Eliminating Qualia

[ryan]

What do I think mind is?

At the end of the day, I don't know what mind is. Does anyone, yet? Is it physical?

For the purposes of this discussion and not to get into a free will debate, the mind traditionally is not defined as physical or physically relevant. So a qualifier for the mind, for now, is that it is not physical.

And, to temporarily adopt your dichotomy, how do you know mind is not the 'thing observed' (by the brain) and is not itself an 'observer'?

It may be all the same substance. But being observable and observing are two different properties/features/attributes, or whatever word you want to use as a descriptor.

Switching from 'experience' to 'observation' may be using a slightly more 'scientific/technical' word, but I'm not sure how it gets us out of the problems I brought up with untermensche.

Experience is more of a psychological/metaphysical word, so to use it in an argument for the existence of the mind is to beg the question.

The ability to observe is necessary for the definition of "mind" that I am using. Science is created on human observation. So science cannot deny observation because observation is required for science. That goes for empiricism too.

 

[Subsymbolic]

For the purposes of this discussion and not to get into a free will debate, the mind traditionally is not defined as physical or physically relevant. So a qualifier for the mind, for now, is that it is not physical.


It may be all the same substance. But being observable and observing are two different properties/features/attributes, or whatever word you want to use as a descriptor.

Switching from 'experience' to 'observation' may be using a slightly more 'scientific/technical' word, but I'm not sure how it gets us out of the problems I brought up with untermensche.

Experience is more of a psychological/metaphysical word, so to use it in an argument for the existence of the mind is to beg the question.

The ability to observe is necessary for the definition of "mind" that I am using. Science is created on human observation. So science cannot deny observation because observation is required for science. That goes for empiricism too.

Feedback loops, meet Ryan, Ryan, meet feeback loops. I'll leave you two to get better acquainted. Be quick though, recursion is waiting outside and wants a word...

 

[ryan]

For the purposes of this discussion and not to get into a free will debate, the mind traditionally is not defined as physical or physically relevant. So a qualifier for the mind, for now, is that it is not physical.


It may be all the same substance. But being observable and observing are two different properties/features/attributes, or whatever word you want to use as a descriptor.

Switching from 'experience' to 'observation' may be using a slightly more 'scientific/technical' word, but I'm not sure how it gets us out of the problems I brought up with untermensche.

Experience is more of a psychological/metaphysical word, so to use it in an argument for the existence of the mind is to beg the question.

The ability to observe is necessary for the definition of "mind" that I am using. Science is created on human observation. So science cannot deny observation because observation is required for science. That goes for empiricism too.

Feedback loops, meet Ryan, Ryan, meet feeback loops. I'll leave you two to get better acquainted. Be quick though, recursion is waiting outside and wants a word...

I learnt about feedback loops in grade 10 biology. What about them?

As for recursion (admittedly I didn't know), what is wrong with setting the definition of the thing we are talking about; it's a must, no? Some people ask if the mind can be physical. Well depending on what definition of mind you are talking about. For the platonists "mind", not physical at all. Today the definition gets murky.

 

[Subsymbolic]

Feedback loops, meet Ryan, Ryan, meet feeback loops. I'll leave you two to get better acquainted. Be quick though, recursion is waiting outside and wants a word...

I learnt about feedback loops in grade 10 biology. What about them?

As for recursion (admittedly I didn't know), what is wrong with setting the definition of the thing we are talking about; it's a must, no? Some people ask if the mind can be physical. Well depending on what definition of mind you are talking about. For the platonists "mind", not physical at all. Today the definition gets murky.

There are certain aspects of the mind that I'm very platonic about indeed and I don't, for a moment, think that they cannot be instantiated in the physical. If you learned about feedback loops already, then why can't they offer you a parsimonious way out of your represented representer dilemma?

 

[ruby sparks]

It may be all the same substance. But being observable and observing are two different properties/features/attributes, or whatever word you want to use as a descriptor.......
Experience is more of a psychological/metaphysical word, so to use it in an argument for the existence of the mind is to beg the question. .......... So science cannot deny observation because observation is required for science. That goes for empiricism too.

I think what I'would not be convinced of for example would be if you said that the mind was the observer, or, if you said that there were only those two options, that something had to be one or the other.

I'm also not clear on how 'observation' changes anything compared to 'experience'. What question does the latter beg that the former doesn't, in your view?

 

[ryan]

Feedback loops, meet Ryan, Ryan, meet feeback loops. I'll leave you two to get better acquainted. Be quick though, recursion is waiting outside and wants a word...

I learnt about feedback loops in grade 10 biology. What about them?

As for recursion (admittedly I didn't know), what is wrong with setting the definition of the thing we are talking about; it's a must, no? Some people ask if the mind can be physical. Well depending on what definition of mind you are talking about. For the platonists "mind", not physical at all. Today the definition gets murky.

There are certain aspects of the mind that I'm very platonic about indeed and I don't, for a moment, think that they cannot be instantiated in the physical. If you learned about feedback loops already, then why can't they offer you a parsimonious way out of your represented representer dilemma?

I didn't know there is a dilemma. Explain.

 

[ryan]

It may be all the same substance. But being observable and observing are two different properties/features/attributes, or whatever word you want to use as a descriptor.......
Experience is more of a psychological/metaphysical word, so to use it in an argument for the existence of the mind is to beg the question. .......... So science cannot deny observation because observation is required for science. That goes for empiricism too.

I think what I'would not be convinced of for example would be if you said that the mind was the observer, or, if you said that there were only those two options, that something had to be one or the other.

I'm also not clear on how 'observation' changes anything compared to 'experience'. What question does the latter beg that the former doesn't, in your view?

I already explained. Science needs to assume observability exists to use its method. It doesn't need a report of the experience to find the experience of being cold; they won't observe this experience in the metaphysical sense. They would find no mechanism or causal reason for this experience. The mind's response to this goes undetected.

 

[ruby sparks]

Sorry. I'm not following you very well.

 

[ryan]

Sorry. I'm not following you very well.

I guess I could have been clearer to answer your second question.

I'm also not clear on how 'observation' changes anything compared to 'experience'. What question does the latter beg that the former doesn't, in your view?

"Experiences" have more of a mind/qualia connotation and even imply mind/qualia, and "observation" doesn't have the connotations even though observation implies experience. Observation is the Trojan horse that I can use to bring down the hard physicalists.

Observation is a type of experience that science or empiricists must accept for there to be science, empiricism. Now, all other experiences science cannot find, don't really use and cannot even acknowledge exist, and rightfully so based on the scientific method. Pain, for example, is not observable. That is one of the kinds of the elusive qualia.

But when it comes to the experience of human observation (usually visual for science), science can't deny that one because it uses it.

So we start with acquiring information with observation, not just scientific information but much of our total information. Now, that information does not carry with it the existence of observation. We start noticing that there is no observer/experience in all of the information that we processed. But we forget it was the observation that brought about the information in the first place.

 

[Subsymbolic]

Sorry. I'm not following you very well.

I guess I could have been clearer to answer your second question.

I'm also not clear on how 'observation' changes anything compared to 'experience'. What question does the latter beg that the former doesn't, in your view?

"Experiences" have more of a mind/qualia connotation and even imply mind/qualia, and "observation" doesn't have the connotations even though observation implies experience. Observation is the Trojan horse that I can use to bring down the hard physicalists.

Observation is a type of experience that science or empiricists must accept for there to be science, empiricism. Now, all other experiences science cannot find, don't really use and cannot even acknowledge exist, and rightfully so based on the scientific method. Pain, for example, is not observable. That is one of the kinds of the elusive qualia.

But when it comes to the experience of human observation (usually visual for science), science can't deny that one because it uses it.

So we start with acquiring information with observation, not just scientific information but much of our total information. Now, that information does not carry with it the existence of observation. We start noticing that there is no observer/experience in all of the information that we processed. But we forget it was the observation that brought about the information in the first place.

If you think pain isn't observable, you clearly are not a first aider and have been very lucky. What you mean is that pain cannot be communicated via what Wittgenstein called 'language games' - it can't be symbolically communicated through something else, words for example, standing for the pain via conceptualising judgements. Pain can be perfectly well communicated by subsymbolic pain behaviour, what ethnologists call 'signalling'. There's a whole host of communication that is built into our biology and for which there is a slightly less contingent relationship between pain and pain behaviour than one finds through mere language.

Language and especially intentional talk are comparatively (and very) recent mind tool tools that trade being real for ease of use, specificity and generality. Most of the time its a good trade, but when you compare them to communicating in something closer to wetware 'machine code'. They are shit and give rise to the illusion that we cannot communicate in older, more bespoke ways. Anyone who thinks we cannot communicate inner states and processes directly must have a really dull sex life.

More to the point, if, for this sort of non bicameral non conceptual content (that is, phenomenology that doesn't intrinsically or conditionally have both a conceptual and a non conceptual aspect) to think of the mental state not being the physical state just looks like indefensible dualism. When we get down to pain processing in the pain matrix of the brain there's no reason not to conclude that the nociception just feels like something to have, even while it is moderated by systems like the PAG. As such, if you make the metaphysical assumption that in some circumstances that the mental state just is the processing state experienced from the inside, then the whole problem about a scientific grip on qualia looks an awful lot less of a problem.

Descartes set us up to fail with an argument that would be laughed out of court nowadays. The daft bugger begs the question and that's a formal fallacy: petitio principii.

Which reminds me. FFS will people stop saying something 'begs the question' when they mean that something raises or invites a question. Begging the question is specific logical fallacy in which one assumes the premise that they want to prove in their argument. This is what Descartes did in his argument that the mind is better known than the body. The argument only works if one has already assumed that they are separate. if you don't assume this, evidence of one is evidence for the other.

http://www.txstate.edu/philosophy/resources/fallacy-definitions/Begging-the-Question.html

 

[ryan]

I guess I could have been clearer to answer your second question.



"Experiences" have more of a mind/qualia connotation and even imply mind/qualia, and "observation" doesn't have the connotations even though observation implies experience. Observation is the Trojan horse that I can use to bring down the hard physicalists.

Observation is a type of experience that science or empiricists must accept for there to be science, empiricism. Now, all other experiences science cannot find, don't really use and cannot even acknowledge exist, and rightfully so based on the scientific method. Pain, for example, is not observable. That is one of the kinds of the elusive qualia.

But when it comes to the experience of human observation (usually visual for science), science can't deny that one because it uses it.

So we start with acquiring information with observation, not just scientific information but much of our total information. Now, that information does not carry with it the existence of observation. We start noticing that there is no observer/experience in all of the information that we processed. But we forget it was the observation that brought about the information in the first place.

If you think pain isn't observable, you clearly are not a first aider and have been very lucky. What you mean is that pain cannot be communicated via what Wittgenstein called 'language games' - it can't be symbolically communicated through something else, words for example, standing for the pain via conceptualising judgements. Pain can be perfectly well communicated by subsymbolic pain behaviour, what ethnologists call 'signalling'. There's a whole host of communication that is built into our biology and for which there is a slightly less contingent relationship between pain and pain behaviour than one finds through mere language.

Language and especially intentional talk are comparatively (and very) recent mind tool tools that trade being real for ease of use, specificity and generality. Most of the time its a good trade, but when you compare them to communicating in something closer to wetware 'machine code'. They are shit and give rise to the illusion that we cannot communicate in older, more bespoke ways. Anyone who thinks we cannot communicate inner states and processes directly must have a really dull sex life.

More to the point, if, for this sort of non bicameral non conceptual content (that is, phenomenology that doesn't intrinsically or conditionally have both a conceptual and a non conceptual aspect) to think of the mental state not being the physical state just looks like indefensible dualism. When we get down to pain processing in the pain matrix of the brain there's no reason not to conclude that the nociception just feels like something to have, even while it is moderated by systems like the PAG. As such, if you make the metaphysical assumption that in some circumstances that the mental state just is the processing state experienced from the inside, then the whole problem about a scientific grip on qualia looks an awful lot less of a problem.

PAG?

"from the inside", you may as well be talking about dualism. But "from the inside" is sort of what I have been saying all along; except I have been using terms like mind or subjectivity.

Which reminds me. FFS will people stop saying something 'begs the question' when they mean that something raises or invites a question. Begging the question is specific logical fallacy in which one assumes the premise that they want to prove in their argument.

That is how I was using it. That is how most people use it on TF.

This is what Descartes did in his argument that the mind is better known than the body. The argument only works if one has already assumed that they are separate. if you don't assume this, evidence of one is evidence for the other.

This seems like new optimism for body and mind. So what happened to your hard physicalist side? Days ago you were toying with the idea of no mind.

 

[Subsymbolic]

PAG?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Periaqueductal_gray

"from the inside", you may as well be talking about dualism. But "from the inside" is sort of what I have been saying all along; except I have been using terms like mind or subjectivity.

I'm certainly talking about property dualism - the same stuff looks different when apprehended from the inside and the outside. I'm still a physicalist.

Which reminds me. FFS will people stop saying something 'begs the question' when they mean that something raises or invites a question. Begging the question is specific logical fallacy in which one assumes the premise that they want to prove in their argument.

That is how I was using it. That is how most people use it on TF.

Cool.

This is what Descartes did in his argument that the mind is better known than the body. The argument only works if one has already assumed that they are separate. if you don't assume this, evidence of one is evidence for the other.

This seems like new optimism for body and mind.

Nope, same position I've held since the late eighties.

So what happened to your hard physicalist side?

It's the only side I've got. Everything supervenes on the physical. I just think that you can do more with mere matter than is dreamed of in most philosophies. Personally I don't think consciousness is logically irreducibly emergent, just practically irreducibly emergent. Intentions, on the other hand, are logically irreducibly emergent, as are a range of logical structures.

We are complicated.

Days ago you were toying with the idea of no mind.

I don't think I was. Ever. At best, I was pointing out a certain poster's inconsistency and supporting Dennett's cleverness. But feel free to pin me to my words. I think you'll find them nuanced.

 

[ruby sparks]

Sorry. I'm not following you very well.

I guess I could have been clearer to answer your second question.

I'm also not clear on how 'observation' changes anything compared to 'experience'. What question does the latter beg that the former doesn't, in your view?

"Experiences" have more of a mind/qualia connotation and even imply mind/qualia, and "observation" doesn't have the connotations even though observation implies experience. Observation is the Trojan horse that I can use to bring down the hard physicalists.

Observation is a type of experience that science or empiricists must accept for there to be science, empiricism. Now, all other experiences science cannot find, don't really use and cannot even acknowledge exist, and rightfully so based on the scientific method. Pain, for example, is not observable. That is one of the kinds of the elusive qualia.

But when it comes to the experience of human observation (usually visual for science), science can't deny that one because it uses it.

So we start with acquiring information with observation, not just scientific information but much of our total information. Now, that information does not carry with it the existence of observation. We start noticing that there is no observer/experience in all of the information that we processed. But we forget it was the observation that brought about the information in the first place.

I'm still not seeing how you gain any additional traction by switching from 'experience' to 'observation'. They're both reported, for instance. In terms of human activity/capacity they're synonyms, aren't they? And does science deny 'experience'?

 

[bilby]

... Which reminds me. FFS will people stop saying something 'begs the question' when they mean that something raises or invites a question. ...

They probably should, but I very much doubt that they ever will, so we can either get used to it, or go through life in an almost permanent state of mild annoyance. (Personally, I choose the latter).

 

[ryan]

I guess I could have been clearer to answer your second question.



"Experiences" have more of a mind/qualia connotation and even imply mind/qualia, and "observation" doesn't have the connotations even though observation implies experience. Observation is the Trojan horse that I can use to bring down the hard physicalists.

Observation is a type of experience that science or empiricists must accept for there to be science, empiricism. Now, all other experiences science cannot find, don't really use and cannot even acknowledge exist, and rightfully so based on the scientific method. Pain, for example, is not observable. That is one of the kinds of the elusive qualia.

But when it comes to the experience of human observation (usually visual for science), science can't deny that one because it uses it.

So we start with acquiring information with observation, not just scientific information but much of our total information. Now, that information does not carry with it the existence of observation. We start noticing that there is no observer/experience in all of the information that we processed. But we forget it was the observation that brought about the information in the first place.

I'm still not seeing how you gain any additional traction by switching from 'experience' to 'observation'. They're both reported, for instance. In terms of human activity/capacity they're synonyms, aren't they? And does science deny 'experience'?

So let's say they do discover experience. Suppose they found pain for some person for some small interval of time. They scan it with 3d scanners and they even build a replica of it and put it in a vat that they run in a loop (they rarely "turn it on" because that would be cruel to that thing's existence).

With me so far?

Now, they found the coveted exact correlate to a kind of pain, one of the big scientific quests.

However, upon inspection, they notice that there is nothing strange about the way it functions. In other words everything in this piece of brain works as you would expect if it didn't have pain associated with it. Absolutely nothing else is found other than the essential molecules and forces doing exactly what they are theorized to do.

Have they really found pain anymore than if they would have tried 2000 years ago, except that 2000 years ago they would have been off by a couple inches due to narrowing pain down to just the brain and not the exact piece of brain?

Furthermore, where is this pain that this stuff is correlated to? Where and what is the property or substance of this pain they found? There is no direct or indirect evidence or any sign of it anywhere!

My point is that experience/consciousness/mind is not science and will never be science as we understand science today.

 

[ruby sparks]

So let's say they do discover experience. Suppose they found pain for some person for some small interval of time. They scan it with 3d scanners and they even build a replica of it and put it in a vat that they run in a loop (they rarely "turn it on" because that would be cruel to that thing's existence).

With me so far?

Now, they found the coveted exact correlate to a kind of pain, one of the big scientific quests.

However, upon inspection, they notice that there is nothing strange about the way it functions. In other words everything in this piece of brain works as you would expect if it didn't have pain associated with it. Absolutely nothing else is found other than the essential molecules and forces doing exactly what they are theorized to do.

Have they really found pain anymore than if they would have tried 2000 years ago, except that 2000 years ago they would have been off by a couple inches due to narrowing pain down to just the brain and not the exact piece of brain?

Furthermore, where is this pain that this stuff is correlated to? Where and what is the property or substance of this pain they found? There is no direct or indirect evidence or any sign of it anywhere!

My point is that experience/consciousness/mind is not science and will never be science as we understand science today.

Then I'm sorry, I don't get your point at all.

Try this:

So let's say they do discover human observation. Suppose they found observation for some person for some small interval of time. They scan it with 3d scanners and they even build a replica of it and put it in a vat that they run in a loop.

With me so far?

Now, they found the coveted exact correlate to a kind of observation, one of the big scientific quests.

However, upon inspection, they notice that there is nothing strange about the way it functions. In other words everything in this piece of brain works as you would expect if it didn't have observation associated with it. Absolutely nothing else is found other than the essential molecules and forces doing exactly what they are theorized to do.

Have they really found observation anymore than if they would have tried 2000 years ago, except that 2000 years ago they would have been off by a couple inches due to narrowing observation down to just the brain and not the exact piece of brain?

Furthermore, where is this observation that this stuff is correlated to? Where and what is the property or substance of this observation they found? There is no direct or indirect evidence or any sign of it anywhere!





ETA: And apart from anything else, the idea that if everything (everything) in the brain works as it should, that there would be either no experience or no observation (or whatever) seems very unlikely. Why would it/they be absent, in that case? Can you think of a reason? I can't.

 

[ryan]

So let's say they do discover experience. Suppose they found pain for some person for some small interval of time. They scan it with 3d scanners and they even build a replica of it and put it in a vat that they run in a loop (they rarely "turn it on" because that would be cruel to that thing's existence).

With me so far?

Now, they found the coveted exact correlate to a kind of pain, one of the big scientific quests.

However, upon inspection, they notice that there is nothing strange about the way it functions. In other words everything in this piece of brain works as you would expect if it didn't have pain associated with it. Absolutely nothing else is found other than the essential molecules and forces doing exactly what they are theorized to do.

Have they really found pain anymore than if they would have tried 2000 years ago, except that 2000 years ago they would have been off by a couple inches due to narrowing pain down to just the brain and not the exact piece of brain?

Furthermore, where is this pain that this stuff is correlated to? Where and what is the property or substance of this pain they found? There is no direct or indirect evidence or any sign of it anywhere!

My point is that experience/consciousness/mind is not science and will never be science as we understand science today.

Then I'm sorry, I don't get your point at all.

Try this:

So let's say they do discover human observation. Suppose they found observation for some person for some small interval of time. They scan it with 3d scanners and they even build a replica of it and put it in a vat that they run in a loop.

With me so far?

Now, they found the coveted exact correlate to a kind of observation, one of the big scientific quests.

However, upon inspection, they notice that there is nothing strange about the way it functions. In other words everything in this piece of brain works as you would expect if it didn't have observation associated with it. Absolutely nothing else is found other than the essential molecules and forces doing exactly what they are theorized to do.

Have they really found observation anymore than if they would have tried 2000 years ago, except that 2000 years ago they would have been off by a couple inches due to narrowing observation down to just the brain and not the exact piece of brain?

Furthermore, where is this observation that this stuff is correlated to? Where and what is the property or substance of this observation they found? There is no direct or indirect evidence or any sign of it anywhere!

ETA: And apart from anything else, the idea that if everything (everything) in the brain works as it should, that there would be either no experience or no observation (or whatever) seems very unlikely. Why would it/they be absent, in that case? Can you think of a reason? I can't.

That is not at all my point. It wouldn't be absent; I believe that the observation is there. I am trying to say that it isn't detectable directly or indirectly, and thus not a matter that the scientific method can address.

 

[ruby sparks]

That is not at all my point. It wouldn't be absent; I believe that the observation is there. I am trying to say that it isn't detectable directly or indirectly, and thus not a matter that the scientific method can address.

Yes, neither it nor experience are arguably, of themselves, detectable in any scientific way, although science acknowledges the existence of both. So why make the distinction? I'm sorry, but I still don't get it.

I think you said that using the word 'experience' begs (or raises, I don't mind which you meant) a question that 'observation' doesn't.

 

[ryan]

That is not at all my point. It wouldn't be absent; I believe that the observation is there. I am trying to say that it isn't detectable directly or indirectly, and thus not a matter that the scientific method can address.

Yes, neither it nor experience are arguably, of themselves, detectable in any scientific way, although science acknowledges the existence of both. So why make the distinction? I'm sorry, but I still don't get it.

From what I understand, science does not yet acknowledge the existence of experience nor should it. Scientists, however, may use their philosophical instincts and attempt to hypothesize for it in some pseudoscientific sort of way and it somehow gives experience/qualia some sort of scientific consideration, but it will never go further than that.

I mean show me a proper experiment that tests for the mind. Seriously, maybe someone has thought of something so clever and so far outside of the box, and I will eat my words.

I think you said that using the word 'experience' begs (or raises, I don't mind which you meant) a question that 'observation' doesn't.

This is part of my argument to the hardcore physicalists that do not acknowledge the existence of experiences in the mental sense of the term. They use scientific explanations - that use experiences/observation - to attempt to sift out the possibility of the mind. For years I have been on here arguing against these extreme physicalists; there are many but they aren't coming out for some reason. They take the stance that if it is not science (observable directly or indirectly), then we are just guessing randomly, and in most cases I agree, but not for the mind.

 

[Subsymbolic]

I'll say it again: i'm as hard core a physicalist that you can get. I don't deny anything mental. I'm also pretty sure that people who deny the existence of the mental are either called behaviourists or eliminativists depending on whether they want to deny the cognitive or the affective. I'm not sure of anyone who wants to deny the conative. People just forget it exists, which is a pity as quite a lot seems to ride on it. I don't remember ever having an internet row about the conative.

Now there are different flavours of behaviourist, but I can't think of any I've read here. There's the occasional linguistic behaviourist elsewhere, but beyond that?

Just out of interest, why don't you accept heterophenomenology. I've never used a radio telescope or a cyclotron, but I trust the community of radiotelescopists or Cernians to tell me how the very big and very small looks. Why not run with Dennett's suggestion that we trust people's heterophenomenological reports as it just happens that they have the right kit - their brains - to report what is going on.

Or my suggestion - that we stop being dualists and accept that any system that solves the easy problem of consciousness and claims to also solve the hard one shoudl be assumed to do so? Most of the really intractable problems of science involved not more research, but changing the type of question or the way we ask the question. Why not here?