Strategic Bombing Campaign in Europe: German vs. Russian and other Allies

[SLD]

Much is made of the strategic bombing campaign in Europe and the failure of the Allies to stop the increase in German war production until almost the very end. I read though a book a while back that criticized Hitler for not further developing his heavy bombers - primarily to attack Russia, and that it could have made a difference in crucial ways. But it didn't really get into sufficient details, but still has had me wondering.

I saw that the Germans really only developed one heavy bomber, a Heinkel, and that they only produced about 1200 of those. The US produced about 12,000 B-17's, 18,000 B-24's and 3,000 B-29's during the war, although a large number of those went to the Pacific theater. I'm not sure about the actual distribution between theaters though. Still, the allies likely had 10 times the number of strategic bombers over Europe than the Germans. While a lot has been made about German war production, attacks on oil production and transportation facilities severely hampered German efforts during the war undoubtedly.

So why wouldn't far more heavy bombers make a difference to Germany on the Eastern Front? What if Moscow had been bombed to rubble in the fall of 1940? Could the Russians have mounted their counterattack? Could it have made a difference in such things as stopping tank production west of the Urals? Especially during the crucial months building up to Stalingrad?

It seems to me that a strategic bombing campaign against Britain, which of course was tried, would have less of an impact. Without the ability to strike at the US, there'd be no sense to develop as huge a bomber fleet as the Allies had. While the Germans tried to develop a long range bomber to hit the US the idea of flying across the Atlantic undetected and unmolested was a pipe dream. Thus the Germans could though have developed less bombers, just for Russia. But would it have made a difference?

Cheers!

SLD

 

[Sarpedon]

The trouble is with this sort of speculation is that it ignores the trade offs: Germany didn't have strategic bombers because they focused on tactical bombers. If they had focused on strategic bombers, then there wouldn't have been the tactical bombers for the blitkrieg.

If germany were to have magically conjured up strategic bombers without having any cost, then there is still the question of getting them to Russia. The russians deliberately moved their industry beyond the ranges of not only existing german bombers, but basically all concievable german bombers. For example, Krasnoyarsk, one of the major Ural industrial cities is 875 miles from Moscow, which the germans didn't quite get to in the winter of 1941. While this was well within the range of heavy bombers of the time (generally 2,000 miles), in practical sense, going that far over enemy territory would have been suicide: American bombers suffered heavy casualties in the first two years of the war, until escort fighters were developed that could penetrate deep into Germany. Without such escorts, losses would have been prohibitive for german bombers. Finally, Strategic bombing really wasn't effective until the USA discovered, through trial and error, what the bottlenecks of german industry were. Who knows how long the germans would have taken to discover the same about Russia?

 

[skepticalbip]

There are innumerable "what ifs" that can be imagined. Example: What if Germany had honored their non-aggression pact with the Soviets and not invaded them in 1941. What if they instead had focused their development and industrial efforts on invading England (Operation Barbarossa aimed at England rather than Russia)? Developing and building thousands of small (able to carry 50 troops or one tank) and fast (greater than 30 knot) troop and equipment transports to be sent across the channel by the thousands in mass would swamp Allied defenses and have a German army in England before the Allies could have time to react. This would have been done in 1940 or 1941 before the US, with its massive contribution of equipment, supplies, and manpower was involved in the war.

They would not have opened the Eastern front that occupied a large section of their military effort. They would have deprived the allies of a massing and launching point for their d-day landings. It would also have eliminated the air bases that were used to launch Allied bombers and fighters.

 

[Horatio Parker]

I think that idea presupposes foresight that the Russian campaign would be difficult. That wasn't the CW.

Hitler thought defeating Russia would secure his back so he could concentrate on the UK. He was a better politician than strategist and he didn't trust Stalin.

IIRC Albert Speer tried to brake Hitlers habit of proliferating designs of tanks and bombers. The strategic bombing went on for a year before the Germans started feeling the bite. Speer said that the Allies shifted targets too quickly eg they brought the ball bearing industry to its knees and then switched to other targets. The Allies figured that with a strong central govt, the Germans would move and decentralize. But politics was a factor in Nazi Germany; Hitler was sensitive to the wishes of the Gauleiters.

 

[rjh01]

What I think the Germans needed in the Russian front was a large, long range transport aircraft. That way it could transport people and other high value cargo close to the front line quickly. The road and rail system in Russia was very poor. It also needed to treat the natives a bit better as the Russians were treated so badly they began to sabotage the German supply routes.

But seriously, the Germans made so many mistakes it would have been hard for them to have won WW2.

 

[Tigers!]

Would the German's shortage of fuel prevented a large strategic bomber force anyway? They are very fuel hungry.

 

[Horatio Parker]

What I think the Germans needed in the Russian front was a large, long range transport aircraft. That way it could transport people and other high value cargo close to the front line quickly. The road and rail system in Russia was very poor. It also needed to treat the natives a bit better as the Russians were treated so badly they began to sabotage the German supply routes.

But seriously, the Germans made so many mistakes it would have been hard for them to have won WW2.

I agree, the poor Russian roads and Facist political arrogance contributed much to the Germans defeat.

I don't know if the Luftwaffe could've compensated; the Demyansk pocket of 100k men was supplied by air for several weeks. The daily requirement of 240 tons used all of the Luftwaffes transport capability. So it would've had to be increased by a factor greater than 10....

The success of the Luftwaffe convinced Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring and Hitler that they could conduct effective airlift operations on the Eastern front.[4] Göring later proposed a similar "solution" to supply the 6. Armee when it was surrounded in Stalingrad. In theory, the outcome could be equally advantageous; with the 6. Armee trapped, but still in fighting condition, the Soviet army would have to use up much of its strength to keep the pocket contained. This could allow other German forces to re-group and mount a counterattack. However, the scale of the forces trapped in the two operations differed greatly. While a single corps (about ⅓ of an army) with about six divisions was encircled in Demyansk, in Stalingrad, an entire and greatly reinforced army was trapped. Whereas the Demyansk and Kholm pockets together needed around 265 t (292 short tons) of supplies per day, the 6. Armee required an estimated daily minimum of 800 t (880 short tons), delivered over a much-longer distance and faced by a much better organised Red Air Force. The air transport force had already suffered heavy losses, and was much further away from good infrastructure. The Luftwaffe simply did not have the resources needed to supply Stalingrad.

  http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demyansk_pocket

 

[Bronzeage]

It's easy to pick apart the air campaigns of both sides with the perspective of history, but we need to imagine the European Theater if there had been no bombers, at all. Strategic bombing changed the face of warfare completely, in a way which had not happened since the infantry started carrying long rifles.

In WW1, the ultimate weapon was artillery. Ground troops were frozen in place while the big guns fired. A long range bomber is flying artillery and like any artillery, doesn't always hit the target. However, it always hits something. A heavy weapon affects the enemy in two ways. The first is the obvious "I will fuck up all your shit" kind of thing, and the other is all the defensive and evasive measures the enemy must take in order to deal with the threat.

It is impossible to have peak war material production, if the factories have to be moved out of bomber range, or moved into caves. Russia may have moved their factories a thousand miles behind the lines, but it added one thousand miles to their lines of communication. That does not come cheap.

The damage done by enemy bombers is not limited to craters.

 

[SLD]

What I think the Germans needed in the Russian front was a large, long range transport aircraft. That way it could transport people and other high value cargo close to the front line quickly. The road and rail system in Russia was very poor. It also needed to treat the natives a bit better as the Russians were treated so badly they began to sabotage the German supply routes.

But seriously, the Germans made so many mistakes it would have been hard for them to have won WW2.

Yeah, certainly single cause issues is a poor way to analyze their failure. But admittedly the Germans came close to taking Moscow. What more could they have done? Could they have made the mistakes they did if they had better and more bombers? Maybe not. There would indeed had to have been a trade off. Less Uboats? U boats weren't much use against Russia. But I've also heard that better. And more U boats by 43 could have made the difference in the Battle of the Atlantic. Personally I am more skeptical of that claim. The U.S. could have afforded to move assets from the Pacific had that been the case.

SLD

 

[barbos]

For example, Krasnoyarsk, one of the major Ural industrial cities is 875 miles from Moscow,

Krasnoyarsk is not in Ural, it's far more to the East in Siberia.

 

[Sarpedon]

Correct. But it was one of the major industrial cities, and illustrates the problem. I regret the error. The city I should have named was Nizny Tagil, a major tank plant. That is about 800 km further east than moscow.

The fact is that Germany failed to destroy the United Kingdom's industries, despite them being closer and more concentrated.

 

[Tristan Scott]

Hitler simply did not grasp the idea of strategic warfare. In that vein his biggest blunder was not the fact that he didn't build a strong offensive strategic force (bombers), but that he didn't develop a strong defensive strategic force (fighters). The ME 262 was delayed over a year and a half because Hitler wanted it converted into a tactical bomber, a role it really wasn't designed for. Had the plane been operational in great numbers by the end of 1943 it would have probably made a real difference in the outcome of the allied strategic bombing campaign. Whether it would have made a difference in the outcome of the war, I doubt. The only chance Germany ever had in winning the war, was if Hitler had left the running of the war to his generals. Had he done that, I think they could have won.

 

[Togo]

Their shortage of pilots was more severe than the shortage of aircraft....

 

[rjh01]

One problem the Germans had was a shortage of oil. This meant they could not train pilots as well as they should have done. So even if they did have a good fighter it would not stand up to any opposition.