His definition of determinism is that we are “compelled of our own free will” to “move in the direction of greater satisfaction.”
The very phrase is asinine, since “compulsion” and “free will” are opposites.
It is also obviously idiotic to suggest that past conditions, including our genetics, do not affect our present choices.
It doesn't make sense in any way you look at it.
It makes absolute sense if you understand that we are always moving in the direction of greater satisfaction from the moment we get up in the morning to the time we go to bed. You are confused DBT. You are in a defensive position trying to protect determinism. We don't have free will, and the author demonstrated why, yet you don't trust him. It's a misconception on your part.
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In reality, we are carried along on the wings of time or life during every moment of our existence and have no say in this matter whatsoever. We cannot stop ourselves from being born and are compelled to either live out our lives the best we can or commit suicide. Is it possible to disagree with this? However, to prove that what we do of our own free will, of our own desire because we want to do it, is also beyond control, it is necessary to employ mathematical (undeniable) reasoning. Therefore, since it is absolutely impossible for man to be both dead and alive at the same time, and since it is absolutely impossible for a person to desire committing suicide unless dissatisfied with life (regardless of the reason), we are given the ability to demonstrate a revealing and undeniable relation.
Every motion, from the beating heart to the slightest reflex action, from all inner to outer movements of the body, indicates that life is never satisfied or content to remain in one position for always, like an inanimate object, which position shall be termed ‘death.’ I shall now call the present moment of time or life
here, for the purpose of clarification, and the next moment coming up
there. You are now standing on this present moment of time and space called
here, and you are given two alternatives: either live or kill yourself; either move to the next spot called
there or remain where you are without moving a hair’s breadth by committing suicide.
“I prefer. . .”
Excuse the interruption, but the very fact that you started to answer me or didn’t commit suicide at that moment makes it obvious that you were not satisfied to stay in one position, which is death or
here, and prefer moving off that spot to
there, which motion is life. Consequently, the motion of life, which is any motion from
here to
there, is a movement away from that which dissatisfies; otherwise, had you been satisfied to remain
here or where you are, you would never have moved to
there. Since the motion of life constantly moves away from
here to
there, which is an expression of dissatisfaction with the present position, it must obviously move constantly in the direction of greater satisfaction. It should be obvious that our desire to live, to move off the spot called
here, is determined by a law over which we have no control, because even if we should kill ourselves, we are choosing what gives us greater satisfaction; otherwise, we would not kill ourselves. The truth of the matter is that at any particular moment, the motion of man is not free, for all life obeys this invariable law. He is constantly compelled by his nature to make choices and decisions and to prefer, of whatever options are available during his lifetime, that which he considers better for himself and his set of circumstances. For example, when he found that a discovery like the electric bulb was for his benefit in comparison to candlelight, he was compelled to prefer it, for his motion, just being alive, has always been in the direction of greater satisfaction, which is the direction life is compelled to take. Consequently, during every moment of man’s progress, he always did what he had to do because he had no choice. Although this demonstration proves that man’s will is not free, your mind may not be accustomed to grasping these type relations, so I will elaborate.
Suppose you wanted very much of two alternatives, A, which we shall designate as something considered evil by society, instead of B, the humdrum of your regular routine. Could you possibly pick B at that particular moment of time if A is preferred as a better alternative when nothing could dissuade you from your decision, not even the threat of the law? What if the clergy, given two alternatives, choose A, which shall now represent something considered good, instead of B, that which is judged evil; would it be possible for them to prefer the latter when the former is available as an alternative? If it is utterly impossible to choose B in this comparison, are they not compelled, by their very nature, to prefer A? And how can they be free when the favorable difference between A and B is the compulsion of their choice and the motion of life in the direction of greater satisfaction? To be free, according to the definition of free will, man would be able to prefer one of two alternatives, either the one he wants or the one he doesn’t want, which is an absolute impossibility because selecting what he doesn’t want when what he does want is available as an alternative is a motion in the direction of dissatisfaction. In other words, if man were free, he could actually prefer of several alternatives the one that gives him the least satisfaction, which would reverse the direction of his life and make him prefer the impossible.
