According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

[Elixir]

Free will says Robert Sapolsky doesn’t exist.

 

[Jarhyn]

Free will says Robert Sapolsky doesn’t exist.

I mean, that has been a claim made; but rather the claim that Robert Sapolski does not exist rather than "because free will says".

Believing the self, and as such believing any delineated token, does not really exist, would lead to that conclusion.

Then, the hard determinist sees in Robert Sapolski only the original chaos which took part in him as it was then; it ignores all the growth and change in the middle that's part of the result.

 

[Elixir]

the hard determinist sees in Robert Sapolski only the original chaos

Alas, it no longer exists.

 

[BSilvEsq]

Ultimately, fatalism is faith based claim, and I think now this has been revealed well and truly to be the case.

The same is true of a belief in Free Will.

The only difference between faith in a fatalistic determinism and faith in free will is that the latter feels consistent with reality and the former does not match our feelings. Believing in free will, however, places faith in the belief that our feelings are not deceptive, illusory, or programmed by the universe.

In the end, every belief about the fundamental nature and/or ultimate operation of the universe is a matter of faith. There is no getting around that, no matter how much we would like to do so.

 

[Jarhyn]

The same is true of a belief in Free Will

No, it isn't. As we've discussed, the belief in free will is compatible with determinism; nay dependent on it being true.

It is the "more atheist" position, and from my perspective, the only one that doesn't proclaim reality abides contradictions.

Go ahead and believe in it, but know that I regard your belief the same as all the others: dangerous to people's ability to exercise their will effectively.

 

[pood]

“Fatalistic determinism.”

Fatalism and determinism are not the same thing,

I have examined two arguments for fatalism, theological and epistemic, and shown that both run afoul of logic.

I await an argument for fatalism.

Free will can be empirically observed almost every moment of every day. Fatalism, not so much,

Determinism, or cause and effect, can also obviously be observed. But not fatalism..

 

[BSilvEsq]

The same is true of a belief in Free Will

No, it isn't. As we've discussed, the belief in free will is compatible with determinism; nay dependent on it being true.

It is the "more atheist" position, and from my perspective, the only one that doesn't proclaim reality abides contradictions.

Go ahead and believe in it, but know that I regard your belief the same as all the others: dangerous to people's ability to exercise their will effectively.

Whether a belief in free will is or is not compatible with determinism is immaterial to my assertion that a belief in either is faith based, as there is no proof or falsification of either.

And, as to your last statement, a belief in fatalistic determinism is dangerous to people's ability to exercise their will effectively only if (i) people truly have free will, (ii) they freely incorrectly choose to believe in the absence of free will, and (iii) they do not act "as if" they have free will, nonetheless.

If people do not, in fact, have free will, there is no danger, because everything is simply the way it is and must be.

If people having free will do not choose to believe in the absence of free will, such people will reject the notion of fatalistic determinism, and there will be no danger.

And, if people having free will do incorrectly choose to believe in the absence of free will but act "as if" they have free will, there still will be no danger.

In the end, however, you are free (or compelled) to believe in anything you decide (or are compelled) to believe.

 

[pood]

Belief in compatibilism is not faith based. It is empirical and analytical.

However, I guess one could “argue” that belief in anything at all, including my own existence, is faith based. If one takes that tack, why discuss anything at all?