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Greece, what the fuck?

We're on page 44. You'll need to give me at least a clue where to look.

Different people make different adjustments and report different things, but here is the IMF version.

https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=43044.0

If you click on "free full text" you should be able to download the report. On page 19 there is a table that shows a 2014 primary surplus of 0.0. 2015, I would strongly think will be worse given the widespread reports of economic disruption and tax protest.
 
We're on page 44. You'll need to give me at least a clue where to look.

Different people make different adjustments and report different things, but here is the IMF version.

https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=43044.0

If you click on "free full text" you should be able to download the report. On page 19 there is a table that shows a 2014 primary surplus of 0.0. 2015, I would strongly think will be worse given the widespread reports of economic disruption and tax protest.

That figure includes debt payments. That's why the line adds up to the cumulative total at the end, which is the quoted as the figure by which the debt will grow over time. If you want figures without debt payments, you can look on page 22. I note that the same document suggests two plans to solve the problem, one of which is greatly reducing the debt payments to the EU, and the other of which is to reduce the fiscal surplus targets from 4.5% to a more manageable 1%. Neither of these plans would work if you central narrative, that Greece has not managed to get it's spending under control, were correct. Instead the IMF document confirms what I already said, that the problem is that Greece can not handle the scale of debt repayments being demanded.
 
Different people make different adjustments and report different things, but here is the IMF version.

https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=43044.0

If you click on "free full text" you should be able to download the report. On page 19 there is a table that shows a 2014 primary surplus of 0.0. 2015, I would strongly think will be worse given the widespread reports of economic disruption and tax protest.

That figure includes debt payments. That's why the line adds up to the cumulative total at the end, which is the quoted as the figure by which the debt will grow over time. If you want figures without debt payments, you can look on page 22. I note that the same document suggests two plans to solve the problem, one of which is greatly reducing the debt payments to the EU, and the other of which is to reduce the fiscal surplus targets from 4.5% to a more manageable 1%. Neither of these plans would work if you central narrative, that Greece has not managed to get it's spending under control, were correct. Instead the IMF document confirms what I already said, that the problem is that Greece can not handle the scale of debt repayments being demanded.

On page 9 there is a table that literally has a row called "primary deficit". By this convention a + is a deficit, a - is a surplus. Look at that row. It has actuals for 2004-2012, 2013, and 2014 and projections for 2015 beyond. The 2014 actual number is 0.0.

They project surpluses in the future because they are modeling cases where Greece conforms to the bailout restrictions. There is no surplus today.
 
That figure includes debt payments. That's why the line adds up to the cumulative total at the end, which is the quoted as the figure by which the debt will grow over time. If you want figures without debt payments, you can look on page 22. I note that the same document suggests two plans to solve the problem, one of which is greatly reducing the debt payments to the EU, and the other of which is to reduce the fiscal surplus targets from 4.5% to a more manageable 1%. Neither of these plans would work if you central narrative, that Greece has not managed to get it's spending under control, were correct. Instead the IMF document confirms what I already said, that the problem is that Greece can not handle the scale of debt repayments being demanded.

On page 9 there is a table that literally has a row called "primary deficit". By this convention a + is a deficit, a - is a surplus. Look at that row. It has actuals for 2004-2012, 2013, and 2014 and projections for 2015 beyond. The 2014 actual number is 0.0..

Which includes debt repayments.

Net Primary Deficit is Net Fiscal Deficit minus net debt payments.
 
On page 9 there is a table that literally has a row called "primary deficit". By this convention a + is a deficit, a - is a surplus. Look at that row. It has actuals for 2004-2012, 2013, and 2014 and projections for 2015 beyond. The 2014 actual number is 0.0..

Which includes debt repayments.

Net Primary Deficit is Net Fiscal Deficit minus net debt payments.

I point you again to the row that says "primary deficit" The word "primary" means it does not include debt payments.
 
Correct me if I'm wrong, but the table on page 19 is the government budget, whereas the table on page 22 pertains to the trade deficit.
 
hey Joe. Somebody told me the bank was running out of money. Heck. I better get my money out before they do.


What does one logically conclude will happen?

The bank will ........

The dwindling Greek reserves have been all over the news. Of course there was a bank run.

If they were in the black they wouldn't have dwindling reserves.

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If they were running a surplus net of debt repayment their banking system wouldn't be in meltdown now.

The unsupported claim was that Greece was being irresponsible and making the debt worse. That isn't the case. It is the debt, not the behaviour, that is the problem. Why are you netting the surplus with the debt?

Do you understand economics-speak?

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Or, more to the point, if they were already running a surplus and intended to continue running one in the future why the hell would they have their panties so wadded up about a bailout that requires them to run a surplus?

They could object to the size of the surplus being asked for.

That doesn't change the fact that it's quite obvious they aren't running a surplus anyway.

I strongly suspect the "surplus" being reported was nothing more than cooked books.
 
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I gotta say I don't get the latest moves. Syriza was elected to end austerity. Then a referendum was held which opposed the deal offered by the Europeans.
Then Alexis Tsipras' goes against all of this and offers the Europeans a deal going against what the people wanted. ???
Are they all wanting it to look like someone else s fault when it blows up?
 
I gotta say I don't get the latest moves. Syriza was elected to end austerity. Then a referendum was held which opposed the deal offered by the Europeans.
Then Alexis Tsipras' goes against all of this and offers the Europeans a deal going against what the people wanted. ???
Are they all wanting it to look like someone else s fault when it blows up?

Syriza was elected to end austerity and to keep Greece in the EU.

The kindest interpretation, to Syriza, is that the referendum showed the EU that Syriza had the support had the people. Then, the bank holiday and capital controls showed Greeks what they were in for if they Grexited. They caved. The hard liners in the EU are now using the situation to push Greece out. Currently, all signs point to a Grexit.
 
Public sentiment in many EU countries are strongly opposed to lending Greece more money. Democratically elected governments have to take that into account, too, if they want to be re-elected.
 
Greece caved in on the demands on pension age and wages I think. But now the eurogroup is asking for a 50 billion euro privatization program, which most certainly will be again rejected by Greece. I suppose that's better than austerity, but why not couple that with at least some sort of debt reduction to make it a bit more attractive?
 
I think it's gone political now, we're past rational solutions.
If even IMF says we need to reduce Greek debt, it means there's some money we're not going to see back anyway, whether we voluntarily reduce the debt or push them to default. And the social/European construction cost will be lighter if we can agree in an adult way on a debt reduction.
BUT
1. no leader of the most impacted countries (Germany, France, Italy) wants to appear to be the one who cost his people billions in lost taxes
2. no conservative (or social-democrat, like in France) leader wants to give bad ideas to his people and let them feel like voting real left-wing can improve things
so we're not out of the deadlock yet.

What's sad about this is that the debt was initially mostly private, it became political when the countries bought back the debt to help the banks. Who had accrued interests to cover the risks, shouldn't they give those interests to the European help fund, if they didn't really take risks because the states were there to buy back the debt when the risk actually happened? Strange how we see none of those "fiscally responsible conservatives" asking for that...
 
The understanding that I get is that the Germans prevailed. That the Greeks face thirty years of crushing austerity to not pay off the debt. But the Germans forced the Greeks to put up €50 trillion in assets against the debt entered into yesterday.

Reparations for the damages suffered by the German bankers. Presumably, the Greeks called them bad names.
 
Here is an interesting interview with the ousted minister of finance Yanis Varoufakis, that sheds some light on what went on in the backroom and why Tsipras did what he did. Highly recommended reading, highlights below.

Varoufakis, who resigned a week ago, has been criticised for not signing an agreement sooner, but he said the deal that Greece was offered was not made in good faith – or even one that the Troika wanted completed. In an hour-long telephone interview with the New Statesman, he called the creditors’ proposals – those agreed to by the Athens government on Friday night, which now seem somehow generous – “absolutely impossible, totally non-viable and toxic …[they were] the kind of proposals you present to another side when you don’t want an agreement.”

Varoufakis added: “This country must stop extending and pretending, we must stop taking on new loans pretending that we’ve solved the problem, when we haven’t; when we have made our debt even less sustainable on condition of further austerity that even further shrinks the economy; and shifts the burden further onto the have-nots, creating a humanitarian crisis.”
It is well known that Varoufakis was taken off Greece’s negotiating team shortly after Syriza took office; he was still in charge of the country’s finances but no longer in the room. It’s long been unclear why. In April, he said vaguely that it was because “I try and talk economics in the Eurogroup” – the club of 19 finance ministers whose countries use the Euro – “which nobody does.” I asked him what happened when he did.

“It’s not that it didn’t go down well – there was point blank refusal to engage in economic arguments. Point blank. You put forward an argument that you’ve really worked on, to make sure it’s logically coherent, and you’re just faced with blank stares. It is as if you haven’t spoken. What you say is independent of what they say. You might as well have sung the Swedish national anthem – you’d have got the same reply.”
“There were people who were sympathetic at a personal level, behind closed doors, especially from the IMF.” He confirmed that he was referring to Christine Lagarde, the IMF director. “But then inside the Eurogroup [there were] a few kind words and that was it: back behind the parapet of the official version. … Very powerful figures look at you in the eye and say ‘You’re right in what you’re saying, but we’re going to crunch you anyway’.”

Varoufakis even answers the very question that baffled me to start this thread:
On the night of the referendum he had a plan, Tsipras just never quite agreed to it.

The Eurozone can dictate terms to Greece because it is no longer fearful of a Grexit. It is convinced that its banks are now protected if Greek banks default. But Varoufakis thought that he still had some leverage: once the ECB forced Greece’s banks to close, he could act unilaterally.

He said he spent the past month warning the Greek cabinet that the ECB would close Greece’s banks to force a deal. When they did, he was prepared to do three things: issue euro-denominated IOUs; apply a “haircut” to the bonds Greek issued to the ECB in 2012, reducing Greece’s debt; and seize control of the Bank of Greece from the ECB.

None of the moves would constitute a Grexit but they would have threatened it. Varoufakis was confident that Greece could not be expelled by the Eurogroup; there is no legal provision for such a move. But only by making Grexit possible could Greece win a better deal. And Varoufakis thought the referendum offered Syriza the mandate they needed to strike with such bold moves – or at least to announce them.
But:
As the crowds were celebrating on Sunday night in Syntagma Square, Syriza’s six-strong inner cabinet held a critical vote. By four votes to two, Varoufakis failed to win support for his plan, and couldn’t convince Tsipras. He had wanted to enact his “triptych” of measures earlier in the week, when the ECB first forced Greek banks to shut. Sunday night was his final attempt. When he lost his departure was inevitable.
So there you have it. Syriza was split, and there was a point to the referendum (at least in Varoufakis's mind), but Tsipras and others got cold feet and backed down.

I can believe Varoufakis's colorful description of how the Euogroup operates... after all, they are not experts on finance (unlike IMF, which at least seems to get some credit from Varoufakis), but politically elected goons. Schäuble, who's been the most hardline critic of Greece and a vocal proponent of Grexit is a lawyer and an accountant, and a lot of the other European finance ministers have similar backgrounds. They're sniveling bean counters to whom compliance and surviving to the next elections is more important than getting Greece to its feet.

Anyway, what's done is done. Greece will get back up, it'll just take a bit longer. The key part is the privatization, that moves mismanaged Greek assets to more capable hands, and that might offset the austerity measures a bit. But after a few years, I fear that Europe is going to be in a same situation with same drama when the Greek run out of money again.
 
The understanding that I get is that the Germans prevailed. That the Greeks face thirty years of crushing austerity to not pay off the debt. But the Germans forced the Greeks to put up €50 trillion in assets against the debt entered into yesterday.

Reparations for the damages suffered by the German bankers. Presumably, the Greeks called them bad names.
I think it should be obvious now that Germany is still intent on remaking Europe in its image. Now, it is engaged in economic warfare and subterfuge instead of military invasions.

I am wondering if there are not some in Europe who are beginning to regret having Germany in the EU.
 
The understanding that I get is that the Germans prevailed. That the Greeks face thirty years of crushing austerity to not pay off the debt. But the Germans forced the Greeks to put up €50 trillion in assets against the debt entered into yesterday.

Reparations for the damages suffered by the German bankers. Presumably, the Greeks called them bad names.
I think it should be obvious now that Germany is still intent on remaking Europe in its image. Now, it is engaged in economic warfare and subterfuge instead of military invasions.

I am wondering if there are not some in Europe who are beginning to regret having Germany in the EU.

That's been the fear all along, hasn't it. That Italy, Spain and Portugal, fearing to become the next Greece, will want out.

Another fear is if the RW nationalists, particularly in France, will be empowered by this.
 
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