Eliminating Qualia

[WAB]

This is Searle at a talk. He has also written it out.

Here is a link to G.E. Moore's hand proof thing:

http://micahcobb.com/blog/g-e-moores-proof-of-an-external-world/

Before I get beaten around the face and neck again [Woody Allen, Play it Again Sam]: I DO NOT (at least not altogether now..) hang with these "common sense" proofs. I merely mentioned them, since the arm raising thing had been brought up, which itself, via Searle, referred back to Moore, though not with a name drop.

 

[DBT]

Why exactly are we all wasting so much effort here?

This chap is absolutely sure he’s right. I’ve been here a while now and he’s not given an inch to anyone on anything. No minds are going to get changed here, it’s old tedious ground and it’s a waste of time and effort that could be used on new ground that might get interesting...

I'm not entirely convinced that he is serious, it's possible that he is, but his position is so untenable that hard to believe that a reasonable person would try to maintain it.

On the other hand, we do still have people arguing for a literal garden of eden, talking snakes, etc...

 

[DBT]

Quote;
''Injury to, and disease in, the brain often provides crucial insights on the role of its different parts. A dramatic example is the injury suffered by American railway foreman, Phineas Gage in 1848. Before his accident, Gage was liked by friends and acquaintances who considered him to be honest, trustworthy, hard working and dependable. A freak accident caused a metal tamping rod to enter under his left zygomatic arch and exit through the top of his skull (Barker, 1995).

The accident left him with little if any intellectual impairment but after the accident, Gage became vulgar, irresponsible, capricious and prone to profanity. The company that had previously regarded him as the most efficient and capable of their employees dismissed him from his job. His change in character after the accident made this the index case for personality change due to frontal lobe damage. Subsequent studies (See, for example, Blumer and Benson, 1975) have shown a wide spectrum of abnormal behaviour (compulsive and explosive actions, lack of inhibition, unwarranted maniacal suspicion and alcohol and drug abuse) after injuries to and disease in the frontal or temporal lobes and their pathways to the deeper regions of the brain.''

''Similar abnormalities also follow chemical derangements in the brain.

Modern marvels such as computerised tomography and magnetic resonance imaging of the nervous system have provided significant additional data. Functional magnetic resonance imaging now allows us to further localise function within the structure of the brain and correlate abnormalities of its structure and function.''


''Neurologists and neurosurgeons see patients with injured or diseased brains. Neurosurgeons attempt restoration of the internal structure of the brain to normalcy or correct disordered function in select areas by such modes as deep brain stimulation or ablation. Some operations are performed on patients who are awake. Observations on patients provided clues to the functions of the mind in relation to the structure of the brain. ‘When a surgeon sends an electrical current into the brain, the person can have a vivid, lifelike experience. When chemicals seep into the brain, they can alter the person’s perception, mood, personality, and reasoning. When a patch of brain tissue dies, a part of the mind can disappear: a neurological patient may lose the ability to name tools, recognize faces, anticipate the outcome of his behaviour, empathize with others, or keep in mind a region of space or of his own body… Every emotion and thought gives off physical signals, and the new technologies for detecting them are so accurate that they can literally read a person’s mind and tell a cognitive neuroscientist whether the person is imagining a face or a place. Neuroscientists can knock a gene out of a mouse (a gene also found in humans) and prevent the mouse from learning, or insert extra copies and make the mouse learn faster. Under the microscope, brain tissue shows a staggering complexity—a hundred billion neurons connected by a hundred trillion synapses—that is commensurate with the staggering complexity of human thought and experience… And when the brain dies, the person goes out of existence’ (Pinker, 2003).''

 

[untermensche]

This is Searle at a talk. He has also written it out.

Here is a link to G.E. Moore's hand proof thing:

http://micahcobb.com/blog/g-e-moores-proof-of-an-external-world/

Before I get beaten around the face and neck again [Woody Allen, Play it Again Sam]: I DO NOT hang with these "common sense" proofs. I merely mentioned them, since the arm raising thing had been brought up, which itself, via Searle, referred back to Moore.

He's close about a lot of things.

He has a lot of the big picture right.

He did not come close to explaining how a mind moves an arm and I think he misunderstands here.

The mind does not move the arm.

The mind causes the brain to move the arm.

The only place the mind has any activity is in getting the brain to do things. Like move arms and retrieve memories and order thoughts or switch perception of cubes at will.

And I don't think Moore's "proof" is much of a proof.

"Here is a hand" means a hand is perceived. If two are perceived then two are perceived. His conclusion is only that two hands are perceived.

That is all it can mean.

It can never mean "A hand that exists is perceived".

Nothing can be said about perceptions except they exist and the thing that experiences them exists.

 

[ruby sparks]

I don't think that for a second.

I think we are drifting into the topic of psychology and the random and capricious associations people can make to experiences.

You make your random associations and I make mine.

And your associations have nothing to do with mine.

You see red and bring up the emotions you may associate with it.

But red does not have an emotional component to it. It is just red, a visual experience, and nothing else.

And since the mind experiences all things these associations are easy to form.

Whether it's the brain or the mind, I'm not sure people can arbitrarily have any reaction they want to stimuli.

Again this is psychology, not physiology.

I don't think people necessary "will" the associations but forming emotional associations to stimulation is a good survival mechanism. Having fear rise up when you encounter a stimulation that could cause injury is a good survival mechanism.

It doesn't mean the stimulation has an emotional component to it.

It doesn't make "red" any more than the visual experience of "red".

Sorry, I'm not sure what we disagree about.

If redness for example is a mental experience (which I think we agree it is) then any associations that go along with it are part of that experience. They don't have to be the same associations for two individuals or even the same associations every time for the same individual.

You personally may not have an emotional response to colour, or it may be so mild that it hardly registers, but many people do report it, in varying degrees. The relationship between colour, or even just light, and mood has some clinical support. It has even entered colloquial language, 'I'm feeling blue' and 'it made me see red' and so on. Similar effects can be experienced for sound, which can be experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Sub mentioned how a scream can be terrifying.

And then there are people for whom certain sounds evoke an experience of certain colours (synesthetes). And all of I think are familiar with the fact that a lot of the time it feels like we are tasting food, we are smelling it.

What I am trying to say is, if a certain mental stimulation has an emotional component to the resultant experience, then by definition there is an emotional component to the experience. It's true that the electro-magnetic waves that carry the colour information don't contain any emotion, but the experience, being mental, can be more varied.

 

[untermensche]

There is a difference between:

The experience of red causes the mind to also experience sadness.

And

When he sees red he is sad and when she sees it she is happy.

Those are just arbitrary connections that have formed during a lifetime.

Not part of the visual experience of red.

Red has no emotional component.

That is only what some people add to it.

These connections, these associations, are very useful sometimes. And we seem to make them constantly.

 

[ruby sparks]

Isn't it though!



Sure, but that's an interaction of intentional and phenomenal content. Not just one doing both jobs.

I'm also not sure that one can't communicate qualia and this ties in with my not-even-half-thought-through musings about language. It isn't easy to think of a way I could communicate red, but I could communicate pain, or at least you could receive it, perhaps via mirror neuronal activity. It seems plausible.

I quite agree. However, and this is key, we can't do it through language or language games. Think of how a terrified scream cuts through you. That's signaling and it's certainly communicating something more than words alone. I argue that if we hadn't gone down the intentionality route, we might well have less of a blindspot there. However, mirror neurons are not communicating qualia, they are communicating behaviour. The communication is assumed because the biology that causes the behaviour in me and you is pretty similar even if the microstructure is utterly different (and it is). That's not communication, that's shared heritage doing most of the work.

Also, on the role of language, perhaps because of my job, I am familiar with what I might call 'visual thinking'.

Wittgenstein is ahead of you here: all of these structured systems he calls 'language games' Seriously, you want to read one thing get the investigations. YOu will not read it all, but you will struggle to get better value for money and it's what half the people of the last fifty years are responding to.

There are also other candidates for communication that do not involve language. Some of he early communication between a mother and a baby for instance. What about so-called 'body language'?

Absolutely - see above.

Also, my dreams do not appear to involve language (at the time I have them, I mean).

I don't believe in dreams either. Or rather I don't believe we have dreams and then remember them - they are an artifact of arsing around with memory as the brain consolidates or fiddles with itself and so you just remember them and rationalise away on the basis of remnants of a network re-organising itself a bit.

We can all watch a silent movie (or the tv with the sound off) and get meaning.

Sure, shared biology, intention and so on. When I lived in Florence I often watched the TV with the sound off as it made far more sense. My Italian is crap.

I read that apparently neanderthals had a much larger visual cortex than us. I suppose this leads me to the vague idea that our ancestors thought and perhaps communicated visually, at least more of the time.

There are other ways of being than being infected by language - it's an invasion of the body snatchers I tell you!

Part of what I'm struggling to say, I think, is that because language is so much part of the way we think and communicate, and probably greatly changed the way we do those things, and possibly played a role in the evolution of our brains, it has led us to this distinction between reasoning and emoting, when it's all just all 'thinking'.

I think this is absolutely right, However, it's the tip of a frighteningly complex iceberg.

I suppose I'm wondering if the accepted taxonomies (and which human endeavour can do without a taxonomy, or at least he making of distinctions) may be a feature of what have been described as paradigms, with all the subjectivity and potential arbitrariness that that entails.

Sure, but I think it's hard to make progress without chunking somehow - this may well be an artifact of the way we need to chunk and decompose to deal with a truly shit working memory. Five items plus or minus 2? we need to upgrade that bottleneck!

Sorry if I've missed anything. Just go back to it if I have. I've been interrupted by a request to drive eldest daughter back to university. Luckily, it's only half an hour's drive. But after that, when I get back, it's the last Match of the Day of the season, and the Hammers beat the Toffees, which expression may highlight the advantages in terms of accurate communication of a sophisticated language over thinking in pictures.

I'm a seagull I'm just delighted they are still flying high. Mind you, I came 25th in my league this year. Shocking!

There is too much there and I don't know enough about even half of it to be able to comment, so again without disagreeing, I'm just going to pick up on one or two little bits.

...that's an interaction of intentional and phenomenal content. Not just one doing both jobs.

I'm not sure of the difference between the two (intentional and phenomenal) or even what each is meant to describe. But saying that they are both made of qualia makes intuitive sense, because they are both mental experiences. I'm temporarily assuming that they necessarily involve consciousness, but not ruling out that that they don't.

However, mirror neurons are not communicating qualia, they are communicating behaviour. The communication is assumed because the biology that causes the behaviour in me and you is pretty similar even if the microstructure is utterly different (and it is). That's not communication, that's shared heritage doing most of the work.

In your example, of a heard scream 'cutting through me', I experience fear. That's more than just behaviour, right? It's an affect. I'm not saying the 'qualia communication' is reliable. The other person may be screaming in delight. But 'crossed wires' are common, even for verbal language communication.

I get the feeling that I am using the word qualia in a very general sense and that perhaps I am going beyond what it is used for by at least many people more thoroughly versed in such things than I am, but at this point I can't see a dividing line between qualia and non-qualia when it comes to any sort of mental experience, well-formed thoughts or raw reactions or just redness.

 

[untermensche]

Watching the sun set at the beach has many experiences associated with it.

The feel of the sand and the wind. The sounds of the tides moving in and out. The smell and taste of salt. The visual experiences. The colors and brightness.

Then there are the memories and emotions.

A lot of experiences at once.

Each of them an individual experience. But the combination of them all a seemingly singular experience in itself because the same thing experiences it all.

No qualias.

 

[ruby sparks]

Yeah I watched that a while back.

What he's saying sounded a bit like what has been mooted here a few times, that thoughts are what the physical process feels like, in other words that the process and the thoughts are essentially the same thing. Very counter-intuitive. Hard to get one's head around. I think we are all, not just Um, inclined to separate things into pigeonholes.

Here is a link to G.E. Moore's hand proof thing:

http://micahcobb.com/blog/g-e-moores-proof-of-an-external-world/

Before I get beaten around the face and neck again [Woody Allen, Play it Again Sam]: I DO NOT (at least not altogether now..) hang with these "common sense" proofs. I merely mentioned them, since the arm raising thing had been brought up, which itself, via Searle, referred back to Moore, though not with a name drop.

'Common sense' proofs might be useful in some ways, but I'd be wary of them too, especially, as seems to be the case in that article, they are about to be used as a basis for believing in god.

 

[ruby sparks]

Watching the sun set at the beach has many experiences associated with it.

The feel of the sand and the wind. The sounds of the tides moving in and out. The smell and taste of salt. The visual experiences. The colors and brightness.

Then there are the memories and emotions.

A lot of experiences at once.

Each of them an individual experience. But the combination of them all a seemingly singular experience in itself because the same thing experiences it all.

No qualias.

I'm not sure that they necessarily are all individual and separate experiences. They might be. Like ingredients in a soup. So you could be right.

In any case, I tend to see them as integrated.

And no qualia? I would say they are all qualia, but then maybe I'm using the term in an unusual way.

 

[ruby sparks]

There is a difference between:

The experience of red causes the mind to also experience sadness.

And

When he sees red he is sad and when she sees it she is happy.

Those are just arbitrary connections that have formed during a lifetime.

Not part of the visual experience of red.

Red has no emotional component.

That is only what some people add to it.

These connections, these associations, are very useful sometimes. And we seem to make them constantly.

The problem with saying that red has no emotional component is surely that there is no such thing as red, there is only the mental experience of red, and that if this experience has associations, perhaps from memory, perhaps in some way from something more innate or inherited, then that is as near as dammit red (ie the experience) having an affect. Let's say that the pattern of internal electro-chemical signals that arise from the external electro-magnetic signals is known, recognised or experienced (by the brain or mind or whatever) as an integrated experience.

But, in theory, there could be a 'neutral' experience to a certain colour, yes, in which we might say it's 'just the colour'.

 

[untermensche]

Watching the sun set at the beach has many experiences associated with it.

The feel of the sand and the wind. The sounds of the tides moving in and out. The smell and taste of salt. The visual experiences. The colors and brightness.

Then there are the memories and emotions.

A lot of experiences at once.

Each of them an individual experience. But the combination of them all a seemingly singular experience in itself because the same thing experiences it all.

No qualias.

I'm not sure that they necessarily are all individual and separate experiences. They might be. Like ingredients in a soup. So you could be right.

In any case, I tend to see them as integrated.

And no qualia? I would say they are all qualia, but then maybe I'm using the term in an unusual way.

Some things are just naturally combined.

Like before you taste something you can usually smell it first.

But the taste of salt is just the taste of salt.

What is this qualia?

My position is shifting to thinking there is no such thing.

 

[untermensche]

There is a difference between:

The experience of red causes the mind to also experience sadness.

And

When he sees red he is sad and when she sees it she is happy.

Those are just arbitrary connections that have formed during a lifetime.

Not part of the visual experience of red.

Red has no emotional component.

That is only what some people add to it.

These connections, these associations, are very useful sometimes. And we seem to make them constantly.

The problem with saying that red has no emotional component is surely that there is no such thing as red, there is only the mental experience of red, and that if this experience has associations, perhaps from memory, perhaps in some way from something more innate or inherited, then that is as near as dammit red (ie the experience) having an affect.

The visual system is a distinct system.

So there is the visual experience of red created from the visual system.

That is the entirety of "red".

What you may have added to that experience is a capricious act on your part.

Or perhaps a "subconscious act" of some kind.

But it only pertains to you.

Not to "red".

These capricious and contingent associations are part of what is called the "self".

 

[ruby sparks]

The visual system is a distinct system.

So there is the visual experience of red created from the visual system.

That is the entirety of "red".

What you may have added to that experience is a capricious act on your part.

Or perhaps a "subconscious act" of some kind.

But it only pertains to you.

Not to "red".

These capricious and contingent associations are part of what is called the "self".

Well, I'm not wholly convinced that the visual system is entirely a separate system.

I think I agree with the rest of what you said.

 

[ruby sparks]

Like before you taste something you can usually smell it first.

I read that both the nasal olfactories and the tongue taste buds are combined when it's in my mouth, because there is a tube/cavity going between them, so I'm smelling it and tasting it at the same time but can't tell the difference.

 

[untermensche]

The visual system starts at the eye.

It is the system that transforms the light that hits the eye into the visual experience.

What is made of the images are different systems.

 

[ruby sparks]

The visual system starts at the eye.

It is the system that transforms the light that hits the eye into the visual experience.

What is made of the images are different systems.

Yes, I agree that the visual system seems more separate than taste or smell, both of which may be interwined with each other in ways that vision aren't. But, synesthetes provide counter-evidence. You may say that synesthesia is a malfunction, but my guess is that such things are on a spectrum. Then there is blindsight, where there is nothing, zilch, coming through the eye.

 

[untermensche]

Like before you taste something you can usually smell it first.

I read that both the nasal olfactories and the tongue taste buds are combined when it's in my mouth, because there is a tube/cavity going between them, so I'm smelling it and tasting it at the same time but can't tell the difference.

Taste is a combination of many things, including smell.

It also includes texture and temperature.

So it is not a singular sensation.

But smell has a distinct cranial nerve.

 

[ruby sparks]

Like before you taste something you can usually smell it first.

I read that both the nasal olfactories and the tongue taste buds are combined when it's in my mouth, because there is a tube/cavity going between them, so I'm smelling it and tasting it at the same time but can't tell the difference.

Taste is a combination of many things, including smell.

It also includes texture and temperature.

So it is not a singular sensation.

But smell has a distinct cranial nerve.

I don't think it's crucial that we agree on this. I'm not even sure we do disagree much, or that if we do, it matters a lot. I'm happy to say that you might be more right, because I am out of my depth when it comes to the detail of all this.

 

[ruby sparks]

Interesting effect, known as the McGurk Effect:

I'm not sure how it bears on the subject and so I'm not trying to make a particular point.

It seems to me that when there's a conflict between what the senses 'tell' us, one is selected over the other in order to retain a coherent view. In this case, vision overrules hearing, so we discard what we actually hear and favour what we see, even though we're wrong about what we actually hear.

[YOUTUBE]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G-lN8vWm3m0[/YOUTUBE]

It's a fun experiment if nothing else, and highlights the unreliability of our subjective experiences.