The activity that produces a product is not the product.
The activity in the computer chip is not the product of that activity.
It is something that arises because of the activity.
The mind, a distinct entity, arises because of activity.
It is not the activity.
It is not the thing producing the activity.
It is a "thing" unto itself.
Not necessarily. The activity could be what we call mind. It might just happen to feel like something to the system.
I think you are too fond of making everything separate. Now you've even added a pigeonhole for 'activity' as a separate, middleman 'thing' to brain and mind. And you already have qualia as separate 'things' from brain, mind and now presumably 'activity'. You end up with a horde of supposed interactions between all the different 'things'. It's not entirely unlike adding 'angels carrying' to why apples fall from a tree. It's not parsimonious. It may in fact be nothing more than semantics.
Take 'life' for example. We could say this is a different thing from non-life, right? But does that make 'life' a separate 'thing' in a brain?
In any case, I was asking about the consequences. Autonomy and/or independence. Splitting the world up into a plethora of separate 'things' does not necessarily make them all autonomous or independent. To say that something is independent when it is fully dependent seems to me to be going in the direction of a contradiction in terms.
But you keep diverting away from responding to my questions.
What experiences the self? And why can't a brain be an experiencer?
ruby, if I may, this is actually what
I would ask of
you, DBT, Dennet, Harris, and anyone else who goes anywhere near the "consciousness as illusion" silliness. Yes, I still maintain that it's a load of crap.
What, exactly, is doing the experiencing?
IF the brain is the experiencer, then why can't I simply tell my brain to stop my heartbeat? That is,
if I am
only my brain: the experiencer.
Who, or
what the actual fuck (stole that from Sub, but I did let him know, lol), is this "I".
Why is it needed? What
possible reason does the brain have to present this illusion to
itself.
WTF— according to YOU— makes a subjective experiencer preferable to a merely operational, functioning machine, a complex arrangement of nuts and bolts?
I know for myself why
I prefer the experience, well, at least the good things, not so much the pain & suffering; but what advantage does an experiencer have over a p-zombie, with respect to fitness, Darwin, evolution? What do materialists think is the answer to this question?
Please, don't just tell me I do not understand things, or that I am asking the wrong questions (Subsie):
Explain what
you mean. Don't refer to Dennet, or link to a paper; tell me, in your own words, what you mean. But, may I make an appeal that you answer me in private, or email me,
if this requires a B I G bunch of paragraphs. I do not have the energy to go toe to toe with anyone in a long drawn out thread, particularly since my memory is fuck.d and I can't even wrap my noodle around all the gadgets, doodads, buttons, tabs, available to me, and necessary for a formal engagement right here.
I am, after all, NOT arguing with Dennet, but with ruby, DBT, untermensche, Subsie, et al.