According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

[The AntiChris]

The cite you give also discusses soft determinism, which is different from hard determinism, so there are different definitions of determinism and not, as you keep insisting, a univocal definition.#

I disagree. As I understand it, soft determinism (compatibilism) and hard determinism (incompatibilism) are beliefs about the nature of free will and not different definitions of determinism. Both hard and soft determinists agree that (to paraphrase Marvin Edwards) "every event is the reliable result of prior events" and is derived from the notion of "a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect".

Of course, there may be some compatibilists who genuinely do define determinism in a different way to incompatibilists but the point remains that compatibilism in general does not rely on a different definition of determinism.

 

[bilby]

a deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system

What kind of free will involves randomness?

As far as I can see, everyone in this thread agrees that a brain making random decisions isn't "free", but rather is "insane".

So randomness is of exactly zero importance here; Its absence is an element of every person's argument in this thread, and consequently it is utterly irrelevant in the support of, or the rebuttal of, any arguments made here by anyone.

Any deterministic system is non-random; as is any system with free will, whatever that is taken to mean.

Randomness is therefore a red herring.

It is neither necessary nor sufficient to generate free will; Whether or not free will is compatible with determinism, the reasons why (or why not) have nothing to do with randomness (quantum or otherwise).

 

[pood]

Sometimes theories are developed with the mere hope that means for experimental testing will eventually be realized.

Absolutely correct. See: Newton, Einstein, string theory, continental drift, interpretation of quantum mechanics, superdeterminism, and on and on.

It is naive in the extreme to reduce science to well-defined lab experiments. Very often the experiments, if they happen at all, come long after the initial insight.

There are often thought experiments in the meanwhile. In any event, the interpretation which effects a theory precedes the experiment testing the theory no matter how soon after theory development empirical testing can be done.

Right.

All measurements are made relative to arbitrary points of reference. ... SI units are unambiguous and not subject to interpretation.

That's fine, but not all terms used in the sciences are unambiguous. Nothing new ever comes about without someone seeing/interpreting matters differently.

Anyhow, insofar as there are interpretations in science, scientific thinking is a matter of - is a product of - philosophical thinking. The quality of philosophical thinking and, therefore, the scientific thinking which brings about discovery is ultimately linked to thinking in terms of possibilities leading to the pursuit and realization of possibilities not previously recognized.

Exactly.

 

[pood]

The cite you give also discusses soft determinism, which is different from hard determinism, so there are different definitions of determinism and not, as you keep insisting, a univocal definition.#

I disagree. As I understand it, soft determinism (compatibilism) and hard determinism (incompatibilism) are beliefs about the nature of free will and not different definitions of determinism. Both hard and soft determinists agree that (to paraphrase Marvin Edwards) "every event is the reliable result of prior events" and is derived from the notion of "a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect".

Of course, there may be some compatibilists who genuinely do define determinism in a different way to incompatibilists but the point remains that compatibilism in general does not rely on a different definition of determinism.

Well, hard determinism denies free will and soft determinism supports it. So they are at loggerheads.

Also see: neo-Humean compatibilism and regularity theory, in which free human choices determine so-called “laws” and not the other way around.

 

[pood]

Science, like literature, art, music and other endeavors, is a free exercise of the human imagination. Alien intelligences with different cognitive structures might well come up with entirely different science and even maths, as discussed in another thread.

 

[The AntiChris]

Well, hard determinism denies free will and soft determinism supports it. So they are at loggerheads.

Yes but the disagreement is about the nature of free will, not about determinism.

If the compatibilist and the incompatibilist cannot agree on what they mean by determinism then any discussion about the compatibility, or otherwise, of free will is entirely pointless.

 

[DBT]

I have no idea whether you are being metaphorical with that "undecided"

As I said, decidability is a concept in math. I strongly advice you look it up.

It has nothing to do with tradition

You seem to not understand what an argument from tradition is.

Given the dispute is about free will, and compatibilists claim that free will is compatible with determinism, it is how compatibilists define determinism

Dude, you don't even understand the terms in the definition and how they apply and when and where, or even what "randomness" is in this setting.

You just are not qualified for the conversation in the first place.

Anyone can get qualified, or "anyone willing and able to pass a few university level classes on math", but you have not done that. Ever.

Crock, you don't get to will your genetic makeup or your neural architecture

Yes you do.

Crispr is a thing.

So is both learning (slow, small, cumulative changes to the neural architecture through learning processes), and direct modification (see also neuralink). Do you think when someone gets a tumor that is causing issues to their present architecture removed that the architecture does not change?

I mean seriously your examples are trivially easy to point how they may be changed specifically because my entire career is about pissing in the face of such "we cannot change" garbage.

I mean fuck, why am I even responding to this drivel?

Your response shows that you don't understand the issue.

Nobody is arguing that we can't think or act, plan or adapt. Clearly, we can and do.

The issue is compatibilism and the notion of free will.

Determinism does not exclude thought and action, planning or adapting, just that if the world is deterministic, what you do in any given instance, the decision you make and the action you perform could not have been otherwise.

Not because I say so, but because that is how determinism is defined and that is how it works.

For that reason, your position on determinism and compatibilism is patently nonsensical.

 

[DBT]

For instance, Pood has endorsed constant conjunction and adequate determinism, which do not permit alternate choice or action, yet argues for free choice.

Yet I have pointed out that you have never yet defended the claim that determinism does “not permit alternate choice or action,” whereas I have pointed out that because determinism is a mindless descriptive process, it is not the sort of thing that can permit, fail to permit, or coerce, anything.

That determinism does not permit alternate actions is inherent.

determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.''

I await your answer to my longstanding request to explain how hard determinism paints pictures, writes novels, composes symphonies, and designs buildings.

The answer has been given multiple times;

Conditions on earth have evolved, microbes to multicellular organisms, to the point where creatures capable of writing, painting, landing spacecraft on other planets, etcetera, have evolved.

Our abilities were not freely willed, we played no part in deciding what we would become or be capable of, but how events unfold as the system evolves from past to present state, a species capable of art, science, books, music, where the present conditions, the current state of the world in turn determines future states of the system.

We have been over all this.

It's been done to death, yet here we are.

The cite you give also discusses soft determinism, which is different from hard determinism, so there are different definitions of determinism and not, as you keep insisting, a univocal definition.

The only difference is that compatibilists claim that free will is compatible with determinism and incompatibilists claim it isn't.

determinism as a system, it's terms and conditions, is the same.

Free will is the dispute, not the nature of determinism....unless it is claimed that alternate decisions and actions are possible.

Due to how determinism is defined, they are not possible. Whatever happens, must happen as determined. Will, for instance, is determined.

You keep mistakingly claiming that (hard) determinism does not “permit” alternative actions. As has been endlessly pointed out, determinism is a descriptive and not a prescriptive process, and thus in no position to “not permit” anything.

The given definition of determinism is a description of how the world works if it is deterministic.

If the world is in fact deterministic, everything happens as determined, just as defined.

The world may include truly random events, but that is irrelevant to compatibilism because that is the argument that free will is compatible with, not random events, but determinism just as it is defined to be.

The Britannica cite commits the modal fallacy, which has been explained to death.

You still have not explained how the Big Bang designs buildings, paints picture, etc. You just assert it.

Nah, no modal fallacy. Though Compatibilism may qualify as a modal fallacy due to its neglect to take the nature of will into account in its careful but erroneous definition of 'free will.'

 

[DBT]

Well, hard determinism denies free will and soft determinism supports it. So they are at loggerheads.

Yes but the disagreement is about the nature of free will, not about determinism.

If the compatibilist and the incompatibilist cannot agree on what they mean by determinism then any discussion about the compatibility, or otherwise, of free will is entirely pointless.

Exactly, and I have pointed this out time and again, to no avail.

 

[DBT]

Either the Big Bang designs a building or an architect does. If an architect does he must make innumerable choices.

There is no evidence that the Big Bang has any capacity to design anything.

Ergo an architect does it.

And therefore he must make choices.

QED.

As pointed out, it was the early conditions on earth, biogenesis and evolution that eventually produced a species capable of art, tool use and technology. A process that had nothing to do with free will.

Where if determinism holds sway, and that is indeed how the world works, it began with conditions at time t and the way things went thereafter fixed as a matter of natural law.

 

[steve_bank]

Not all philosophy is useless.

Normal science? What a laugh. More useless philosophy that impacts nothing.

Like a theist quoting scripture he quotes philosophy aka secular scripture on science without any clue what science is and how it is done.

The calculus is the basic language of science and technology. Without it you can not read science.

dil·et·tante
/ˌdiləˈtänt/
noun
noun: dilettante; plural noun: dilettantes; plural noun: dilettanti

a person who cultivates an area of interest, such as the arts, without real commitment or knowledge.
"a wealthy literary dilettante"

A great book written by a group of Japanese students who started with little or no math and science. Used to have a copy. A good place to start

What Is Quantum Mechanics?: A Physics Adventure: Transnational College of LEX, Transnational College of LEX: 9780964350410: Amazon.com: Books

Buy What Is Quantum Mechanics?: A Physics Adventure on Amazon.com ✓ FREE SHIPPING on qualified orders

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What is Quantum Mechanics? A Physics Adventure comprehensively traces the historical development of quantum mechanics, treating a complex subject in a light-hearted, user-friendly manner. It not only introduces the reader to the concepts of quantum mechanics, but also tells the story behind the theories. It is easy to understand for beginners because it was written by people going through the learning process themselves. Yet, even the seasoned scientist will enjoy the controversy and drama as the development of physics unfolds in the book.Dr. Yoichiro Nambu, 2008 Nobel Prize Winner in Physics, served as a senior adviser to the student authors of What is Quantum Mechanics? A Physics Adventure at the Transnational College of LEX throughout their journey of discovery.

 

[Jarhyn]

I'll note, I always find it amusing when people who get their views thrashed over them containing some particular kind of fallacy tend towards accusing others of engaging in the fallacy, almost as if they don't understand fallacies or logical reasoning at all.

As to The Antichris, no, they ARE different concepts of determinism, as much as they are different concepts of freedom and will, because the fatalist as much as the libertarian each think that Determinism is equivalent to Fatalism, which they are not.

Fatalism is the express belief that there is a Set of All Sets that creates some kind of omnipotence-based requirement for things to be as they are rather than being as they are because that's how things happen to be there.

When you have a contradiction or syntax error buried somewhere in your assumptions, it can manifest in various way, be buried in various places, and create errors that appear in pairs or groups.

Regardless, it's tiresome and boorish to try and beat a horse zombie back to death.

Maybe Carrier can help out if he decides it's worth his time.

 

[Jarhyn]

The cite you give also discusses soft determinism, which is different from hard determinism, so there are different definitions of determinism and not, as you keep insisting, a univocal definition.#

I disagree. As I understand it, soft determinism (compatibilism) and hard determinism (incompatibilism) are beliefs about the nature of free will and not different definitions of determinism. Both hard and soft determinists agree that (to paraphrase Marvin Edwards) "every event is the reliable result of prior events" and is derived from the notion of "a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect".

Of course, there may be some compatibilists who genuinely do define determinism in a different way to incompatibilists but the point remains that compatibilism in general does not rely on a different definition of determinism.

The problem is that "every event is the reliable result of prior events" persistently gets injected with "such that you could not do otherwise" by hard determinists, despite the fact that this part is a modal fallacy.

It's a bait ("every event is the reliable result of prior events") and switch ("you could not do otherwise") which injects the bad definition of freedom directly into the definition of determinism.

Oftentimes errors compound this way, or occur in nested groups.

I assure you, BOTH fatalist definitions are flawed.

 

[The AntiChris]

The cite you give also discusses soft determinism, which is different from hard determinism, so there are different definitions of determinism and not, as you keep insisting, a univocal definition.#

I disagree. As I understand it, soft determinism (compatibilism) and hard determinism (incompatibilism) are beliefs about the nature of free will and not different definitions of determinism. Both hard and soft determinists agree that (to paraphrase Marvin Edwards) "every event is the reliable result of prior events" and is derived from the notion of "a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect".

Of course, there may be some compatibilists who genuinely do define determinism in a different way to incompatibilists but the point remains that compatibilism in general does not rely on a different definition of determinism.

The problem is that "every event is the reliable result of prior events" persistently gets injected with "such that you could not do otherwise" by hard determinists, despite the fact that this part is a modal fallacy.

It's a bait ("every event is the reliable result of prior events") and switch ("you could not do otherwise") which injects the bad definition of freedom directly into the definition of determinism.

Oftentimes errors compound this way, or occur in nested groups.

I assure you, BOTH fatalist definitions are flawed.

Sure, all incompatibilists insist that freedom is not possible within determinism.

I can't tell if you're agreeing or disagreeing with what I posted?

 

[pood]

Well, hard determinism denies free will and soft determinism supports it. So they are at loggerheads.

Yes but the disagreement is about the nature of free will, not about determinism.

Not for me. For me, the problem is that hard determinism mistakes determinism for pre-determinism. Although propositions may timelessly true, as I think they are, the events that the propositions describe provide the truth grounds for those propositions. If it rains tomorrow then the proposition “tomorrow it will rain” is true. I again commend the linked essay by Carrier on these matters, and also the philosophical writings of Norma Swartz.

 

[pood]

For instance, Pood has endorsed constant conjunction and adequate determinism, which do not permit alternate choice or action, yet argues for free choice.

Yet I have pointed out that you have never yet defended the claim that determinism does “not permit alternate choice or action,” whereas I have pointed out that because determinism is a mindless descriptive process, it is not the sort of thing that can permit, fail to permit, or coerce, anything.

That determinism does not permit alternate actions is inherent.

determinism, in philosophy and science, the thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable. Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.''

I await your answer to my longstanding request to explain how hard determinism paints pictures, writes novels, composes symphonies, and designs buildings.

The answer has been given multiple times;

Conditions on earth have evolved, microbes to multicellular organisms, to the point where creatures capable of writing, painting, landing spacecraft on other planets, etcetera, have evolved.

Our abilities were not freely willed, we played no part in deciding what we would become or be capable of, but how events unfold as the system evolves from past to present state, a species capable of art, science, books, music, where the present conditions, the current state of the world in turn determines future states of the system.

We have been over all this.

It's been done to death, yet here we are.

The cite you give also discusses soft determinism, which is different from hard determinism, so there are different definitions of determinism and not, as you keep insisting, a univocal definition.

The only difference is that compatibilists claim that free will is compatible with determinism and incompatibilists claim it isn't.

determinism as a system, it's terms and conditions, is the same.

Free will is the dispute, not the nature of determinism....unless it is claimed that alternate decisions and actions are possible.

Due to how determinism is defined, they are not possible. Whatever happens, must happen as determined. Will, for instance, is determined.

You keep mistakingly claiming that (hard) determinism does not “permit” alternative actions. As has been endlessly pointed out, determinism is a descriptive and not a prescriptive process, and thus in no position to “not permit” anything.

The given definition of determinism is a description of how the world works if it is deterministic.

If the world is in fact deterministic, everything happens as determined, just as defined.

The world may include truly random events, but that is irrelevant to compatibilism because that is the argument that free will is compatible with, not random events, but determinism just as it is defined to be.

The Britannica cite commits the modal fallacy, which has been explained to death.

You still have not explained how the Big Bang designs buildings, paints picture, etc. You just assert it.

Nah, no modal fallacy. Though Compatibilism may qualify as a modal fallacy due to its neglect to take the nature of will into account in its careful but erroneous definition of 'free will.'

Right, then. Still no answer to the question of how the Big Bang designs buildings, etc.

For the billionth time, the modal fallacy is to conflate necessity with contingency. The hard determinist — or, as I prefer, the pre-determinist — says that given antecedents x, y, and z, then I MUST do A. My view, modally consistent, is that given those antecedents I WILL [but not MUST] do A.

It’s a world of difference, described to death.

 

[Jarhyn]

The cite you give also discusses soft determinism, which is different from hard determinism, so there are different definitions of determinism and not, as you keep insisting, a univocal definition.#

I disagree. As I understand it, soft determinism (compatibilism) and hard determinism (incompatibilism) are beliefs about the nature of free will and not different definitions of determinism. Both hard and soft determinists agree that (to paraphrase Marvin Edwards) "every event is the reliable result of prior events" and is derived from the notion of "a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect".

Of course, there may be some compatibilists who genuinely do define determinism in a different way to incompatibilists but the point remains that compatibilism in general does not rely on a different definition of determinism.

The problem is that "every event is the reliable result of prior events" persistently gets injected with "such that you could not do otherwise" by hard determinists, despite the fact that this part is a modal fallacy.

It's a bait ("every event is the reliable result of prior events") and switch ("you could not do otherwise") which injects the bad definition of freedom directly into the definition of determinism.

Oftentimes errors compound this way, or occur in nested groups.

I assure you, BOTH fatalist definitions are flawed.

Sure, all incompatibilists insist that freedom is not possible within determinism.

I can't tell if you're agreeing or disagreeing with what I posted?

I'm disagreeing, insofar as the definition of "deterministic" for the fatalist generally contains "such that you could not do otherwise" directly in the definition.

It is such a tacit assumption by the hard determinist, that you will see them frequently invoking 'terms and conditions' of determinism and quoting this particular(ly erroneous) one.

The result is that they say "could do otherwise" is necessary to freedom, "determinism" says couldn't do otherwise, therefore no freedom... Despite the fact determinism doesn't say that, fatalism does.

 

[The AntiChris]

Yes but the disagreement is about the nature of free will, not about determinism.

Not for me. For me, the problem is that hard determinism mistakes determinism for pre-determinism.

I don't think this is right. You're assuming that incomptatibilism necessarily entails a belief in pre-determinism. Whilst there will be some incomptatibilists who do subscribe to pre-determinism (a bizarre worldview) I'm pretty sure most don't. Most incomptatibilists believe that reliable cause and effect means that, under the same conditions, we couldn't act differently and that this robs us of freedom of will - this is standard hard determinism. The disagreement is about the nature of freedom under determinism.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

I always find it amusing when people who get their views thrashed over them containing some particular kind of fallacy tend towards accusing others of engaging in the fallacy, almost as if they don't understand fallacies or logical reasoning at all.

The modal error which occurs most frequently is that which happens when a person imagines something as being possibly the case but the person asserts that something as being actually the case.

This error most commonly occurs when a person has not sufficiently imagined other possibilities which could be the case and/or when a person has not sufficiently dispensed with other possibilities that could be the case.

 

[Jarhyn]

I always find it amusing when people who get their views thrashed over them containing some particular kind of fallacy tend towards accusing others of engaging in the fallacy, almost as if they don't understand fallacies or logical reasoning at all.

The modal error which occurs most frequently is that which happens when a person imagines something as being possibly the case but the person asserts that something as being actually the case.

This error most commonly occurs when a person has not sufficiently imagined other possibilities which could be the case and/or when a person has not sufficiently dispensed with other possibilities that could be the case.

Except contradiction. The one thing that is rejected from "possibility" is, in fact, contradiction.

And you on your infinitely questionable "wisdom" believe that this is a modal error to reject the possibility of logical impossibility, in whatever domain.

Pick a version of logically inclined language and you will 100% of the time find that "contradiction" ends up rejected as useless, which is part of the reason libertarian logic is so wacky: they specifically state contradictions do happen in space.

Determinism is a proposition, in part, that our experience lacks such contradictions.

But the one thing someone absolutely must reject as "possible" if they wish to be seriously considered in logical discussion, is "contradiction".

That is the problem that you seem to be having, and it is clearly a "you" problem.

If you want to keep playing stupid retreat-from-reason games, that's entirely up to you I can't stop you. But they are, in fact, stupid retreat-from-reason games we see theists play here all the GD time.

This is almost the paradox of tolerance, but of contradiction.