producing the activity.

It is a "thing" unto itself.

Not necessarily. The activity could be what we call mind.

Activity is the movement of things.

It can either create something that is aware or not.

But the activity cannot be aware.

 

[untermensche]

Nonetheless, the properties are intrinsic to the ball.

And the ball's various properties could be subdivided. The shape and size properties are not in any way related and do not affect each other, I think.

So does that make 'shape' and 'size' different 'things'? More to the point, does it make them independent? I don't think so. It would seem odd to say that either of them exist in their own right.

Red is not intrinsic to any ball.

Red is something that only exists in minds.

It is not the property of anything in the world.

Things in the world have the property of differential reflectivity.

Objects do have the properties of shape and size.

And things can have the same shape but a different size and the same size but a different shape.

 

[DBT]

A ball may be any colour, but if the ball happens to be red, the colour is a part or aspect of that particular ball.

No ball in the world is red.

Red is only something that exists on the balls in the mind.

Color is something brains create for minds to experience.

They do not exist in any other way.

Yes, of course. But the property (reflected wavelength of light) of the ball that we perceive as being red is nonetheless an aspect of that ball (which is what I meant). As is all information acquired by the brain via its senses being interpreted and represented as objects, colours, sounds smells, etc.

 

[ruby sparks]

Please, don't just tell me I do not understand things, or that I am asking the wrong questions (Subsie).

If it's any consolation, I don't understand sub's points much of the time either. He knows this.

- - - Updated - - -

Activity is the movement of things.

It can either create something that is aware or not.

But the activity cannot be aware.

I'd prefer not to detour, however interesting it might be. Plus, I think I have already said a lot of what I want to say about 'activity', and asked a few questions about consequences. And another about 'life'. Your specific answers to those would be more useful than you just restating your previous position repeatedly. And could you please answer my two longstanding questions which are more to do with the topic?

 

[ruby sparks]

Nonetheless, the properties are intrinsic to the ball.

And the ball's various properties could be subdivided. The shape and size properties are not in any way related and do not affect each other, I think.

So does that make 'shape' and 'size' different 'things'? More to the point, does it make them independent? I don't think so. It would seem odd to say that either of them exist in their own right.

Red is not intrinsic to any ball.

Red is something that only exists in minds.

It is not the property of anything in the world.

Things in the world have the property of differential reflectivity.

Objects do have the properties of shape and size.

And things can have the same shape but a different size and the same size but a different shape.

Sure, but I ended up asking a specific question, which was basically about independent versus intrinsic and dependent.

'Shape' does not exist of itself, yeah? So although we could say it is a completely different thing, it is a wholly dependent and intrinsic property.

 

[ruby sparks]

By the way, I think 'shape' is an interesting one. It might be possible to say that it at least partially exists in the brain (or mind) in a similar way to red. I'm not sure about size.

I think it's definitely the case that we can perceive both (in fact all three) incorrectly.

Which takes us back to illusions, and subjectivity being unreliable.

 

[WAB]

By the way, I think 'shape' is an interesting one. It might be possible to say that it at least partially exists in the brain (or mind) in a similar way to red. I'm not sure about size.

I think it's definitely the case that we can perceive both (in fact all three) incorrectly.

Which takes us back to illusions, and subjectivity being unreliable.

Thanks ruby (and you're still a hot porn star in my noodle). lol.

May this need to seguey into the topic of nominalism, ie: the distinction between real and non-real entities, groups, universals, et al?

Perhaps yet another thread...

 

[ruby sparks]

By the way, I think 'shape' is an interesting one. It might be possible to say that it at least partially exists in the brain (or mind) in a similar way to red. I'm not sure about size.

I think it's definitely the case that we can perceive both (in fact all three) incorrectly.

Which takes us back to illusions, and subjectivity being unreliable.

Thanks ruby (and you're still a hot porn star in my noodle). lol.

May this need to seguey into the topic of nominalism, ie: the distinction between real and non-real entities, groups, universals, et al?

Perhaps yet another thread...

I had to google Nominalism to see what it was. But yes, I might subscribe.

My experience with philosophical isms is (a) the devil is in the detail, (b) there are usually many varieties of any ism and (c) I usually end up thinking I'm partly but not wholly any of them.