Is to an Ought: A problem?

[Angra Mainyu]

Somewhere out there, there's a paroled felon -- we'll call him Andy -- who's used a gun in his past crimes. But Andy currently finds himself without one. He's planning more crimes so he wants to acquire a gun. He's been approached by an undercover police officer -- we'll call him Bill -- posing as a criminal who sells guns illegally. Bill offered to sell Andy a gun. I sincerely think it would be immoral for Andy to offer to buy the gun. And I sincerely do not want Andy not to offer to buy the gun.

Pretty good points - I agree of course it would be immoral for him to buy the gun, and that he would deserve to be punished for it if he offered to buy the gun.

Based on what I've read from different philosophers (and my interpretation of their work; they're not always crystal clear), a claim that sincere moral claims involve emotional commitments of the the "you-want-it" type is probably too strong common among philosophers, but there are weaker claims that seem to enjoy much wider support among anti-realists (whether error theorists or success-theorists to give them a name), and among realists of some pretty weird (though not necessarily infrequent) varieties, and which are sometimes used in support of their views (even if they don't always make the claims explicit, they seem implicit at least).

This is tentative, but my guess is that a wearker claim in the vicinity (at least, the philosophical vicinity given what sort of work the claim is frequently meant to do) would be something like:

WC1: Necessarily, if person A sincerely reckons that B has a moral obligation to X, then B's failing to X would be valued intrinsically negatively by A, regardless of whether A overall valued B's failing to X positively or neutrally given other factors (i.e., as a means to some further end).
WC2: Necessarily, if person A sincerely reckons that it would be immoral for B to fail to X, then the assessment that the act is immoral would contribute negatively to A's valuation of B's failure to X, regardless of whether A overall valued B's failing to X positively or neutrally given other factors (i.e., as a means to some further end).

Personally, I think that it's at least questionable whether such claims (or even the "you-want-it" type) would do the work they're meant to, but that aside, I think these claims seem to go too far because they include a "necessarily" condition without a corresponding condition about the normal functioning of the brain of the person making the assertion, and so they seem at least unwarranted to me (and I would even say improbable).

Well, suppose somebody said "I've been deaf from birth, but I know a falling tree makes a noise." Most of us would wonder if this person was using the word 'noise' in the same way as most of us do. He sort of isn't -- he can be using it to mean "the air vibrations that normal human ears can detect that people label 'noise'", of course, but that would probably leave us all suspecting there's an aspect of noise that he doesn't grok. But this shouldn't delude us into thinking noise depends on ears. If a tree falls in the forest and nobody is there to hear it, yes, it makes a noise. If a person says he doesn't care about rape but knows it's morally wrong, he's presumably got brain damage, but is willing to take other people's word for it that it's wrong.

Good example.
I think even if he doesn't fully understand the words, he's being sincere in his claim - why wouldn't he be? I don't need to fully understand the word "black hole" to sincerely say there is one at the center of the Milky Way. But in any case, here's a modified example:

1. Let's say that someone said "I've been deaf since the car accident last year, but I know a falling tree makes a noise.".
We wouldn't think she's not using "noise" in the same way as most of us do, or that she's being insincere. She lost her sense of hearing, but not her linguistic competence or her common sense, or her ability to be sincere. It's clear that properly understanding noise statements don't require any sort of current noise perception on a person's part, and sincere noise statements do not require it, either.

Now let's suppose a guy says "I used to care about rape, because I cared about the suffering of the victims, until the car accident last year. But now part of my brain is damaged, and I don't care less about rape, provided that I'm not the victim". I don't see a good reason to suppose that he would not be sincere, or that he would fail to fully understand the meaning of the claim about suffering. He just does not care anymore.

But let's say that the claim is now about morality, like: "I used to care about rape, because I cared about the suffering of the victims, and also because I wanted the perpetrators to be punished because they deserve it, until the car accident last year. But now part of my brain is damaged, and I couldn't care less about rape, provided that I'm not the victim. I don't care that the victims suffer, and I don't care if the perpetrators do not get punished. I know they deserve to be punished, but I don't care if people get what they deserve."

As before, I don't see a good reason to suppose that he would not be sincere, or that he would fail to fully understand the meaning of the claims involved. He just does not care anymore.

He might even add, sincerely: "That's a part of my brain I'm glad is damaged. It was holding me back. But I value being the way I am now".
That would all be pretty odd, but I don't see why it would be impossible.

 

[WAB]

Never!

Hey, EB, I would love to hear your solution.

Nah, you'd be disappointed.

But at least you know there's one solution even if it's one you wouldn't like.
EB

Don't tease me, EB!

Come on, good sir, (or madamoiselle? I forgot - I think I knew at some point, but that may have been another pigeon from another dimension) - out with it!

Why do you think I'd be disappointed? At least give me more hints. ?

Edited in: Is it because I describe myself as a "follower of Christ"?

That's probably (no, definitely) misleading. Let me 'splain: (*kracks knuckles* - just remember, I'm manic now, and when I'm manic I can write a 300 page book in like two days...bear with me, or just ignore me, I'm used to it!)

Below is something I wrote to a fellow poet on another board about ten minutes ago, but it's apt (because I back-engineered everything so that my navel-gazing might appear pertinent to the discussion )


I'm probably not really a Christian, by anyone's standards except my own. I call myself a "follower of Christ" because I have a certain grasp of the gospels that indicates to me that my own personality is, and always has been, finely tuned to what I THINK Jesus was trying to teach.

I'm sure that sounds grandiose and decidedly unhumble - but the truth is, I ain't humble. I try to be, but when one tries to be humble, it's usually a sure sign that they're not.

I'm an egoist, a classic Liberal (meaning I identify strongly with old-school liberal thought, but not with modern "progressive liberal" thought, which to my mind is too deeply infused with deconstructionism and post-modernism to do itself any real favors). I'm also an ardent secularist, and so was Jesus: "Render unto Caesar what belongs to Caesar, and to God what belongs to God", etc. I also believe in evolution (or accept it as fact, pretty much), and don't think it contradicts the concept of an "Eternal One".

I am probably most accurately defined as agnostic with respect to religion. I believe that there's something that would qualify as God - even if that reduces to something as seemingly mundane as collective consciousness. Shelley, an avowed atheist his whole life, and intransigently so, spoke passionately of a "spirit" coeternal and cooperative with the march of human progress, and in fact being its source and cause. To Shelley, this was not necessarily an entity, but a general, truly progressive, benevolently 'collective' intellect, shared and passed on by rational humans.

I believe (not know!) that Jesus existed (even many diehard atheists believe that, due to certain items of evidence, and there's a whole community of scholarly, and often vitriolic - debate among atheists about Christ's historicity); I also believe that he (I'm dropping the big H on purpose) was a very intelligent teacher whose words may have been politicized by Paul and the writers of the gospels. In other words, references to a literal hell may have been "spun", or simply made up, in order to give more "muscle" to the teachings. And by muscle I mean something unfortunate: the ad baculum fallacy, which causes what I think (perhaps only imagine) were the teachings of a very intelligent man in a turbulent place and time to become contradictory.

As I say to hellfire evangelists, and to anyone who gives the sick notion of a literal, fiery hell any credence: Love and torture cannot be reconciled, no how, no way. Where there is actual torture for disobedience, there is nothing like Love present; and where there is Love present, nothing like a literal hell can possibly exist.

Hell is the wet dream of religious men, who sought (and seek) to use God (and even Jesus) as a means of power by proxy. Anyone teaching a literal, eternal place of torture to people - especially children - is hiding something, or is simply too dim to be reasoned with.

If I'm wrong, and going to a literal hell, then that's the way the cookie crumbles. I'm not afraid.

:devil-smiley-029:

 

[Bomb#20]

When I initially started to respond to your entrapment scenario I wasn't sure which of your claims to challenge ('Gun purchase is immoral' or 'want-it/neutral about the gun purchase').

As I'm not at all convinced by your attempted counterexample I'll have a go at my alternative criticism.

I'm not challenging your sincerely held belief that Andy's purchase of the gun is immoral, I'm challenging the notion that the purchase of the gun in this specific context qualifies as an immoral act as it is commonly understood.

Clearly it's an illegal act (a necessary component of the set-up) but is it immoral? Before I go further can you give me your justification for characterising the purchase of the gun in this specific, controlled, context immoral?

Two reasons, each sufficient on its own. I specified in the scenario that he's a paroled felon. This means in exchange for not having to spend his whole sentence in prison, he promised to obey the law. So if he buys the gun he's breaking his promise. And furthermore, it's not as though he wants it for self-defense or to shoot dinner. I specified that he wants the gun because he's planning to commit more crimes. He's getting it in order to intimidate somebody with it.

I know you don't want to defend his words, but if it isn't fair to liken that to god-of-the-gaps, what is it you see in that paragraph that's any different...

God is an imaginary entity.

Want-its/emotions are human mental states which are heavily correlated with moral claims and justifications. They seem worlds apart to me.

A want that an ought is really just a rewording of is an imaginary entity. Sure, wants are real things; but a god is just an intelligent agent with some extra claimed characteristics thrown in, and intelligent agents are real things. It's the claims of extra characteristics -- magic powers and having been here 4 billion years ago and so forth -- that make God an imaginary entity. Likewise, it's the claim of an extra characteristic -- being a rewording of an ought -- that makes the invisible want in a moral subjectivist's garage an imaginary entity.

Moreover, note that just as wants are heavily correlated with moral claims, intelligent agents are heavily correlated with complex systems of functional parts and goal-oriented actions. (To be precise, what's heavily correlated with complex systems of functional parts and goal-oriented actions is the peculiarly disjunctive property of "either having been made by an intelligent agent, or else being a rough copy of some already existing complex system of functional parts and goal-oriented actions". In the god-of-the-gaps argument, the option of the cell being a copy is ruled out by the circumstance that the arguer is talking about the first cell.)

 

[The AntiChris]

Two reasons, each sufficient on its own.

Ok.

I specified in the scenario that he's a paroled felon. This means in exchange for not having to spend his whole sentence in prison, he promised to obey the law. So if he buys the gun he's breaking his promise.

So what?

As a general principle, breaking a promise is deemed 'wrong' because it can, and often does, lead to harm of some kind (e.g. an emotional, financial or other loss on the part of the person whose trust is broken). In the entrapment scenario this isn't the case. You know that if Andy breaks his promise no harm will come to anyone.

And furthermore, it's not as though he wants it for self-defense or to shoot dinner. I specified that he wants the gun because he's planning to commit more crimes. He's getting it in order to intimidate somebody with it.

And you know this will never happen in this specific context.

You say "I sincerely think it would be immoral for Andy to offer to buy the gun." but it's not really immoral is it? That's why you can say "And I sincerely do not want Andy not to offer to buy the gun. with an easy conscience.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Just to add a couple of thoughts:

1. I fully agree that Andy's behavior if he offers to buy the gun is immoral.
In fact, I reckon it's no less or no more immoral than it would be if the offer were genuine, given the same info available to Andy. The probability that Andy will carry out his evil plans and/or harmed third parties, when that probability is assessed from the epistemic perspective of someone with the information available to us, or to some other third party, but not to Andy is irrelevant with regard to the matter of whether Andy's behavior is immoral, or if it is immoral, how immoral it is (leaving aside indirect effects on the information available to him, e.g., if he knows that we made some probabilistic assessment, but that's not the case here, and in that case, that might still be relevant only if it affected the info available to him).

Given that his immoral behavior in this case would be deliberate, I think it's debatable whether the probability of success and/or of harming others as assessed from the epistemic perspective of Andy would be relevant: if he really tries to rob people in order to get money, would his behavior be less immoral if he reckoned the chances of success are lower? What if he really tries to rob people and epistemically should realize the odds of success are low, but fails to realize that, and improperly reckons his odds are very high?
I think there might be some interesting subtleties here, but at any rate, given that he does not know about the trap, the degree of immorality of his behavior is not affected, for sure - in my assessment, but I'm right! - more below.

2. At any rate, what is crucial in this context of discussion is not whether Andy's behavior would be immoral - though it would be immoral -, but whether it's metaphysically possible that a person sincerely reckons that his behavior would be immoral, while at the same time wanting to engage on such behavior. Given that at least two of us sincerely reckon that it would be immoral while we would want him to do that, the issue of whether it's actually immoral seems to be a side matter.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Nah, you'd be disappointed.

But at least you know there's one solution even if it's one you wouldn't like.
EB

Don't tease me, EB!

Come on, good sir, (or madamoiselle? I forgot - I think I knew at some point, but that may have been another pigeon from another dimension) - out with it!

Why do you think I'd be disappointed? At least give me more hints. ?

Edited in: Is it because I describe myself as a "follower of Christ"?

That's probably (no, definitely) misleading. Let me 'splain: (*kracks knuckles* - just remember, I'm manic now, and when I'm manic I can write a 300 page book in like two days...bear with me, or just ignore me, I'm used to it!)

Below is something I wrote to a fellow poet on another board about ten minutes ago, but it's apt (because I back-engineered everything so that my navel-gazing might appear pertinent to the discussion )


I'm probably not really a Christian, by anyone's standards except my own. I call myself a "follower of Christ" because I have a certain grasp of the gospels that indicates to me that my own personality is, and always has been, finely tuned to what I THINK Jesus was trying to teach.

I'm sure that sounds grandiose and decidedly unhumble - but the truth is, I ain't humble. I try to be, but when one tries to be humble, it's usually a sure sign that they're not.

I'm an egoist, a classic Liberal (meaning I identify strongly with old-school liberal thought, but not with modern "progressive liberal" thought, which to my mind is too deeply infused with deconstructionism and post-modernism to do itself any real favors). I'm also an ardent secularist, and so was Jesus: "Render unto Caesar what belongs to Caesar, and to God what belongs to God", etc. I also believe in evolution (or accept it as fact, pretty much), and don't think it contradicts the concept of an "Eternal One".

I am probably most accurately defined as agnostic with respect to religion. I believe that there's something that would qualify as God - even if that reduces to something as seemingly mundane as collective consciousness. Shelley, an avowed atheist his whole life, and intransigently so, spoke passionately of a "spirit" coeternal and cooperative with the march of human progress, and in fact being its source and cause. To Shelley, this was not necessarily an entity, but a general, truly progressive, benevolently 'collective' intellect, shared and passed on by rational humans.

I believe (not know!) that Jesus existed (even many diehard atheists believe that, due to certain items of evidence, and there's a whole community of scholarly, and often vitriolic - debate among atheists about Christ's historicity); I also believe that he (I'm dropping the big H on purpose) was a very intelligent teacher whose words may have been politicized by Paul and the writers of the gospels. In other words, references to a literal hell may have been "spun", or simply made up, in order to give more "muscle" to the teachings. And by muscle I mean something unfortunate: the ad baculum fallacy, which causes what I think (perhaps only imagine) were the teachings of a very intelligent man in a turbulent place and time to become contradictory.

As I say to hellfire evangelists, and to anyone who gives the sick notion of a literal, fiery hell any credence: Love and torture cannot be reconciled, no how, no way. Where there is actual torture for disobedience, there is nothing like Love present; and where there is Love present, nothing like a literal hell can possibly exist.

Hell is the wet dream of religious men, who sought (and seek) to use God (and even Jesus) as a means of power by proxy. Anyone teaching a literal, eternal place of torture to people - especially children - is hiding something, or is simply too dim to be reasoned with.

If I'm wrong, and going to a literal hell, then that's the way the cookie crumbles. I'm not afraid.

:devil-smiley-029:

At this point I have completely forgotten whatever I was talking about.
EB

 

[Bomb#20]

This is tentative, but my guess is that a wearker claim in the vicinity (at least, the philosophical vicinity given what sort of work the claim is frequently meant to do) would be something like:

WC1: Necessarily, if person A sincerely reckons that B has a moral obligation to X, then B's failing to X would be valued intrinsically negatively by A, regardless of whether A overall valued B's failing to X positively or neutrally given other factors (i.e., as a means to some further end).
WC2: Necessarily, if person A sincerely reckons that it would be immoral for B to fail to X, then the assessment that the act is immoral would contribute negatively to A's valuation of B's failure to X, regardless of whether A overall valued B's failing to X positively or neutrally given other factors (i.e., as a means to some further end).

Hmm. Definitely more plausible than the "you-want-it is necessary" hypothesis. WC1 makes a certain amount of sense, although the "intrinsically" is a red-flag that there may be an unfalsifiability engine at work. When a person is conflicted, who is to say which of his conflicting motives is "intrinsic"?

But WC2, I think I can provide a counterexample to. Suppose the person A in question is a paparazzo. He's stalking a celebrity in the hope that he'll get a photo of her doing something immoral. The more immoral it is the more he expects his photo will sell for. So the assessment that the act is immoral would contribute positively to A's valuation of the act.

Personally, I think that it's at least questionable whether such claims (or even the "you-want-it" type) would do the work they're meant to,

Well, we'd have to get a subjectivist to explain what work they're meant to do. But assuming the point is to establish moral subjectivism, I agree with you. Showing "you-want-it" is a necessary condition for a sincere moral claim appears to me to be completely inadequate for that purpose; they really need it to also be a sufficient condition.

Actually, I don't think merely showing it's a necessary condition is even enough for the more modest task of refuting moral realism. Suppose it were a fact of psychology that everybody who accuses others of special-pleading fallacies in fact wants people to stop making special-pleading arguments. Would that be enough to prove that a special-pleading accusation is not caused by the accused having objectively engaged in special-pleading? It seems to me you can be a special-pleading realist while still granting that nobody would ever point out that somebody's doing it unless she wants him to stop.

but that aside, I think these claims seem to go too far because they include a "necessarily" condition without a corresponding condition about the normal functioning of the brain of the person making the assertion, and so they seem at least unwarranted to me (and I would even say improbable).

Also a good point.

Good example.
I think even if he doesn't fully understand the words, he's being sincere in his claim - why wouldn't he be? I don't need to fully understand the word "black hole" to sincerely say there is one at the center of the Milky Way.

That makes sense.

But let's say that the claim is now about morality, like: "I used to care about rape, because I cared about the suffering of the victims, and also because I wanted the perpetrators to be punished because they deserve it, until the car accident last year. But now part of my brain is damaged, and I couldn't care less about rape, provided that I'm not the victim. I don't care that the victims suffer, and I don't care if the perpetrators do not get punished. I know they deserve to be punished, but I don't care if people get what they deserve."

As before, I don't see a good reason to suppose that he would not be sincere, or that he would fail to fully understand the meaning of the claims involved. He just does not care anymore.

He might even add, sincerely: "That's a part of my brain I'm glad is damaged. It was holding me back. But I value being the way I am now".
That would all be pretty odd, but I don't see why it would be impossible.

I suppose a subjectivist might slightly modify his position, say the passage of time is beside the point, and argue that the memory of wanting an action is just as adequate an account for the moral claim as currently wanting the action is. But in the absence of an explanation from a subjectivist for exactly how a want is supposed to imply an ought, it will be hard for us to evaluate whether a memory of a want could serve equally well.

 

[Bomb#20]

Ok.

I specified in the scenario that he's a paroled felon. This means in exchange for not having to spend his whole sentence in prison, he promised to obey the law. So if he buys the gun he's breaking his promise.

So what?

As a general principle, breaking a promise is deemed 'wrong' because it can, and often does, lead to harm of some kind (e.g. an emotional, financial or other loss on the part of the person whose trust is broken). In the entrapment scenario this isn't the case.

Well, he seemed so low that I couldn't say no; then he says with a sort of moan:
"It's the cursèd cold, and it's got right hold, till I'm chilled clean through to the bone.
Yet 'tain't being dead — it's my awful dread of the icy grave that pains;
So I want you to swear that, foul or fair, you'll cremate my last remains."

A pal's last need is a thing to heed, so I swore I would not fail;
And we started on at the streak of dawn; but God! he looked ghastly pale.
He crouched on the sleigh, and he raved all day of his home in Tennessee;
And before nightfall a corpse was all that was left of Sam McGee.

There wasn't a breath in that land of death, and I hurried, horror-driven,
With a corpse half hid that I couldn't get rid, because of a promise given;
It was lashed to the sleigh, and it seemed to say: "You may tax your brawn and brains,
But you promised true, and it's up to you, to cremate those last remains."

- Robert Service, "The Cremation of Sam Mcgee"​

So no, I don't agree that that's why breaking a promise is deemed 'wrong'. Most people think "Nobody's going to get hurt" is a pretty lame-ass excuse for not keeping your promises. Even people who think promises to dead people aren't binding any more will typically have a pretty low opinion of you if you cheat on your wife, even if you wear a condom and are careful to make sure your wife never finds out.

You know that if Andy breaks his promise no harm will come to anyone.

Even if we accept your theory about what makes breaking promises wrong, it's not about what I know. It's about what Andy knows. He doesn't know no harm will come to anyone so he doesn't get any credit for that circumstance.

I specified that he wants the gun because he's planning to commit more crimes. He's getting it in order to intimidate somebody with it.

And you know this will never happen in this specific context.

You say "I sincerely think it would be immoral for Andy to offer to buy the gun." but it's not really immoral is it?

Are you drawing a distinction between acts that aren't really immoral because they will not lead to any harm, as opposed to otherwise similar acts that will lead to harm and therefore are really immoral? That sounds kind of like you're stipulating that some acts are really immoral. If some acts are really immoral, that's what it means for moral realism to be correct.

That's why you can say "And I sincerely do not want Andy not to offer to buy the gun. with an easy conscience.

Sure; but whether Andy's act is immoral doesn't depend on whether it in fact won't cause harm; it depends on whether Andy has good reason to believe it won't cause harm. If I lean over to pick up a quarter and this unexpected action distracts a driver who kills a pedestrian, that doesn't make it immoral for me to have picked up the quarter.

This actually raises an important issue. It's common to talk of morality as a property of actions, and many philosophers see that as fundamental. That was Kant's view. But Hume disagreed. He saw morality as fundamentally a property of people. "Actions render a person criminal merely as they are proofs of criminal principles in the mind." I think Hume was correct on this point. Whether buying the gun will in fact lead to Andy intimidating someone with it doesn't tell us anything about the principles in Andy's mind. But whether Andy believes buying the gun will lead to him intimidating someone with it tells us a lot about the principles in Andy's mind.

(Also, everything Angra Mainyu said, +1.)

 

[The AntiChris]

So no, I don't agree that that's why breaking a promise is deemed 'wrong'. Most people think "Nobody's going to get hurt" is a pretty lame-ass excuse for not keeping your promises.

I don't disagree with you. I'm just trying to tease out the reason why you are content for Andy to act immorally in one context (entrapment) but presumably not (I'm making an assumption here) in a non-entrapment scenario.

Are you drawing a distinction between acts that aren't really immoral because they will not lead to any harm, as opposed to otherwise similar acts that will lead to harm and therefore are really immoral?

I'm suggesting a possible reason why you might encourage an immoral act in one context but discourage the same act in another.

That sounds kind of like you're stipulating that some acts are really immoral.

No I'm just asking you if you really are convinced the entrapment scenario is immoral.

If some acts are really immoral, that's what it means for moral realism to be correct.

That's not what I'm saying.
______________________________

Ok I accept that most people (me included) would see Andy as acting immorally in the entrapment scenario.

Assuming you would want Andy to not purchase the Gun in a non-entrapment scenario but would not want him to not purchase the gun in the entrapment scenario (sorry about the convoluted language) would it be fair to say that the absence of a 'want-it' in the second scenario is because you see the entrapment purchase as necessary in order to obtain a greater good?

This actually raises an important issue. It's common to talk of morality as a property of actions, and many philosophers see that as fundamental. That was Kant's view. But Hume disagreed. He saw morality as fundamentally a property of people. "Actions render a person criminal merely as they are proofs of criminal principles in the mind." I think Hume was correct on this point.

So do I.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Hmm. Definitely more plausible than the "you-want-it is necessary" hypothesis. WC1 makes a certain amount of sense, although the "intrinsically" is a red-flag that there may be an unfalsifiability engine at work. When a person is conflicted, who is to say which of his conflicting motives is "intrinsic"?

Sorry, I was unclear.
I understand the "intrinsically" part meant that the valuation of the act in virtue of what it is (though there is some debate among philosophers about what intrinsicality is), and leaving aside other factors, like further goals, would be negative. I didn't know how to write it more clearly, but I should have written only WC2.

But WC2, I think I can provide a counterexample to. Suppose the person A in question is a paparazzo. He's stalking a celebrity in the hope that he'll get a photo of her doing something immoral. The more immoral it is the more he expects his photo will sell for. So the assessment that the act is immoral would contribute positively to A's valuation of the act.

I'm not sure that works, because while it's true that the more immoral it is, the more positively A values the act, the other factors do not remain constant, and in fact, the reason A values the more immoral act overall better is that the further goal (i.e., getting paid) gets better, so this seems consistent to me with the greater immorality of the action contributing on its own negatively to the paparazzo's evaluation of the act, as long as the overall evaluation gets better because that negative component gets outweighed by the positive component given by the increase in expected payment.

But suppose that A reckons that the increase in payment comes not directly from the increase immorality of the act, but rather, from the increase perception of immorality of the act, and he knows that in his society, not immoral actions {Yn} are widely regarded as immoral, and increasingly so, while immoral actions {Xn} are regarded as immoral just as {Yn}. The paparazzo prefers that B engages in Xn+1 over Xn, but wouldn't he value Yn+1 better than Xn, and also better than Xn+1?
Then again, maybe not, if - say - he's a psychopathic paparazzo. But the psychopathic part seems to be doing the work.

Well, we'd have to get a subjectivist to explain what work they're meant to do. But assuming the point is to establish moral subjectivism, I agree with you. Showing "you-want-it" is a necessary condition for a sincere moral claim appears to me to be completely inadequate for that purpose; they really need it to also be a sufficient condition.

It can be to establish some kind of sophisticated subjectivism (not the basic version "X is morally obligatory=I want X", etc.; no philosopher supports that one afaik), or a moral error theory, or some kind of expressivism/noncognitivism the disjunction of those, or even to support DCT, but what seems crucial when it comes to the subjectivist part is to try to strongly support that (either moral claims are at least partly about the wants (or overall evaluative attitudes/functions, in more sophisticated forms) of the agent making the claims, or at least they're made true by those wants/evaluative attitudes/functions), as a means to rule out realism in any form. That would support (either an error theory or some form of non-error irrealism), and then they would need to do some more work against the error theory, and in favor of their preferred version of irrealism. But they could put the burden on the error theorist by saying that they've shown that moral claims are at least partly about the wants (or overall evaluative attitudes/functions), and that does not seem to significantly support an error theory.

Of course, the DCTist might reply that the connection is given by a universal conscience based on which there is at least a part of everyone's mind (in any possible world) that values negatively disobeying God, so the DCTist can work with that too, and there are other variants. Moreover, a theist who isn't a DCTist also has that option: they might simply say that God - who exists necessarily - only makes beings with the capacity for rational reflection who would disvalue immoral behavior - all other things equal -, so even if they become wicked and they suppress their conscience to a great extent, it's still in there, even if very weakened.
Thomists have an alternative complicated reply I think.

Actually, I don't think merely showing it's a necessary condition is even enough for the more modest task of refuting moral realism. Suppose it were a fact of psychology that everybody who accuses others of special-pleading fallacies in fact wants people to stop making special-pleading arguments. Would that be enough to prove that a special-pleading accusation is not caused by the accused having objectively engaged in special-pleading? It seems to me you can be a special-pleading realist while still granting that nobody would ever point out that somebody's doing it unless she wants him to stop.

Right, though I think I've been unclear here as well, because by "person" I didn't mean "human person", but "any personal agent". Probably, I ought to have simply said "agent who understands moral claims", leaving the "person" part aside.
If one could show that every agent (human or not, real or simply metaphysically possible) who sincerely and fully understanding the words accuses others of special-pleading fallacies in fact wants people to stop making special-pleading arguments, would that significantly decrease the probability of special-pleading realism? Would it significantly increase the probability of theism instead? It's hard to say given the weirdness of the hypothesis. How could one go about showing that that holds for every possible agent? Hmm...I'll need to think more about that one.

I suppose a subjectivist might slightly modify his position, say the passage of time is beside the point, and argue that the memory of wanting an action is just as adequate an account for the moral claim as currently wanting the action is. But in the absence of an explanation from a subjectivist for exactly how a want is supposed to imply an ought, it will be hard for us to evaluate whether a memory of a want could serve equally well.

I agree, and furthermore, I think that's vulnerable to the deaf example or similar ones.
Let's say Mary is deaf after an accident. She can make sincere true claims about a tree falling and making a noise. She also understands the words. But even if she wouldn't understand the words if she hadn't been able to hear in the past, that provides no support whatsoever for noise antirealism of any sort.
More to the point: even if it's true that an agent needs to have had some capacity C (such as hearing, color vision, or a fully functioning moral sense) or even having exercised that capacity and/or having the memories of certain experiences in order to make sincere claims in category M and fully understand those claims, that does not seem to support an antirealist view about claims in category M.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

But suppose that A reckons that the increase in payment comes not directly from the increase immorality of the act, but rather, from the increase perception of immorality of the act, and he knows that in his society, not immoral actions {Yn} are widely regarded as immoral, and increasingly so, while immoral actions {Xn} are regarded as immoral just as {Yn}. The paparazzo prefers that B engages in Xn+1 over Xn, but wouldn't he value Yn+1 better than Xn, and also better than Xn+1?
Then again, maybe not, if - say - he's a psychopathic paparazzo. But the psychopathic part seems to be doing the work.

On second thought, A might prefer {Xn} because he doesn't want B to be unjustly blamed. But that's also an external factor. A modification would be that {Yn} are neither immoral nor regarded as such, but are among those celebrity behaviors that fascinate his audience, and can make his payment as good as {Xn}.
At any rate, I think a psychopathic paparazzo would provide a good counterexample to WC2, but those who support WC2 would probably say that the psychopath is not being sincere - but then again, I don't see why not.

 

[WAB]

Hume was no doubt correct, re: "Actions render a person criminal merely as they are proofs of criminal principles in the mind." I won't quibble over that. Well, alright, except for the word "merely". Criminal acts are criminal acts, not "merely" as they are proofs of criminal principles in the mind", but because they are criminal acts. A person with no "criminal principles" in his/her mind can be whipped into a moment of rage and break the law: hit someone, break something not theirs, even kill someone, either accidentally or on purpose. Crimes of passion come to mind. The human animal is a delicate thing, and emotions can and often do blind a person to rational thinking, and cause horrible things to happen. This is NOT to defend crimes of passion, or to give a pass to someone who harms someone else in a moment of rage or emotional stupidity. A crime is a crime, and should be punished according to degree, according to the law. I don't waffle on that.

The thing that worries me in the sentence by Hume is that there are people in our midst who seem to advocate thought-policing. In other words, to these people, there is such a thing as a thought-crime, and if we can manipulate the brain, if we can get into people's heads, literally, and know what they're thinking, then that's a great thing, because then we can tame those people by altering their brains and shutting off those "criminal principles", or criminal thoughts, or fantasies, or whatever.

Such a notion is, in my opinion, extremely creepy.

I use that word "creepy", because it's a popular word, used by all sorts of people to incriminate others. In this hyper-sensitive world we live in, more and more people are being "creeped out" by other people, very often for excellent reasons - since there are scads of dangerous and perverted individuals around - but also very often for the silliest reasons. As an example, I wrote and posted a poem on another website - a poetry workshop - wherein the narrator was distracted by the presence of beautiful women in bikinis. He was at the beach with his two sons, who had just gotten married, and ruminates that he's getting older (N is middle aged) and finds modern swimwear to be a tad overboard. He's a bit of a prude, perhaps, but hardly dangerous, and certainly not a creep.

However, I had at least two reviewers who told me that my narrator was not only a prude, but creepy, in fact, a misogynist. Yep, this old codger obviously hates women, since he admits to finding micro-bikinis and thongs a tad too revealing for his own particular tastes. Try and try as I did, I couldn't convince these two reviewers (both friends of mine online for several years) that my poem was not the result of my "hatred for women", that I in fact love and revere women, and that I'm also, possibly, transgender. OH the horror!

I've used female avatars for several years. I currently use the avatar y'all see here, everywhere, even Youtube. The only place I don't use it is on Facebook, since I figure I ought (there's that word again!) to use my own face on a place called Facebook, even though I'm not nearly as attractive as the Toda woman in my avatar.

***

What I'm getting at is: WHO decides what a "criminal principle" is? If the progressive left continues the way it is, simply being a heterosexual white male could very well be thought of as somewhat "criminal", or, at the very least, suspect. If you doubt that - take a look at the link below, which I was alerted to by a fellow poet and political ally (I'm a centrist, but what she calls herself I don't know, I just know she's not on the left). For those who won't click, a quote:

The pledge reads in part, “Every theatre in the United States of America will produce only work by women, people of color, Native American artists, LBGTQIA artists, deaf artists, and artists with disabilities.”

http://www.nationalreview.com/artic...rs-straight-white-men-receives-federal-grants

 

[Bomb#20]

That sounds kind of like you're stipulating that some acts are really immoral.

No I'm just asking you if you really are convinced the entrapment scenario is immoral.

Fair enough. Yes.

Assuming you would want Andy to not purchase the Gun in a non-entrapment scenario but would not want him to not purchase the gun in the entrapment scenario (sorry about the convoluted language) would it be fair to say that the absence of a 'want-it' in the second scenario is because you see the entrapment purchase as necessary in order to obtain a greater good?

Sure, as long as you don't mean "necessary" in some metaphysical sense. It contributes to the greater good; it has a better chance of bringing about the greater good than alternatives, yada yada.

 

[The AntiChris]

Assuming you would want Andy to not purchase the Gun in a non-entrapment scenario but would not want him to not purchase the gun in the entrapment scenario (sorry about the convoluted language) would it be fair to say that the absence of a 'want-it' in the second scenario is because you see the entrapment purchase as necessary in order to obtain a greater good?

Sure, as long as you don't mean "necessary" in some metaphysical sense. It contributes to the greater good; it has a better chance of bringing about the greater good than alternatives, yada yada.

Ok. We're talking about a necessary evil - an evil (in this case a moral wrong) that must be allowed in order for a greater good to result.

The thing with necessary evils is that we really don't want them to occur, we tolerate them. In the entrapment scenario we tolerate Andy's immorality but want him to purchase the gun so that another criminal can be taken off the streets.

An example which brings this 'necessary evil' conflict into sharp focus is the surgeon who wants to save his patient's life by removing a diseased limb. Despite being totally committed to to doing what he must to save his patient's life, in a very real sense, he does not want to deprive his patient of a limb.

So, no, in my view you have not demonstrated the existence of a sincere moral claim without a correlated emotional attitude/commitment.